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1.  Non-linked  QUEST  simulation:  increase  in  government  investment  56 
by  11  of  baseline  GOP,  standard  monetary  policy;  quarterly 
multipliers  for  real  GOP,  GOP  deflator,  total  employment  and 
short-term  interest  rates 1.  BACKGROUND 
This  paper  gives  an  overview  of  a  •odelling  project  in  the  Directorate-
General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (DG  II)  at  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Com•unities.  The  project  aiMs  at  the  construction  of  linked 
quarterly  macroeconomic  models  for  the  Community  countries  and  their  main 
trading  partners.  The  new  model  is  called  QUEST  (.Qy,arterly  .[uropean  1imu-
1ation Iool)  and  may  be  considered  as  1)  a  substitute fbr  the  COMET  model, 
as  2)  a  disaggregation  of  the  COMPACT  model,  going  from  an  aggregate  Euro-
pean  model  to  individual  EC  country  models,  and  3)  in  common  with  EUROLINK 
being  quarterly  and  based  on  national  data  sources. 
The  need  for  such  a  project  has  also  been  emphasized  by  an  outside  consul-
tant,  Mr.  c.  Wymer,  in  his  Report  on  the  Use  of  Macroeconomic  Models  in  DG 
II  (1982).  In  this  report,  after a  review  of  the  then  existing  models  in  DG 
II  (COMET  and  EUROLINK)  and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages,  Mr.  Wymer 
presented,  amongst  others,  the  following  proposals  for  the  development  of  a 
new  system  of  linked  macroeconomic  models  in  DG  II: 
- the  model  should  be  developed  specifically for  the  purposes  of  DG  II; 
- the  model  should  be  developed  to  fulfill  the  forecasting,  policy  analysis 
and  pedagogical  requirements  of  DG  II:  it should  be  small  enough  to  pro-
vide  a  framework  for  thought  and  discussion  within  DG  II  and  serve  its 
pedagogical  and  research  purpose,  whilst  being  suitable  for  medium-term 
projections  and  sufficiently  disaggregated  in  time  to  be  used  for  short-
term  forecasts; 
-the model  should  be  developed  within  DG  II  (pedagogical  purpose,  inter-
action  modelbuilders-users); 
- there  could  be  an  exchange  of  ideas  with  universities  and  other  organi-
sations;  a  prototype  model  for  only  a  few  EC  countries  and  the  United 
States  could  already  be  used  to  test the  major  feedbacks  in  the  system; 
-the model  should  be  relatively  small  in  the first  instance,  paying  parti-
cular  attention  to  the  interactions  among  the  EC  countries  and  between 
the  Community  and  the  rest of  the  world  (United  States  and  Japan,  several 
zones  for  the  rest of  the  world). 
The  QUEST  project  has  been  designed  on  this basis,  taking  into  account  past 
modelling  experience.  The  previously  existing  models,  COMET  and  EUROLINK, 
which  were  constructed  outside,  used  to  be  operated  by  the  Commission's 
services  without  major  modifications.  COMET  was  more  specifically  used  for 
medium  term  projections  and  policy evaluation.  Continued  use  of  COMET  would 
have  required  updates,  reestimations  and  extensive  revisions  (such  as  the 
production  and  financial  blocks).  EUROLINK,  although  oversized  and  only 
covering  four  Member  countries,  was  an  attempt  to  set  up  models  more  adap-
ted  to  the  requirements  and  the  tools  of  the  country  experts  of  DG  II  in 
the  framework  of  the  forecasting  rounds.  In  the  meantime,  a  new  annual -2-
model  was  constructed  by  A.  Dramais  {1986),  in  which  the  Co••unity  is  trea-
ted  as  an  aggregate,  linked  to  compacted  •odels  for  the  US  and  Japan,  and  a 
rest  of  the  world  zone.  This  Model  is  called  COMPACT,  and  is  used  to 
provide  medium-ter•  projections  and  policy  analysis  for  the  Community 
{EUR12)  as  a  whole.  It was  requested  both  by  •odel-users within  the  Co••is-
sion  services  and  by  member  countries  that this  •odel  be  disaggregated  both 
geographically  and  in  time  in  order  to  meet  the  specific  purposes  of  DG  II 
in  terms  of  detail  for  forecasting  and  •edi u•-ter•  ana  1 ys is.  So•e  of  its 
essential  characteristics  can,  however,  not  easily  be  •aintained  at  this 
level  of  aggregation. 
The  following  sections  describe  how  the  objectives  defined  by  Mr.  Wy•er  can 
concretely  be  achieved  and  report  on  the  work  in  progress.  In  section  2,  an 
overview  of  the  project,  its  architecture  and  purposes,  are  presented.  A 
more  detailed presentation of  the  equations  is  given  in  section  3,  with  the 
estimation  results  obtained.  Following  Mr.  Wymer•s  proposal  of  testing  the 
system  on  a  sub-group  of  countries,  the  empirical  investigation  focused  up 
to  now  .on  those  countries  for  which  a  complete  set  of  sufficiently  long 
time  series  of  quarterly  national  accounts  is  available,  namely  Germany, 
France,  the  UK  and  the  US.  Section  4  illustrates  the  simulation  properties 
of  the  four  country  modules  in  linked  and  unlinked  mode  for  a  set  of 
standard  simulation  exercises.  In  section  5,  finally,  some  conclusions  are 
drawn  and  subjects  for  further  research  are  set out. 
Two  separate  volumes  {which  can  be  obtained  from  the  authors  upon  request) 
contain  full  listings  of  the  national  modules  and  the  trade  linkage  as  well 
as  detailed  simulation  results. -3-
2.  OVERVIEW 
2.1.  General  philosophY 
The  development  of  the  QUEST  model  aims  at  contributing  to  economic  analy-
sis  inside  DG  II.  It  would  be  unrealistic  to  envisage  setting  up  a  tool 
able  to  answer  all  the  questions  raised  by  the  implementation  of  Community 
policies.  These  are  anyway  often  microeconomic  or  sectoral.  The  intention 
is  more  specifically to  build  a  consistent  framework  providing  a  quick  eva-
luation  of  the  main  aggregates  of  the  European  economies.  As  recommended  by 
Mr.  Wymer,  three  main  working  areas  of  DG  II ·should  be  concerned:  medium 
term  projections,  policy  analysis,  short  term  forecasts  (particularly  in 
view  of  evaluating  quickly  alternative  scenarios  around  the  central  projec-
tion  elaborated  by  the  country  experts  of  DG  II). 
These  objectives  have  clear  implications  for  the  priorities  to  be  given  to 
the  modelling  work: 
- the  model  must  cover  all  the  Member  States  and  incorporate  their  inter-
dependencies  in  a  way  allowing  evaluations  of  the  repercussions  at  the 
Community  level  of  national  policies; 
- the  model  should  endogenise  the  main  determinants  of  the  extra-Community 
environment,  taking  into  account  the  interactions  of  world  trade  flows; 
moreover  the  model  should  rapidly  provide  answers  to  questions  on  the 
impact  of  changes  in  the  world  economy.  This  implies,  in  particular,  a 
fairly  detailed  description  of  the  US  and  Japanese  economies; 
-to remain  manageable,  the  model  must  be  small:  no  sectoral  disaggregation 
is  envisaged.  This  should  be  compatible  with  the  need  for  a  flexible  sys-
tem.  Flexibility  means  partly  adaptation  to  different  policy  regimes, 
implying  a  fairly  great  disaggregation  of  policy  instruments  and  the  pos-
sibility  of  running  the  model  under  different  policy  constraints  (exter-
nal  or  budgetary  constraints,  exchange  rate  or  monetary  targets).  It  is 
not  excluded  that  for  some  specific  issues,  which  are  not  covered  by  the 
basic  structure,  the  model  may  be  extended  with  satellite  modules  to 
integrate  new  international  linkages  or  specific  national  features. 
-as  the  model  will  be  used  for  policy  evaluation,  its  specification  and 
simulation  properties  should  be  consistent  with  current  mainstream 
thinking. 
The  feasibility  of  achieving  these  aims  is  considered  below. 
2.2.  Model  architecture 
2.2.1.  Geographical  coverage 
The  QUEST  model  is  a  multinational  model,  i.e.  consisting  of  national 
models  which  are  linked.  The  major  linkage  mechanisms  which  could  be  envi-
saged  are  trade  and  capital  flows  and  exchange  rates.  In  a  first  instance, 
only  trade  linkages  are  modelled  exhaustively.  Although  the  country  models 
contain  the  balance  of  payments  in  consolidated  form,  bilateral  capital 
flows  will  not  be  introduced.  This  does  not  exclude  the  transmission  of 
international  monetary  effects,  such  as  mutually  dependent  interest  rates 
or  inflationary  dynamics  through  price  linkages. -4-
The  Model  consists  of  individual  11odels  for  the  12  EC  Member  States,  US  and 
Japan,  and  integration  of  six  other  OECD  countries  and  five  zones  to  cover 
world  trade  (for  a  more  detailed  overview  of  the  geographical  disaggrega-
tion  see  Appendix  1).  Introduction  of  the  country  Models  will  proceed  as 
follows: 
- Group  1:  Germany,  France,  United  Kingdom,  United  States; 
- Group  2:  Italy,  Spain,  Belgium/Luxembourg,  Netherlands; 
-Group  3:  Ireland,  Greece,  Denmark,  Portugal,  Japan. 
For  the  other  six  OECD  countries,  there  are  no  elaborate  Models  in  pri n-
cipl~.  Like  the  zones  covering  the  rest of  the  world,  these  are  represented 
by  trade-feedback  mechanisms,  in  which  iMports  are  linked  to  export 
receipts  and  relative prices  through  a  partially  reduced  form,  and  in  which 
the  export  price  is  linked  to  import  prices  and  the  world  oil  price. 
The  model  contains  25  countries  or  zones  (see  Appendix  1)  corresponding  to 
the  classification  which  is  used  for  the  DG  II  consistency  and  forecasting 
exercise  and  according  to  the  geographical  breakdown  of  the  trade  matrices 
which  are  used  to  calculate  competitiveness  indicators. 
2.2.2.  Periodicity 
The  main  purposes  of  the  QUEST  model,  apart  from  its  pedagogical  function, 
reside  in  forecasting  and  economic  policy  analysis.  Forecasting  rounds  in 
DG  II  pro  vi de  forecasts  with  semi-annua  1  peri odi city,  whereas  medi u11-ter11 
forecasts  for  five  years  are  a 1 so  required.  A  quarterly  model  is  fit  for 
both  purposes,  as  long  as  it contains  satisfactory  medium-term  properties. 
The  fact  that  a  model  is  quarterly  should  not  be  confused  with  the  fore-
casting  range:  whether  a  model  is  suited  for  short  term,  medium  term  or 
even  long  term  forecasting  depends  essentially  on  its  economic  properties, 
not  on  its periodicity. 
An  advantage  of  a  quarterly  model  over  an  annua 1  11odel  is  that,  over  the 
same  time  period,  one  has  in  principle  four  times  as  many  observations  for 
estimating  equations,  which  does  not,  however,  imply  four  times  as  11uch 
information.  Since  the  post  1973  world  is  often  regarded  as  being  structu-
rally different  from  the  one  before  1973,  quarterly data  present  the  advan-
tage  of  permitting  the  estimation  of  economic  relationships  for  the  single 
period  after  1973  with  a  reasonable  number  of  degrees  of  freedom,  which 
would  hardly  be  possible  with  annual  data. 
For  the  countries  of  Group  1  (see  I  2.2.1.),  which  are  being  modelled  at 
this  stage  of  the  project,  a  full  system  of  quarterly  national  accounts 
exists;  this  is  however  not  the  case  for  most  countries  of  Groups  2  and  3. 
Whereas  a  clear  preference  exists  for  official  national  data  sources, 
exploiting  other  sources  cannot  however  be  excluded  to  obtain  quarterly 
series  for  those  countries.  In  the worst  possible  case,  where  no  quarterly 
data  are  available at all,  these  either will  have  to  be  constructed  through 
interpolation of  annual  series  or  annual  modules  will  have  to  be  integrated 
into  the  QUEST  model. -5-
2.2.3.  Scale  and  specification 
The  country  11odules  of  the  QUEST  11odel  are  •acroeconomically  oriented  with 
siMilar structures  among  countries.  The  size of  each  country  module  is  com-
parable  to  that of  the  aggregate  EC  model  in  COMPACT,  i.e.  120  to  140  equa-
tions,  of  which  some  25  are  behavioural.  The  trade  linkage  module  comprises 
605  stochastic  equations  for  bilateral  trade  which  follow  a  similar  speci-
fication.  The  whole  QUEST  model  will  therefore  eventually  consist  of  a  few 
thousand  equations.  To  maintain  intellectual  command  over  such  a  large  and 
complex  syste11,  the  similarity  of  specifications  of  the  national  country 
modules  is  a  necessary  condition.  Similarity  does  not- imply,  however,  that 
the  size of  the  reactions  of  economic  agents  in  the  different  models  is  the 
sa11e.  Because  the  coefficients  of  the  model  are  not  the  same  among  coun-
tries,  each  model  is  specific  enough  to  cover  a  country•s  own  peculiari-
ties.  At  the  same  time,  the  similar  specification of  equations  across  coun-
tries  allows  one  to  make  interesting  inter-country  comparisons  of  the  esti-
mation  results  and  simulation  properties. 
2.3.  Scope  for  policy  evaluation 
The  QUEST  model  will  be  used  to  reproduce  short-term  forecasts  in  line with 
the  DG  II  Economic  Forecasts  from  the  forecasting  round.  These  short-term 
forecasts  (up  to  six  or  eight  quarters)  will  then  be  used  as  a  point  of 
departure  for  medium-term  forecasts  (up  to  20  quarters).  Once  a  baseline 
forecast  is  established,  policy  scenarios  of  different  kinds  and  the  sensi-
tivity to  changes  in  the  international  environment  may  be  analysed. 
Policy  scenarios  may  be  executed  through  changes  in  the  exogenous  policy 
variables  or  through  the  adjustment  factors  in  behavioural  equations.  The 
exogenous  policy  variables  comprise  the  following: 
Government  spending: 
-public consumption  and  employment; 
-public fixed  capital  formation; 
- subsidies. 
Policy  instruments  can  be  fixed  in  real  or  in  nominal  terms.  In  the 
first  case,  the  direct  impact  on  the  real  variables  of  the  economy  is 
assessed,  whereas  the  nominal  effects  are  the  result  of  an  autonomous 
real  effect and  an  induced  price effect. 
The  use  of  the  instruments  in  nominal  terms  allows  for  the  direct 
assessment  of  the  impact  on  the  government  budget,  which  is  determined 
in  no11inal  terms.  The  real  trajectory  will  then  also  depend  on  the 
induced  inflationary effects. 
Government  receipts: 
- average  employers•  social  contribution  rate; 
- average  employees•  social  contribution  rate; 
- income  taxes  (lump  sum); 
- average  corporate  tax  rate; 
- indirect  tax  rate  (VAT  rates  and  others). -6-
The  model  endogenises  money  demand  and  interest  rates.  It is  however  possi-
ble  to  simulate  the  model  in  a  mode  in  which  short  term  interest  rates  are 
used  as  an  instrument  to  target  the  money  supply  (see  I  4.4.1). 
In  a  multinational  model,  the  external  constraints  are  to  a  large  extent 
endogenised.  The  inclusion  of  complete  US  and  Japanese  models  in  particular 
offers  a  wide  range  of  possible  simulations  of  international  adjustMent. 
Furthermore,  the  simulation  of  shocks  in  the  international  environment  is 
of  primary  importance  in  the  context  in  which  the  model  will  be  used. 
Variables  representing  such  international  shocks  comprise: 
- exchange  rates  (ECU  and  US-dollar  rates); 
- foreign  interest  rates; 
-oil  prices; 
- world  demand  (imports  of  various  non-EC  zones); 
- world  prices  (export  prices  of  various  non-EC  zones). 
2.4.  Data  characteristics* 
a)  Basic  principles 
In  the  light  of  the  basic  features  of  the  QUEST  model,  as  they  have  been 
described  in  the  previous  paragraphs,  two  fundamental  characterictics 
emerge  covering  the  data  base: 
- the  model  structure  for  each  country  and  therefore  the  corresponding  set 
of  statistical  data  should  be  coherent  and  internally consistent; 
-variables  and  results  for  different  countries  should  refer  to  the  same 
concept  and  therefore  be  directly  comparable.  Such  compatibility  is  also 
indispensible  with  a  view  to  calculating  EC  aggregates.  A  detailed, 
harmonised  system  of  European  quarterly  accounts  would  do  the  job  ideal-
ly;  such  a  system  is  however  not  available.  Therefore,  data  coming  from 
national  statistical  sources  are  the  second  best  solution.  The  use  of 
these  data  necessitates  finding  an  acceptable  compromise  between  the  need 
for  consistency  and  for  comparability.  It was  therefore  decided  to  intro-
duce  some  adjustments  in  order  to  harmonise  to  a  certain  extent  the  dif-
ferent  country  modules  of  the  model,  but  at  the  same  time  to  retain offi-
cial  statistics  as  much  as  possible.  In  each  individual  case,  the  choice 
has  been  made  on  economic  relevance  grounds  and  by  evaluating  the  effects 
on  the  future  model  behaviour  in  simulation  mode.  As  a  general  rule,  the 
limited  harmonisation  that  has  been  retained  for  the  QUEST  data  base  was 
designed  to  be  consistent  with  the  European  System  of  Integrated  Accounts 
(ESA),  following  DG  II  statistics for  short-term  forecasts. 
*See Appendix  2  for  the  list of  variables  used  in  the  model -7-
More  specifically,  the  following  rules  for  harMonisation  and  adjustment 
have  been  applied: 
1.  The  three  major  equilibria within  each  system  of  national  accounts  have 
to  be  respected.  This  concerns 
-the  equilibrium  between  the  income  and  the  expenditure  side  of  the 
national  accounts; 
- the  modelling  of  profit  income  by  different  economic  agents  through 
an  appropriate  distribution  of  the  gross  operating  surplus  of  the 
economy  (GOS); 
- the  direct  connection  between  the  different  policy  instruments  and 
the  corresponding  general  government  income  flows  which  are  affected. 
2.  Only  a  limited  number  of  variables  of  central  importance  are  treated  in 
an  explicit  and  harmonised  way.  Other  variables  are  dealt  with  impli-
citly  in  the  form  of  adjustment  factors  (e.g.  capital  transfers). 
3.  Harmonisation  has  only  been  attempted  where  this  does  not  endanger  the 
consistency  of  the  whole  system.  For  example,  while  some  countries  base 
their  national  acounts  on  the  concept  of  gross  national  product  (GNP), 
others  use  gross  domestic  product  (GOP)  instead.  No  attempt  was  made  to 
transform  a  country•s  national  accounts  from  one  system  to  the  other. 
4.  Harmonisation  was  only  carried  out  in  cases  where  the  necessary  statis-
tical  information  for  the  transformation  is  published  in  official  docu-
ments  by  national  statistical  sources. 
b)  Seasonal  adjustment 
The  fact  that  for  some  countries  (e.g.  France  and  the  United  States)  natio-
nal  accounts  data  are  only  available  in  seasonally  adjusted  form  necessi-
tated  the  use  of  seasonally  adjusted  data  for  all  countries.  even  if  this 
might  imply  certain  econometric  disadvantages. 
Unadjusted  data  have  been  adjusted  by  the  DAINTIES  method  of  the  Stati s-
tical  Office  of  the  EC. 
c)  Interpolation 
As  some  of  the  series  needed  for  the  model  do  not  exist  in  quarterly  form. 
quarterly  data  had  to  be  obtained  by  interpolating  yearly  series.  In  prin-
ciple,  two  different  sets  of  methods  are  available  for  this  task  - purely 
mathematical  methods  and  methods  using  related  series.  Extensive  empirical 
comparisons  between  the  different  available  methods  have  shown.  related 
series  methods  do  not  necessarily  perform  better.  while  involving  a  consi-
derable  amount  of  additional  work.  Where  necessary.  yearly  series  have 
therefore  been  interpolated  by  a  purely  mathematical  method  (a  numerical 
analysis  of  polynomial  approximation). -8-
Box  1:  Data  sources 
The  quarterly  national  accounts  data  have  been  taken  fro•  the  following 
national  sources: 
France 
Germany 
Institut National  de  la Statistique et  des  Etudes 
Economiques  (INSEE),  Paris 
Systeme  elargi  de  comptabilite  nationale 
Deutsches  Institut fUr  Wirtschaftsforschung  (DIW),  Berlin 
Vierteljihrliche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesa•trechnung 
United  Kingdom  Central  Statistical  Office  (CSO),  London 
National  Income  and  Expenditure 
United  States  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (BEA),  Washington 
National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA) 
The  full  set of  data  is  available  for  the  following  periods,  respectively: 
France  1963,  1st quarter  to  1985,  2nd  quarter  (old  base  year  1970) 
Germany  1960,  1st quarter  to  1984,  4th  quarter 
UK  1966,  1st quarter  to  1984,  4th  quarter  (old  base  year  1980) 
us  1970,  1st quarter  to  1985,  2nd  quarter  (old base  year  1972) 
Labour  market  data 
Employment  data  have  been  chosen  to  be  consistent with  national  accounts. 
The  unemployment  measure  corresponds  to  the  number  of  registered 
unemployed,  retaining  EUROSTAT  classifications.  The  block  had  to  be 
completed  with  demographic  series. 
The  quarterly  balance  of  payments  data  have  been  taken  from  the  following 
national  sources: 
France 
Germany 
UK 
us 
Banque  de  France  (BdF),  Paris,  La  balance  des  paiements  de  la 
France,  Rapports  annuals 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  (DBB),  Statistische Beihefte  zu  den 
Monatsberichten  der  Deutschen  Bundesbank,  Reihe  3, 
Zahlungsbilanzstatistik 
Central  Statistical  Office  (CSO),  London.  Financial  Statistics 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  Washington,  Survey  of  Current 
Business  (SCB) -9-
Box  1:  Data  sources  (cont.) 
The  data  for  the  monetary  sector  have  been  taken  fro•  the  following 
national  and  international  sources: 
France 
Ger11any 
UK 
us 
Banque  de  France  (BdF),  Bulletin tri•estriel 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  (DBB),  Monatsberichte  and  Statistische 
Bei hefte  zu  den  Monatsberi chten  der  Deutschen  Bundesbank,  Rei he 
2,  Wertpapierstatistik 
Central  Statistical  Office  (CSO),  London.  Financial  Statistics 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  Washington,  Survey  of  Current 
Business  (SCB) 
Committee  of  Governors  of  Central  Banks  of  the  Member  States  of  the  EEC, 
Monthly  Statistical  Series 
OECD,  Financial  Statistics part  2,  Monthly  Financial  Statistics. 
The  data  for  the  trade  linkage  module  have  been  obtained  from  the  Direction 
of  Trade  Data  of  the  IMF,  supplemented  with  i nformat  1  on  from  the  United 
Nations  Yearbook  of  International  Trade  Statistics.  Quarterly  total  trade 
data  for  the  25  countries/zones  from  appendix  1  cover  the  period  1960-1984, 
while  the bilateral  trade  flow  data  only  start in  1965,  and  end  in  1984. -10-
3.  MODEL  SPECIFICATION  AND  ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
3.1.  Guidelines 
In  the  construction  of  a  multinational  model,  the  requirements  on  the  size 
of  the  model  and  the  data  are  the  major  limiting  factors  concerning  the 
incorporation  of  different  theoretical  approaches  in  the  model  and  their 
empirical  testing.  In  particular,  the  double  requirements  of  availability 
and  comparability  of  the  data  constrains  the  number  of  variables  that  may 
be  part of  the  data  set,  and  consequently  the  number  of  testable specifica-
tions.  The  modelling  work  should  then  a1m  at  exploiting  the  wide  range  of 
interactions,  in  particular  those  offered  by  the  Multinational  dimension  of 
the  model.  While  thus  maintaining  the  objective  of  manageability,  this 
strategy  is  still  compatible  with  the  aim  of  obtaining  rich  simulation 
properties.  Before  presenting  the  equations  in  more  detail,  the  achievement 
of  these  objectives  is  further  discussed  below. 
At  least  in  some  cases,  the  quality  of  the  data  rules  out  a  high  degree  of 
econometric  sophistication.  For  example,  the  treatment  of  the  data  (harmo-
nisation,  interpolation,  seasonal  adjustment)  may  impede  a  rigorous  inves-
tigation  of  short  term  dynamic  properties  or  a  sophistication  1n  the  speci-
fication  of  expectations.  This  does  not  exclude  a  careful  examination  of 
long  run  properties  of  the  equations  and  even  makes  robustness  tests  more 
necessary  (such  as  parameter  stability tests). 
Other  severe  limitations  that  can  be  ascribed  to  the  data  relate  to  the 
treatment  of  the  supply  side.  The  model  cannot  pretend  to  combine,  in  a 
theoretically  consistent  manner,  aspects  such  as  the  treatment  of  uncer-
tainty,  imperfect  competition,  disequilibrium  on  the  goods  market.  In  the 
context  of  these  theoretical  developments,  potential  output  and  its  link 
with  investment  and  employment,  together  with  profitability,  are  considered 
as  highly  relevant  determinants  of  the  supply  side.  But  their  incorporation 
had  to  cope  with  unsatisfactory  measurement  of  variables.  For  robust  esti-
mation,  it was  decided  to  incl~de  such  effects  within  a  simplified  produc-
tion  block,  based  on  a  production  function  with  two  factors  of  production. 
Clearly  the  problems  concerning  the  data  and  the  objectives  of  small  scale 
similar  country  models  play  a  major  role  in  the  design  of  financial  feed-
backs  which  are  considered  an  important  issue  in  recent  modelling  develop-
ments.  The  QUEST  model  must  compensate  for  the  di ffi cul ty  of  modelling 
international  capital  flows  or  the  non-application  of  a  stock-flow  approach 
or  a  portfolio  approach  in  the  national  models.  In  this  respect,  the  lin-
kages  through  endogenous  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  in  a  multi-
national  system  go  some  way  towards  integrating  recent  theoretical  aspects 
of  monetary  and  financial  analysis. 
Although  sometimes  neglected  by  economic  theory,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
expectations  are  of  major  importance  in  economics.  One  could  even  go  so  far 
as  to  say  that  most  behaviour  is,  implicitly or  explicitly,  based  on  expec-
tations.  The  treatment  of  expectations  in  an  econometric  model  is.  there-
fore,  of  interest. I) 
- 11-
Theory  and  empirical  analysis  of  expectations  has  been  heavily  influenced 
by  Muth•s  article  on  rational  expectations  and  its  discovery  in  the  recent 
years.  Rational  expectations  are  by  now  an  integral  component  of  many 
theoretical  models. 
However,  in  the  QUEST  model  expectations  are  not  rational  in  the  sense  of 
Muth.  Both  theoretical  and  practical  reasons  can  be  given  for  this  fact. 
Firstly,  although  theoretically  appealing,  rational  expectations  rely  on 
informational  assumptions  that  can  hardly  be  called  realistic.  Not  surpri-
sing  1  y,  therefore,  the  ration  a 1  expectations  hypothesis  has  been  rej ectad 
in  most  empirical  studies.  Secondly,  the  implementation  of  rational  expec-
tations  in  econometric  models  is  normally  extremely  burdensome  computa-
tionally  • 
For  these  reasons,  in  the first  version  of  the  QUEST  model  expectations  are 
of  the  more  traditional  type  (i.e.  extrapolative/regressive  or  adaptive). 
implemented  by  using  distributed  lag  structures.  Future  work  might  then 
concentrate  on  introducing  selectively  a  forward-looking  aspect  as  well  as 
on  extending  economic  agents•  information  set.  The  explicit  modelling  of 
expectations  in  this  semi-rational  way  will,  however,  have  to  use  either 
survey  results  (with  the  need  to  introduce  an  equation  to  explain  these 
data),  or  to  rely  on  a  priori  choices  of  determinants  and  use  joint  tests 
of  the  respective  equation  and  the  assumed  expectations  formation  process. 
Given  these  compromises  on  possible  specifications,  empirical  investigation 
has  been  pursued  following  two  principles: 
- a  focus  on  medium-term  properties:  as  embodied  in  the  estimation  of  key 
parameters,  such  as  the  propensities  to  consume  or  to  import,  the  accele-
rator  effect,  the  Phillips  curve,  the  productivity-wage-price  nexus,  com-
petitiveness  constraints  in  prices  and  external  trade,  output-employment 
elasticity,  interest  rate  feedbacks,  etc ....  The  acceptability  criteria 
are  a  compromise  between  theoretical  requirements  (homogeneity  with  res-
pect  to  prices,  for  example),  compatibility  with  other  estimations  (nota-
bly  with  existing  national  models)  and  statistical  robustness  over  the 
sample  period; 
-with  a  view  to  obtaining  an  appropriate  evaluation  of  the  multipliers, 
the  advantages  of  a  sample  period  including  the  first  half  of  the  ao•s 
have  been  exploited  to  investigate  recent  theoretical  developments  1n  the 
explanation  of  behavioural  trends  (saving  behaviour  in  the  labour  market 
context,  profitability  effect  on  investment,  wage  bargaining  models, 
exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  adjustments). - 12-
3.2.  Real  demand  1 
The  real  demand  block  of  the  model  determines  gross  national  product  or, 
depending  on  the  country,  gross  domestic  product  at constant prices  and  its 
major  components  endogenously.  Real  GOP/GNP  {YQ)  1s  determined  as  the  sum 
of: 
- private  consumption  {CPQ) 
- general  government  consumption  {CGQ) 
- total  fixed  investment  (ITQ) 
- total  inventory  investment  (IITQ) 
- total  exports  (XTQ) 
- minus  total  imports  (MTQ) 
Total  imports  (MTQ)  are  the  sum  of  non-energy  imports  of  goods,  energy  1m-
ports  of  goods  and  imports  of  services.  Exports  (XTQ)  are  only  d1saggrega-
ted  into  goods  and  services.  All  these  flows  are  treated  1n  the  section  on 
international  trade  (3.8). 
3.2.1  Consumption 
The  specification  of  the  household  consumption  function  (see  Table  1)  fol-
lows  a  traditional  approach.  Per  capita  real  consumption  (durables  plus 
non-durables)  is  a  function  of  per  capita  real  income.  the  inflation  rate. 
the  real  long-term  interest  rate  and  the  unemployment  rate.  The  inflation 
rate  enters  the  equation  with  a  negative  coefficient:  this  serves  as  a 
proxy  for  the  real  wealth  effect.  Also  the  real  long  term  interest  rate 
coefficient  1s  negative,  which  1s  the  result  of  two  effects:  (1)  higher 
interest  rates  have  a  positive  influence  on  savings.  and  (11)  higher 
interest  rates  affect  purchases  of  durables  to  the  extent  that  consumption 
credit  becomes  more  expensive.  The  negative  influence  of  the  unemployment 
rate  can  be  explained  by  the  increased  uncertainty  when  unemployment  rises, 
wh1 ch  1  eads  to  1 ncreased  precautionary  saving.  The  est  1  mat 1  ons  y1 el ded  a 
wrong-signed  (but  insignificant)  inflation coefficient for  the  French  equa-
tion.  As  a  consequence,  the  inflation  term  was  dropped  1n  this  case.  This 
creates  however  some  problems  1n  simulation;  1n  a  later  version  of  the 
model  the  1 nfl at  ion  term  will  therefore  have  to  be  reintroduced  1  nto  the 
French  equation.  As  an  alternative  for  the  partial  adjustment  mechanism 
which  relates  actual  to  desired  consumption,  an  error-correction  model  was 
tested,  but  the  latter  could  not  be  distinguished  significantly  from  the 
former  1n  all  cases.  Finally it should  be  noted  that  no  wealth  variable was 
directly  introduced  in  the  equation  at  this  stage  of  the  project  due  to 
data  constraints. 
Government  consumption  1s  exogenous  either  in  real  or  in  nominal  terms, 
depending  on  the  simulation  mode  (see  section  4.1). 
1  Appendix  3  provides  a  list of  the  equations -13-
3.2.2  Investment 
Gross  fixed  capita  1  formation  in  the  QUEST  model  is  treated  in  a  fairly 
detailed manner.  The  choice  has  been  made  mainly  for  the  following  reasons: 
Firstly,  from  a  behavioural  and  simulation  point  of  view,  the  distinction 
between  private  and  public  investment  is  quite  important.  In  the  QUEST 
model,  public  investment  is  defined  as  genera  1  government  investment  and 
treated  as  an  exogenous  policy  instrument.  Private  investment,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  endogenous  and  modelled  by  behavioural  equations. 
Secondly,  it  seemed  to  be  desirable  to  distinguish  between  investment  in 
equipment  and  construction  investment.  This  distinction  is  not  only  made  in 
the  Commission's  short-term  economic  forecasts,  it  is  also  justified  for 
behavioural  and  modelling  reasons.  Investment  in  equipment  can  much  easier 
be  aggregated  to  a  stock  of  equipment,  which  in  turn  should  be  more  appro-
priate  to  approximate  productive  capacity  than  the  total  capital  stock.  In 
addition,  equipment  has  a  much  shorter  life  span  than  structures. 
Thirdly,  it  seemed  to  be  desirable  to  distinguish  between  private  invest-
ment  in  structures  and  investment  in  private  dwellings.  This  decision  is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  companies•  investment  decisions  are  guided  by 
d i f fer  en t  c r i t e r i a  than  h  o  u  s e h  o 1  d  s •  i n  vestment  dec i s-i on s .  F  o r  the  rea so n  s 
outlined,  the  following  classification  has  been  retained.  Total  gross  fixed 
capital  formation  at  constant  prices  (ITQ)  is  split  into  private  (IPQ)  and 
general  government  (IGQ)  fixed  investment.  Private  fixed  investment  for  its 
part  is  the  sum  of  private  investment  in  equipment  (IEPQ,  discussed  in  the 
section  describing  the  supply  block),  private  investment  in  non-residential 
construction  (•  structures,  ISPQ)  and  private  residential  construction 
(IHPQ).  Government  fixed  investment  1s  composed  of  investment  in_  equipment 
(IEGQ)  and  inves.tment  in  construct1on  (ICGQ).  It  is  exogenous  either  in 
nom1nal  or  in  real  terms  (see  sect1on  4.1). 
Admittedly,  such  a  detailed  classification  will  not  be  possible  for  all 
Member  countries.  Where  lack  of  data,  even  of  annual  periodicity,  does  not 
allow  such  detail,  a  higher  aggregation  level  will  have  to  be  retained. 
A 
11trad1tional"  way  of  modelling  housing  investment  decisions  adopts  a 
two-step  approach,  according  to  wh1ch  an  optimal  stock  of  dwellings  is 
determined  by  long-term  factors,  such  as  population  growth  and  wealth, 
whereas  current  housing  investment  is  a  function  of  this  optimal  stock  of 
dwellings  and  some  short-term  determinants,  such  as  interest  rates,  infla-
tion  rates,  the  level  of  unemployment,  etc. 
This  approach  is  however  not  followed  in  QUEST,  because  data  series  on 
stocks  of  dwellings  are  difficult  to  construct  and  not  always  very  relia-
ble.  Therefore,  1t  1s  preferred  to  specify  an  equation  in  which  both 
long-term  and  short-term  determinants  appear. 
Furthermore,  the  QUEST  data  series  on  res1dential  1nvestment  (IHPQ)  make  no 
distinction  between  residential  1nvestment  by  households  and  resident1al 
investment  by  enterprises. - 14-
Table  1:  Household  consumption 
log(CPQ/EX.POPT)  •  a+ b.log(CPQ(-1)/EX.POPT(-1))  + c.log(YDHQ/EX.POPT)  + d.PCP  + e.DEL1(LUR)  + f.(RL/400-PCP) 
Country/  estimated coefficients2 13  long-term  coefficients 
sa!!!Ele  a  b  c  d  e  f  c•  d'  e•  f'  y  SER  i2  ow 
DE  0,00  0,59  0,40  -1,12  -0,006  -0,90  0,98  -2,76  -0,01  -2,21  0,75  0,999  2,28 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,04)  (0,05)  (0,05)  (0,31)  (  0  J 004)  (  0  J 34) 
FR  -0,00  0,74  0,25  -0,01  0,96  -0,04  -0,25  0,76  0,999  2,04 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,04)  (0,005)  (0,11) 
UK  0,17  0,66  0,31  -0,34  -0,01  -0,02 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,10)  (0,07)  (0,06)  (0,12)  (0,004)  (0,16) 
us  -0,09  0,79  0,22  -0,47  -0,01 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,05)  (0,05)  (0,06)  (0,13)  (0,001) 
Notes:  1 DEL(X)  =  X - X_1 
2 Standard errors  in brackets  and  SER  in percentage  points 
3 Estimation  method:  OLS 
0,91  -0,99  -0,03  -0,05 
1,05  -2,22  -0,04 
FR:  OLS  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction for autocorrelation 
Table  2:  Residential  investment1 
.  .  . 
1,09  0,989  2,25 
0,62  0,997  2,02 
log(IHPQ)=a  + b.log(IHPQ(-1))  + c.log(EX.POPT)  + d(L).PIT  +  e(L).(RL/100-PY)  + f(L).YQ  + g(L).log(YDHQ-CPQ)  + h.LUR 
Country/  estimated coeffic1ents2  3 
sa!!!Qle  a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h  Jl  SER  i2  ow 
DE  -4,23  0,80  0,44  -0,27  -0,77  0,32  4,03  0,758  2,10 
1965.11-1984. IV  (4,19)  {0,07)  (0,39)  {0,18)  (0,40)  (0,19) 
FR4  -26,57  0,63  2,52  -0,18  -0,50  0,10  -0,03  2,02  0,987  2,53 
1965.11-1984. IV  (6,89)  (0,09)  {0,65)  {0,12)  {0,25)  {0,04)  (0,01) 
UK  -82,14  0,29  8,00  -0,99  -1,13  1,78  5,03  0,744  1,80 
1966.11-1984.IV  (14,58)  {0,10)  (1,39)  {0,21)  (0,27)  (0,39) 
us5  -9,43  0,40  0,89  -0,33  -0,26  1,71  0,86  4,88  0,935  1,76 
1965.11-1984. IV  (9 125}  (Ozll}  {0 176}  {0 136}  Pz09}  {0 150}  (0 106} 
Notes:  1 With  X  = X/X_4-1 
2 Standard errors  in brackets  and  SER  in percentage  points 
3 Estimation  method:  OLS  with  Almon  lags  (DE:  e with  8  lags,  degree  2,  constraint head 
FR:  d with  4 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
e with  4 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
g with  4 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
UK:  d with  6 1  ag s,  degree  2,  constraint tail 
e with  4 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
f  with  4 1  ag s,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
US:  e with  4 lags) 
4 With  real  long-term  interest rate defined as  (Rl/100-PCP) 
5 d{L}APiT  in  the  US  eguation -15-
Whereas  in  the  latter  case  construction  activities  may  be  considered  as  an 
investment,  depending  on  factors  like  expected  returns,  economic  growth, 
etc.,  this  is  much  less  the  case  for  the  households  sector,  where  residen-
tial  investment  presents  more  similarities  to  the  purchase  of  consumer 
durables,  thus  depending  on  factors  like  disposable  income,  inflation 
expectations,  wealth,  etc. 
In  the  preferred  specification  (see  Table  2),  the  variables  entering  the 
equation  are  population,  the  growth  of  the  investment  price  index  as  a 
proxy  for  construction  prices  (the first  difference  of  this  growth  rate  in 
the  US  equation),  the  real  long-term  interest  rate  and  the  growth  of  natio-
nal  income.  Only  in  the  French  case  did  the  latter  variable  have  to  be 
replaced  by  households'  savings  and  by  the  unemployment  rate  to  represent 
uncertainty  about  future  incomes. 
Private  investment  in  structures  (ISPQ)  is  treated  in  the  real  demand  block 
instead  of  the  supply  block  mainly  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  the  relation-
ship  between  buildings  and  production  capacity  is  theoretically  less 
stringent  than  the  one  between  equipment  and  capacity.  Secondly,  empirical 
investigations  have  shown  that  the  respective  QUEST  investment  series  are 
in  some  cases  quite  different  from  the  series  implicit  in  the  EUROSTAT 
capital  stock  data  referring  to  structures.  The  problem  arises  mainly  from 
the  fact  that  in  some  countries  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  precisely 
between  dwellings  and  other  buildings. 
In  view  of  the  observation  that  the  treatment  of  investment  in  structures 
varies  widely  between  different  econometric  models,  the  econometric  analy-
sis  for  the  QUEST  equation  focussed  especially  on  the  question  of  comple-
mentarity  between  equipment  and  structures.  However,·  the  empirical  estima-
tions  suffered  from  the  fact  that  the  historical  evolution  of  investment  in 
structures  has  been  very  different  in  the  four  countries  under  investiga-
tion,  both  in  absolute  levels  and  in  shares  of  GOP.  The  finally  retained 
specification  therefore  attempts  to  integrate  an  aspect  of  (technical)  com-
plementarity  by  introducing  private  investment  in  equipment  as  an  explana-
tory  variable  in  addition  to  other  variables  that  are  considered  to  be  of 
specific  importance  for  investment  in  structure.  Two  variables  are  assumed 
to  represent  these  factors,  real  interest  rates  and  liquidity,  approximated 
by  the  profit  share.  With  respect  to  the  estimation  results  (Table  3)  1t 
has  to  be  noted  that  the  equation  performs  rel at  i vel y  well  for  Germany. 
France  and  the  United  States.  For  the  UK,  however,  none  of  the  explanatory 
variables  turns  out  to  be  statistically  significant.  In  addition,  the 
liquidity  variable  had  to  be  dropped  for  this  country,  as  the  coefficient 
turned  out  to  have  the  "wrong"  sign.  The  simulation  properties  of  the  equa-
tion  are  marked  by  a  very  strong  sensitivity  to  interest  rate  and  profit 
share  changes  in  Germany  and  France. 
As  far  as  inventory  investment  (I ITQ)  is  concerned,  national  accounts  do 
not  usually  distinguish  between  private  and  public  stocks.  Since  one  would 
not  expect  public  inventory  investment  to  be  of  considerable  size,  this 
should  not  be  a  major  disadvantage. -16-
Table 3:  Pr1 vate  i  nvestJnent 1  n structures 
log(ISPQ)  • a+ b(L).(RL/~.100) + c.log(OOS)  + d.log(IEPQ)  + e.log(ISPQ(-1)) 
y 
Coontry/  estimated coefficients1 12  lonrtenl coefficients 
~  s~le  a  b  c  d  e  9  b'  c'  d'  SER  1)1 
IE 
1965. I-1984. IV  0,4335  -3,5285  0,4470  0,2697  0,6996  -(),3238  -11,747  1,488  0,898  3,89  0,0  2,11 
(0,1024)  (1,7404)  {0,1070)  (0,0416)  (0,0563)  (0,1110) 
FR 
1967. I-1984. IV  0,4050  -3,6414  0,3039  0,0648  o,8no  -28,461  2,375  0,506  1,82  0,962  2,00 
(0,0910)  (1,0983)  (0,(8i())  {0,0297)  (0,0438) 
lK 
1967.I-1984.IV  0,2299  -(),2a>9  0,0626  0,0052  -(),4841  -2,965  - 0,661  7,29  0,730  2,04 
(0,4418)  (0,8253)  (0,0763)  (0,0634)  (0,1052) 
us 
1968. I-1984. IV  0,8810  -(),5718  0,4688  0,3014  0,4666  0,9358  -1,072  0,879  0,565  2,11  0,964  2,11 
{0,4125)  (3,0949)  (0,1964)  (0,0894)  (0,0975)  {0,0420) 
tbtes:  1 Standard errors  1n brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation  met.tDd:  OLS  (FR)  and  Cl.S  with Cochrane-Orwtt correction for autocorrelation  (DE,  lX,  US)  with AliDl  lags 
Table  4: 
(DE:  b with  20  lags,  degree  2,  constraint bot;h 
FR:  b with 16  lags,  degree  2,  constraint head 
LK:  b with 12  lags,  degree 2,  constraint both 
US:  b with  12  lags 1  degree 21  constraint both) 
Inventory  investment 
IITQ  =  a+ b.(YTTQ(-1)-IITQ(-1))  + c.KAPIQ(-1)  + d(L).(RS/4-PYTT.100)  + e.UCAP  + f.IITQ(-1) 
estimated coeff1c1ents1  long-term 
Country/  coeff. 
sam~le  a  b  c  d  e  f  b'  i2  ow 
DE  -42,275  0,105  -0,116  -225,553  0,302  0,269  0,144  0,521  1,96 
1965. I-1984. IV  {10,387)  (0,035)  (0,040)  (75,326)  (0,101)  (0,124) 
FR  -42,647  0,087  -0,070  -1,417  0,383  0,340  0,132  0,528  2,00 
1967.I-1984.IV  (9,422)  (0,035)  (0,029)  (29,647)  (0,125)  (0,112) 
UK  -6154,4  0,089  -0,132  -34529,3  51,160  0,281  0,124  0,607  1,64 
1965. I-1984. IV  (1272,1)  (0,019)  (0,027)  (7007,2)  (13,517)  (0,104) 
us  -18,393  0,150  -0,183  -241,850  0,022  0,383  0,244  0,674  1,90 
1965.I-1984.IV  (4,076)  (0,027)  (0,035)  (52,075)  (0,057)  (0,084) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors in brackets 
DE:  d with  5 lags,  degree  2,  constraint head 
FR:  d with  2 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail 
UK:  d with  14  lags,  degree  2,  constraint head 
US:  d with  7 lags 1  d!9ree 21  constraint none 
Durbin-h 
-0,069 
4,461 
0,702 -17-
On  theoretical  grounds,  it would  be  desirable  to  distinguish  between  stocks 
of  finished  goods,  work  in  progress  and  stocks  of  raw  materials.  Unfortuna-
tely  national  accounts  do  not  permit  this  distinction,  although  it  might 
contain  useful  information  for  business  cycle analysis.  For  the  time  being, 
integration of  business  survey  information  referring  to  stock  buildings  has 
not  been  attempted. 
From  an  econometric  point  of  view,  the  quality  of  inventory  investment 
equations  is  usually  inferior  to  the  quality of  fixed  investment  equations, 
as  most  national  accounts  determine  the  change  in  stocks  as  a  residual  in 
the  final  demand  breakdown.  Statistical  measurement  errors  are,  therefore, 
sometimes  quite  important.  The  econometric  analysis  started  from  a  general 
model  explaining  both  planned  and  unplanned  inventories.  In  this  framework, 
planned  inventories  are  mainly  due  to  three  motives:  the  transactions 
motive  in  order  to  cushion  the  lack  of  synchronisation  between  the  produc-
tion  or  receipt of  goods  and  the  delivery  or  use  of  goods;  the  precautiona-
ry  motive  as  a  reason  for  holding  buffer  stock  (to  smooth  or  sustain  pro-
duction  or  to  meet  demand)  and  the  speculative  motive  in  case  of  expected 
price  changes.  In  the  empirical  estimations,  attempts  to  explain  unplanned 
or  speculative  inventory  changes  have  met  with  little success.  The  finally 
retained  equation  therefore  focusses  on  the  transactions  and  precautionary 
demand  for  stocks.  Derived  within  a  partial  adjustment  framework,  the  equa-
tion  contains  as  explanatory  variables  lagged  total  final  demand  (excluding 
inventory  investment),  the  lagged  level  of  stocks,  a  proxy  for  the  real 
short  term  interest  rate  and  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  to  capture 
work  in  progress.  As  can  be  seen  in  Table  4,  the  equation  explains  between 
501  and  701  of  the  variation  in  inventory  investment.  The  estimated coeffi-
cients  have  in  all  cases  the  expected  sign.  However,  the  influence  of  the 
real  interest  rate  in  France  and  of  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  in 
the  United  States  is  statistically  insignificant.  In  addition,  the  coeffi-
cient  of  the  lagged  stock  variable  (KAPIQ)  is  relatively  low.  This  pheno-
menon  of  the  so-called 
11 slow  speed  of  adjustment
11  is  well  known  in  the 
literature  on  inventory  investment.  Although  it  could  be  due  to  missing 
explanatory  variables,  attempts  to  extend  the  set  of  explanatory  variables 
did  not  resolve  the  problem. -18-
3.3  The  supply  block 
The  main  purpose  of  the  supply  block  is  to  generate  the  potential  output  of 
the  economy,  with  a  view  of  reproducing  the  11edi um  term  potentia  1  growth. 
The  approach  retained  for  the  QUEST  model  is  a  recursive  one,  separating 
the  decisions  on  the  long-term  level  of  installed  productive  capacity  from 
those  on  potential  (profitable)  output  and  the  capital-labour  ratio  (pro-
duction  technology).  In  a  first  step,  decisions  on  the  desired· medium-term 
level  of  production  capacity  are  considered  to  be  e11bodied  in  the  determi-
nation  of  investment.  This  is  done  through  a  function  for  private  i nves-
tment  in  equipment  (IEPQ)  which  incorporates  demand  and  profitability 
effects.  The  thereby  determined  1  evel  of  the  capital  stock  (KAPEQ)  then 
forms  an  input  into  the  second  step,  the  siMultaneous  deterMination  of 
potential  output  (YQPOT)  and  potential  (classical)  employment  (LEEPPOT). 
The  process  operates  within  the  framework  of  profit maximisation  subject  to 
a  putty-putty  production  function  and  implicitly  determines  the  capital-
labour  ratio  as  a  function  of  real  wage  costs.  In  specifying  the  three  main 
equations  of  this  block  (IEPQ,  YQPOT,  LEEPPOT),  priority  has  been  given  to 
empirical  considerations,  in  the  sense  of  a  systematic  investigation  of 
demand  and  profitability  effects  and  the  selection  of  parameters  with 
acceptable  simulation  properties,  the  recursive  structure  of  the  block 
being  a  guarantee  for  the  consistency  of  production  linkages. 
This  recursive  approach  has  been  preferred  to  a  theoretical  model  of  simul-
taneous  factor  demands.  Its  underlying  philosophy  is  that  due  to  the  preva-
lence  of  uncertainty,  adjustment  costs  and  factor  rigidities,  asymmetries 
in  factor  demand  behaviour  exist  so  that  investment  and  employment  deci-
sions  have  to  be  treated  separately.  The  complexity  of  production  decisions 
cannot,  in  fact,  be  easily  formalised  as  a  general  problem  of  optimisation 
under  constraints,  the  specification  of  the  constraints  becoming  intracta-
ble  in  that  case.  Commonly  accepted  simplifications  in  such  frameworks  tend 
to  reduce  profitability  effects  to  a  relative  factor  price  variable.  The 
resulting  models  are  often  rejected  by  the  data,  with  weak  evidence  on 
substitution effects.  In  addition,  specific  structural  breaks  occur  in  each 
factor  demand  equation,  which  is  not  easy  to  reconcile  with  the  assumption 
of  a  joint  determination  of  the  inputs.  All  these  results  have  been 
confirmed  by  the  extensive  preliminary  tests  using  the  QUEST  data. 
In  the  next  two  sections,  the  retained  equations  for  investment  and  poten-
tial  levels  of  output  and  employment  are  presented. -19-
3.3.1  Investment  in  equipment  and  the  determination  of  the  capital  stock 
The  starting  point  for  the  empirical  investigation of  private  investment  in 
equipment  has  been  the  combination  of  an  effective  demand  model  (where 
firms  are  rationed  in  goods  markets  and  therefore  the  desired  capital  stock 
is  a  function  of  expected  demand  and  expected  relative factor  prices)  and  a 
profit  model  (where  either  firms  are  constrained  on  capital  markets  or 
where  sales  are  uncertain;  see  CATINAT/CAWLEY/ILZKOVITZ/ITALIANER/MORS 
(1987)).  However.  the  econometric  estimations  did  not  allow  the  detection 
of  significant  factor  substitution  effects.  This  holds  true  both  for  a 
putty-putty  and  a  putty-clay  formulation  and  for  alternative specifications 
of  the  user  cost  of  capital  variable.  Instead  of  imposing  a  coefficient on 
a  priori  grounds.  a  specification  was  searched  that  is  not  rejected  by  the 
data. 
The  retained  equation  (Table  5)  determines  (the  logarithm  of)  private 
investment  in  equipment  as  a  function  of  a  putty-clay  type  accelerator  term 
(change  in  total  final  demand).  the  real  long-term  interest  rate.  represen-
ting  capital  cost.  and  a  profitability  term  (proxied  by  the  profit  share 
in  GOP  multiplied  by  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization).  As  investment 
decisions  are  largely  made  on  the  basis  of  expectations.  all  variables 
enter  with  distributed  lags  (i.e.  adaptive  or  extrapolative  expectations). 
In  addition.  a  time  trend  has  been  included  to  represent  the  influence  of 
technical  progress. 
All  estimated  coefficients  have  the  "expected"  sign  and  are  statistically 
significant at  the  5~  level.  With  respect  to  the  size  of  the  coefficients. 
the  accelerator  seems  to  be  relatively  modest  at  first  sight.  However.  it 
has  to  be  kept  in  mind  that.  in  simulation.  part  of  the  demand  effect  is 
propagated  via  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  in  the  profitability 
term.  The  influence  of  real  interest  rates  is  particularly  strong  in  the 
German  and  French  equations.  while  it  is  only  weak  for  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States.  To  a  1 esser  extent  the  same  phenomenon  can  be 
observed  for  profitability. 
After  private· investment  in  equipment  has  been  determined.  the  capital 
stock  is  derived.  This  is  done  by  adding  investment  to  the  capital  stock  at 
the  end  of  the  previous  quarter.  after  having  subtracted depreciation: 
KAPEQ  •  (1-DELTA).KAPEQ(-1)  +  IEPQ 
The  rate  of  depreciation  (DELTA)  has  been  estimated  as  a  function  of  time 
on  the  basis  of  the  available  capital  stock  and  investment  data  series 
using  the  equation  specified  above.  The  stock  of  private  equipment  has  been 
chosen  to  represent  an  economy's  stock  of  productive  capital  as  it  proved 
difficult  to  eliminate  "unproductive"  buildings  from  the  total  stock  of 
private capital. -20-
Table  5:  Private investment  in equipment 
•  GOS.UCAP 
log(IEPQ)  ~a+  b(L).log(YTTQ--(1-,)YTTQ(-1))  + c(L).(RL/4-PY.100)  + d(L).log(  )+  e.TIME  + f.log(IEPQ(-1)) 
Country/ 
sanple 
DE 
1968.I-1984.IV 
FR4 
1968. I-1984. IV 
UK 
1969.I-1984.IV 
us 
1966. I-1984. IV 
estimated coeff1c1ents1,2 
a  b  c  d  e  f 
1,3300  0,1661  -5,5520  0,4454  0,0041  0,5448 
(0,3015)  (0,0783)  (1,7083)  (0,1296)  (0,0009)  (0,0999) 
1,3186  0,1689  -3,6910  0,4575  0,0070  0,4760 
(0,4372)  (0,0752)  (1,7401)  (0,1292)  (0,0021)  (0,1170) 
5,2322  0,1922  -1,9147  0,4575  0,0032  0,2441 
(1,0398)  (0,0524)  (0,8249)  (0,1196)  (0,0006)  (0,1166) 
0,5451  0,1367  -1,0664  0,1252  0,0030  0,7108 
(0,2345)  (0,0209)  (0,4765)  (0,0616)  (0,0010)  (0,0778) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors 1n  brackets 
2 Estimation method:  OLS  with  Almon  lags: 
Y.100 
long-ten1 coeff1c1ents 
b
1  c•  d
1 
0,3650  -12,1980  0,9785  3,45  0,947  1,81 
0,3224  -7,0445  0,8732  4,02  0,966  2,17 
0,2542  -2,5329 0,6052  3,39  0,885  1,87 
0,4727  -3,6872  0,4330  1,84 0,995  1,91 
(DE:  b w1th  6 lags,  degree  2,  constraint none;  c with  5 lags,  degree  2,  constraint none;  d w1th  8 lags, 
degree  2,  constraint head.  FR:  b with  7 lags,  degree  3,  constraint ta11;  c with  6 lags,  degree  2, 
constraint none;  d with  6 lags,  degree  2,  constraint tail.  UK:  b w1th  8  lags,  degree  2,  constraint 
head;  c with  10  lags,  degree  2,  constraint head;  d w1th  8 lags,  degree  2,  constraint head.  US:  b with 
8  lags,  degree  2,  constraint none;  c with  5 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail; d w1th  7 lags,  degree  1, 
constraint tail). 
The  assumed  quarterly depreciation  rates are 0,040  for  DE  and  FR,  and  0,035  for  UK  and  US 
3  In  percentage points 
4 For  the second  quarter of 1968  the observed  value  for YTTQ  has  been  replaced by  its interpolated value  1n 
order to avoid  a  negative argument  for the logarithm 
Table  6:  Potential  employment  - bas1c  equations  for the estimation of the parameters 
(a)  Alog(LEEP)  = c + a.time + b.log(WC/PY)  + d.log(YQ)- e.log(LEEP(-1)) 
(b)  Alog(LEEP/YQPOT)  •  c + a.time + b.log(WC/PY)  + d.log(UCAP)- e.log(LEEP(-1)/YQPOT(-1)) 
structural 
Country/  estimated coefficients1,2  parameters 
sanple  elast. elast.  techn. 
to  of  progr. 
c  a  b  d  e  output subst.  1n  ~  12!!  !  SER  ~  r::w 
[E 
1965. I-1984. IV  1,820  -0,0009  -0,098  0,218  1*  0,45  3,0  0,438  0,494  1,41 
(a)  with d=e  (0,232)  (0,0001)  (0,016)  (0,025) 
FR 
1965. I-1984. IV  1,732  0,0016  -0,132  0,263  0,419  1*  0,32  2,3  0,540  0,447  0,573  2,11 
(b)  w1 th CCRC  (0,476)  (0,0004)  (0,038)  (0,052)  (0,079)  (0,098) 
lJ( 
1965.1-1984. IV  0,319  -0,0006  -0,058  0,138  0,139  1  0,42  3,0  0,602  0,418  0,516  2,10 
(a) with CCRC  (0,505)  (0,0002)  (0,029)  (0,032)  (0,047)  (0,093) 
lf) 
1965. I-1984. IV  3,606  -0,0003  -0,184  0,405  1*  0,45  0,5  0,427  0,659  1,23 
(a)  with d=e  (0,381)  (0,0001)  (0,033)  (0,033) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors in brackets  and  SER  in percentage po1nts. 
2 Estimation method:  OLS  with Cochrane-Orcutt  correction when  CORC  1s  specified. -21-
3.3.2  Potential  levels  of  employment  and  output 
The  data  series  for  potential  output  was  constructed  as  (a  moving  average 
of)  real  GOP,  divided  by  the  degree  of  capacity  utilisation  (in  the  manu-
facturing  sector).  No  corresponding  measure  for  potential  employment 
exists.  Thus,  in  this  case,  the  equation  had  to  be  specified  so  as  to 
define  potential  employment  and  at  the  same  time  to  endogenise  the  adjust-
ment  of  observed  employment  to  its  potentia  1  1 evel.  Parameters  are  then 
directly  estimated  in  the  employment  function. 
The  joint determination  of  potential  output  and  employment  follows  from: 
(  max  PY.YQPOT  - WC.LEEPPOT 
)  YQPOT  =  f(KAPEQ,  LEEPPOT) 
with  the  standard  model  mnemonics. 
Ideally  the  system  should  be  fully  specified  and  estimated  simultaneously 
using  either  the  reduced  form  with  the  capital  stock  and  the  real  wage 
costs  as  exogenous,  or  the  structural  form  implying,  in  particular,  a 
direct  estimation  of  the  production  function.  Unfortunately,  these  approa-
ches  have  been  unsuccessful  and  the  only  alternative  left  has  been  a  sepa-
rate  treatment  of  each  equation. 
a)  Potential  employment 
The  employment  function  relating  observed  employment  to  output  and  the  real 
wage  incorporates  a  partial  adjustment  dynamic  scheme: 
Alog(LEEP)  =  c  +  a.time  +  b.log(WC/PY)  +  d.log(YQ)- e.log(LEEP(-1)) 
Its  parameters  are  used  to  define  potential  employment  as  the  level  requi-
red  by  full  use  of  capacity  in  the  long  run: 
log(LEEPPOT)  = (1/e).(c  +  a.time  +  b(L).log(WC/PY)  +  d.log(YQPOT)) 
Four  year  lags  on  (WC/PY)  are  added  to  keep  the  feature  of  delayed  effects 
of  factor  cost. 
Results  are  presented  in  Table  6.  At  this  stage,  only  the  structural  para-
meters  deserve  attention: 
-In France  and  Germany,  the  long  term  elasticity of  employment  to  output 
had  to  be  constrained  to  one,  coming  out  too  low  for  the  former  and  too 
high  for  the  latter  when  unconstrained.  In  the  United  States,  the  cons-
traint  plays  a  minor  role:  it only  mitigates  multicolinearity,  the  techni-
cal  progress  becoming  significant  with  the  constraint.  In  the  UK,  the 
elasticity is  spontaneously  unitary. 
- Productivity  gains  from  technical  progress  range  from  2-3~  p.a.  for  the 
European  countries  to  0,5~  in  the  United  States.  These  results  confirm  the 
contrast  observed  between  Europe  and  the  US  when  comparing  time  series  of 
apparent  productivity. 
- Substitution  effects  are  more  homogenous  between  countries,  implying  an 
elasticity  of  substitution  of  0,32  to  0,45  if  a  CES  was  used.  It  was  not 
straightforward  to  find  such  a  real  wage  effect  in  France  and  the  equation 
had  to  be  rewritten  according  to  the  version  (b)  in  Table  6. -22-
Table  7:  Potential  output - aCUustment  under  the assumption  of a  COBB-DOUGLAS  production 
function1 
log(YQPOT)  •  a.time + b + 0,33.P(L).log(KAPEQ(-1))  + 0,67.1og(LEEPPOT) 
estimated 
Country/  coefficients213  !1  92  SER  ~  ow 
sample  a  b 
DE  0.0042  -3.370  1.68  -0.71  0.20  0.9996  2,26 
1965.1-1984. II  (0.0004)  (0,029)  (0,09)  (0.09) 
FR  0,0027  -3,223  1.57  -0.59  0.15  0,9995  2,19 
1967.1-1984.1V  (0,0005)  (0,041)  (0,10)  (0.10) 
UK  0,0033  0,024  1.73  -0.78  0.30  0.9990  2.23 
1965.1-1984.1V  (0,0003)  (0,021)  (0,07)  (0,07) 
us4  0*  -3,839  1.76  -0,81  0.14  0,9830  1.64 
1965.1-1984.1V  (0.003)  (0,06)  (0.06) 
Notes:  1 The  capital  stock  is introduced as  a moving  average over 4 quarters and  potential 
employment  is derived from  the estimated employment  functions 
2 Standard errors  in  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
3  Estimation  method:  OLS  with  Cochrane  Orcutt correction of 2nd  order autocorrelation 
of the  residuals,  the coefficient a  has  been  set to zero 
4 The  coefficient a  has  been  set to zero 
Table  8:  Employment  in the private sector - aqjustment  to potential  employment 
A log(LEEP)  = a(L). [log(LEEPPOT)  - log(YQPOT/YQ)] + b.log(LEEP(-1)) 
Country/  estimated coefficients1 12  structural  parameter: 
sa!!!ele  al  b  mean  agjustment  1ag4 
DE  with  CORC  0,256  -0,257  3.9  0,605 
1965.1-1984.11  (0,048)  (0,048)  (0.091) 
FR  with  CORC  0,152  -0.152  6,6  0,822 
1968.1-1984.IV  (0,032)  (0,032)  (0,074) 
UK  with  CORC  0,209  -0,209  4,8  0,720 
1965.111-1984.IV  (0,051)  (0,051)  (0,081) 
us  with  a = -b  0,364  1,7 
with  1965.1-1984.IV  (0,021) 
Notes:  1 Standard  errors  in brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation method:  OLS  including Cochrane-Orcutt procedure  when  CORC  is specified 
3  Estimated with  Almon  lags:  DE:  4 lags,  polynomial  of degree  1,  constraint:  tail 
FR:  4 lags,  polynomial  of degree  1,  constraint:  tail 
UK:  4 lags,  polynomial  of degree  1,  constraint:  tail 
US:  no  lag 
SER  i2 
0,407  0,576 
0,160  0,871 
0,432  0,557 
0,432  0,789 
ow 
2,18 
1,23 
2,17 
1,34 
4  In  quarters;  calculated by  adding  the lag  implied by  the endogenous  variable and  the mean  lag  of the 
Almon  distribution -23-
This  preliMinary  step  provides  the  potential  employment  (see  3.4.1  for  the 
final  employment  equation),  which  can  in  turn  be  used  as  an  exogenous 
variable  in  the potential  output  equation. 
b)  Potential  output 
At  this  stage,  the  putty-putty  production  function  can  be  directly  estima-
ted.  To  be  consistent  with  the  specification  of  the  employment  function 
above,  a  CES  function  should  be  used.  However,  under  this  assumption,  the 
estiMated  elasticity  of  substitution  came  out  with  very  high  values, 
between  1,6  (US)  and  3,1  (UK),  far  above  the  one  found  with  the  employment 
equation.  In  addition,  in  simulation,  such  high  values  would  give  too  high 
a  weight  to  potential  employment  in  the  determination  of  potential  output. 
Results  on  employment  and  potential  output  could  not  be  reconciled  and  some 
simplifications  had  to  be  introduced.  Instead  of  estimating  a  production 
function,  it has  been  retained  to  impose  a  simple  COBB-DOUGLAS  function  for 
the  supply  determination. 
In  this  case,  the  only  structural  parameter  that  has  to  be  identified  is 
the  technical  progress  and  the  respective  weights  of  labour  and  capital 
inputs  are  set  at  the  historical  average  of  the  wage-profit  share.  Any 
attempt  to  introduce  dynamics  in  this  equation  has  been  rejected  by  the 
data.  The  final  results  are  reported  in  Table  7.  They  exhibit  relatively 
low  standard errors,  but  they  are  obtained  with  substantial  corrections  for 
autocorrelation  of  the  residuals.  This  has  to  be  kept  in  mind  for  the  use 
of  the  equation  in  projection. 
The  restrictions  and  inconsistencies  which  had  to  be  accepted  given  the 
estimation  difficulties  encountered  do  not,  however,  invalidate  the 
approach.  The  main  foundations  of  the  recursive  scheme  have  been  kept  and 
ensure  consistent  linkages  with  specific  features  in  simulation: 
- The  channels  through  which  changes  in  factor  costs/profitability  affect 
the  different  supply  components  depend  on  the  variable  concerned.  An 
increase  in  the  real  wage,  for  example,  would  tend  to  affect  the  capital 
stock  negatively  to  the  extent  that  it is  not  compensated  by  an  equivalent 
increase  in  productivity,  i.e.  to  the  extent  that  the  profit  share  and 
therefore  productive  investment  decreases.  But  it  wou 1 d  direct  1  y  reduce 
potential  output  and  employment.  Changes  in  the  real  interest  rate,  on  the 
other  hand,  affect all  the  components  of  the  supply  block.  Thus,  a  rise  in 
interest  rates  has  not  only  a  negative  influence  on  investment,  but  also  on 
potential  output  and  employment.  These  simulation  features  are  not  standard 
compared  to  the  usual  formulation  of  substitution effects. 
- Demand  prospects  are  transmitted  to  the  whole  of  supply  components 
through  the  accelerator  effect  and  the  elasticity of  employment  to  output. 
This  guarantees  market  clearing  in  the  medium  term.  However,  in  the  short 
run,  supply  reacts  only  moderately  to  demand  conditions.  The  utilisation 
rate  measures  the  gap  between  demand  and  supply  on  the  goods  and  services 
market.  Its  feedback  in  the  inventories,  import  and  price  equations  implies 
in  the  short  run  a  mixed  market  clearing  process  with  adjustment  on  prices 
and  effective  supply. -24-
3.4  The  labour  market 
For  a  first  version  of  the  model,  the  labour  market  block  has  been  limited 
to  two  key  behavioural  equations:  the  wage  rate  per  head  (WR)  and  the  total 
number  of  employees  in  the  private  sector  (LEEP).  The  labour  supply,  measu-
red  by  the  active  population,  is  kept  exogenous.  In  simulation,  unemploy-
ment,  which  is  calculated  from  an  identity equation,  consequently  only  res-
ponds  to  changes  in  employment.  Total  employment  is  calculated  by  adding  to 
the  number  of  employees  in  the  private  sector  two  exogenous  components:  the 
number  of  self-employed  and  public  sector  employment. 
3.4.1  Labour  demand 
The  demand  for  labour  is  directly  derived  from  the  supply  block  as  descri-
bed  in  section  3.3.  There,  a  simple  employment  function  was  estimated  to 
identify  the  three  key  structural  parameters  of  labour  demand:  elasticity 
to  output,  elasticity  of  substitution  and  the  rate  of  technical  progress. 
This  simple  function  is  used  only  to  define  potential  employment,  but  is 
not  incorporated  as  such  in  the  model.  It  is  more  appropriate  to  relate 
observed  employment  (LEEP)  to  its  potential  level  (LEEPPOT),  taking  into 
account  the  short-term  constraint  on  demand.  The  adjustment  pattern  has 
then  to  be  estimated  at  this  stage.  Different  specifications  relating 
employment  to  its  potential  level,  corrected  by  the  utilisation  rate  of 
capacity,  have  been  tested.  No  asymmetries  in  the  adjustment  to  these  two 
variables  could  be  found.  Table  8  presents  the  final  equation  based  on  a 
partial  adjustment  model.  It  has  acceptable  properties,  with  a  full  adjus-
tment  of  employment  to  its  potential  level  in  the  long  run.  From  a  statis-
tical  point  of  view,  the  SER  is  on  the  low  side,  indicating  a  satisfactory 
fit. 
Greater flexibility  of  the  American  labour  market  is  again  confirmed  with  a 
mean  adjustment  which  is  less  than  two  quarters,  compared  to  4  to  7  quar-
ters  in  the  European  countries.  But  it must  also  be  kept  in  mind,  that with 
the  retained  definition  of  potential  employment,  employment  reacts  faster 
to  output  changes  than  to  real  wage  changes  in  all  the  countries. 
3.4.2  Wage  rate  per  head 
The  endogenous  variable  is  the  growth  rate  of  average  earnings  per  head  in 
the  whole  economy.  The  approach  follows  a  standard  augmented  Phillips  curve 
specification,  with  additional  profitability  effects  as  integrated  in  wage 
bargaining  models.  A  pure  wage  bargaining  model  determining  the  wage  rate 
in  level  has  been  rejected  by  the  data  with  the  exception  of  the  limit  case 
of  the  UK.  In  any  event,  homogenous  specifications  have  been  retained. 
The  final  equations  are  reported  in  Table  9  and  exhibit  strong  country 
specific  features: 
1)  Full  indexation  has  generally  been  confirmed  by  the  estimation,  except 
in  the  UK,  where  the  degree  of  indexation  is  unstable  over  the  period  and 
full  indexation  appears  only  on  the  1974-76  period.  It  has,  however,  been 
imposed.  This  is  done  through  a  two  step  estimation  procedure,  estimating 
indexation  lags  in  the  first  step  and  reestimating  the  equation  with  the -25-
given  lags  and  the  long  term  coefficient  of  private  consumption  prices  set 
to  one.  Full  indexation  has  also  been  imposed  in  France  and  the  US,  a 
slight  tendency  to  over-indexation  having  been  observed.  But  this  cons-
traint does  not  affect  the  other  parameters.  Indexation  lags  are  very  long 
in  the  US,  covering  a  three  year  period,  and  short  in  the  European  coun-
tries with  the  intermediate  case  of  the  UK  (a  two  year  period).  This  is  one 
aspect  of  the  contrast  between  nomina 1  wage  rigidity  in  the  US  and  rea  1 
wage  rigidity  in  Europe. 
2)  The  Phillips  curve  effect  is  another  aspect  of  this  contrast,  with  a 
coefficient  on  the  unemployment  rate  for  the  United  States  about  three 
times  higher  than  for  the  European  countries.  The  similarities  between 
European  countries  are  only  superficial:  tests  on  non-linearities  of  the 
Phillips  curve  revealed  that  the  pressure  of  unemployment  on  wages  has 
decreased  in  France  si nee  1970  and  increased  in  Germany;  in  the  UK,  the 
unemployment  variable  comes  out  with  a  significant  coefficient  only  when 
the  wage  freeze  at  the  end  of  the  sixties  is  eliminated  through  a  dummy 
variable. 
3)  Employers•  pressure  on  the  wage  setting  process,  measured  by  profitabi-
lity variables,  is  another  source  of  inter-country  differences.  Strong  evi-
dence  has  been  found  for  such  effects  in  Germany,  corroborating  the  effi-
ciency  of  the  industrial  relations  system  in  this  country.  In  the  final 
specification,  this  is  represented  by  the  repercussion  of  productivity 
changes  on  wages  and  the  dampening  effect  of  slower  growth  in  the  GOP 
deflator  relative  to  consumer  price  changes  on  indexation.  In  France,  only 
this  terms  of  trade effect plays  a  role  and  in  the  US,  only  the  productivi-
ty  growth  variable  has  been  retained.  In  the  UK,  it was  impossible  to  com-
bine  simultaneously  unemployment  and  productivity  variables.  An  equation 
with  the  unemployment  effect  has  been  preferred  for  reasons  of  simulation 
properties  and  homogeneity  of  specifications. 
4)  Other  issues  such  as  hysteresis  on  unemployment  and  the  weight  of  taxa-
tion  on  wage  claims  have  been  examined  but  are  not  backed  by  strong  eviden-
ce.  The  treatment  of  income  policies  has  been  simplified  by  the  introduct-
ion  of  dummies. -26-
Table  9:  Wage  rate per  head  .  .  .  . 
WR  •  a + b(L).PCP  + c.(PCP-PY}  + d.LUR  + e(L).UPRO 
Country/  estimated coefficientsi 12 
i2  samele  a  b  c  d  e  SER  ow 
DE3  0,498  1,031  -0,806  -0,115  0,644  0,930  0,723  2,24 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,176)  (0,133)  (0,046)  (0,149) 
FR4  1,063  1*  -0,487  -0,099  0,442  0,715  1,19 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,084)  (0,094)  (0,017) 
UK5  1,161  1*  -0,094  1,073  0,494  2,34 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,270)  (0,041) 
us6  2,115  1*  -0,302  o,327  0,468  o,550  2.12 
1965.I-1984.IV  (0 1293}  (0 1042}  (0 1067} 
Notes:  I  Standard errors  in brackets and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation  method:  OLS  with  DE,  b:  no  lag,  e:  3  lags;  FR,  b:  1  lag;  UK,  Almon  lags  (b: 
8  lags,  degree  2);  us.  b:  coefficient  set  to  1  using  for  PCP  a  moving  average  over 
3 years,  e:  no  lag. 
3 With  seasonal  dummies.  The  value  reported for the constant corresponds  to the average 
estimated  seasonal  coefficients 
4 With  two  dummies  for the 1968  strike and  outcome  1n  1968.II  and  1968.III 
5 With  dummies  for  income  policies:  0651-694  = 1  from  1965.I  to 1969.IV,  0 elsewhere 
0743-772  = 1  from  1974.III  to 1975.I 
-0,5 from  1975.II  to 1977.II,  0 elsewhere 
6 with  dummies  for wage  episodes:  0651-714- 1  from  1965.I  to 1971.IV,  0 elsewhere 
0751-762  = 1  from  1975.I  to 1976.II,  0 elsewhere 
0754  •  1 in 1975.IV  0 elsewhere 
Table  10:  Value-added  prices 
Country/ 
P  =  a(L}.WC  + b.log(WC(-1}/PY(-1}}  + c +  d.~UCAP- OcAP)  + e.(PMM- f(L}.PMM} 
estimated coefficients ,2 
sample 
a3  b  c  d4  e5  1  SER  i2 
DE  with  CORC  0,641  0,010  -0,046  -0,303  0,725  0,362 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,081)  (0,004)  (0,016)  (0,110) 
FR  0,582  0,020  -0,081  0,046  -0,076  0,470  0,787 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,066)  (0,003)  (0,011)  (0,025)  (0,013) 
UK6  0,933  0,018  -0,049  0,0010  -0,141  0,694  0,814 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,068)  (0,007)  (0,018)  (0,0033}  (0,028) 
us  0,937  0,033  -0,104  0,035  -0,082  0,393  0,610 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,135)  (0,010)  (0,031)  (0,013)  (0,025) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors in brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation method:  OLS  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction when  CORC  is specified 
3 With  Almon  lags:  DE:  4 lags,  polynomial  of degree  1,  constraint:  tail;  FR:  3 lags,  polynomial  of 
degree  1,  no  constraint;  UK:  5  lags,  polynomial  of  degree  2,  no  constraint;  US:  5  lags, 
polynomial  of degree  3,  n~nstraint. 
4  In  FR:  UCAP  =  83,7%;  UK:  UCAP  =  81,2~ and  the effect is introduced only  in  1974  onwards; 
US:  UCAP  =  81,6~ and  the effect is introduced  in  1975  onwards 
5 The  lags on  f  have  been  imposed:  f(L).PMM  =  0,44.PMM(-1)  + 0,31.PMM(-2)  + 0,25.PMM(-3) 
For  the US,  the effect is only  introduced after 1974 
6 The  UK  equation  includes  a  dummy  in 1973.  I  for the  introduction of the  VAT  SYStem 
ow 
2,15 
1,57 
1,88 
1,36 -27-
3.5  The  price  block 
The  price  block  is  organised  according  to  a  recursive  sche11e,  with  a  cen-
tral  price  equation  representing  producers•  behaviour  and  specified  as  a 
mark-up  over  costs.  The  demand  deflators  are  obtai ned,  in  a  second  step, 
from  this  domestic  price  index  and  from  the  import  prices  derived  in  the 
linkage  block.  This  step  also  includes  a  correction  for  indirect  taxes. 
Difficulties  lie  in  the  choice  (a)  of  a  good  price  indicator  for  an  accura-
te  description  of  profit  margin  deter•ination,  and  (b)  for  adequate  disag-
gregation  of  demand  deflators  to  avoid  distortions  in  relative  prices  and 
nominal  aggregates  in  simulation. 
3.5.1  The  value  added  price 
This  first point  is  a  delicate one.  Different  producers•  or wholesale  price 
indexes  have  been  examined  and  finally  rejected  as  they  do  not  cover  the 
whole  economy  and  are  not  comparable  between  countri as.  It  has  therefore 
been  decided  to  endogenise  the  value-added  price  (P).  This  is  a  partly  un-
satisfactory  solution,  as  this  price  does  not  allow  a  proper  treatment  of 
imported  intermediate  goods,  and  its  use  raises  also  problems  of  consisten-
cy  and  overdetermination  within  the  price  block.  It  is,  however,  the  only 
feasible  option  for  a  recursive  structure.  Preliminary  investigation  of  the 
demand  deflator  equations  have  shown  that  the  recursive  approach  still  per-
forms  better  than  a  direct  approach,  relating  demand  deflators  to  the  cor-
responding  production  costs. 
Empirical  investigation  of  the  value-added  price  equation  on  the  basis  of 
the  mark-up  assumption  led  to  retain  the  following  options:  1)  exclusion  of 
capital  costs  which  are  not  observable;  the  use  of  proxies  based  on 
interest  rates  would  have  perverse  inflationary  effects  in  the  case  of  a 
tight  monetary  policy;  2)  long-term  homogeneity  of  prices  with  respect  to 
labour  costs;  3)  domestic  costs  are  measured  by  the  wage  cost  per  head  ins-
tead  of  by  unit  labour  cost.  This  follows  from  econometric  tests,  where 
productivity  was  systematically  found  with  a  too  high  weight,  even  when 
lags  were  introduced  and  even  if  the  long  term  coefficient was  always  smal-
ler  than  one.  This  feature  implies  in  simulation  that  the  productivity 
gains  generated  by  an  expansion  would  have  dominated  the  inflationary 
effects  of  the  wage/price  nexus;  4)  the  adjustment  of  prices  on  wages 
follow  an  error correction  mechanism,  which,  in  terms  of  dynamic  simulation 
properties,  has  been  found  superior  to  other  dynamic  patterns.  This  insures 
also  a  determination  of  prices  in  levels;  5)  to  endogenise  the  mark-up,  the 
approach  focussed  on  the  introduction  of  demand  pressure  indicators.  Such 
an  effect  is  represented  in  the  model  by  the  deviation  of  the  utilisation 
rate  from  its  historical  average  level.  Such  an  effect  could  not  be  found 
in  Germany,  and  in  both  the  UK  and  the  US  it plays  a  significant  role  only 
after  the  first  oil  shock.  T.emporary  reductions  of  the  mark-up  rate  also 
occur  with  a  shock  on  external  prices.  This  is  taken  into  account  through 
the  deviation  of  import  price  growth  from  its  average  in  the  recent  past. 
This  effect  is  particularly  important  for  a  value-added  price  which  is,  in 
the  very  short  term,  negatively  affected  by  the  import  price.  This  method 
is  an  indirect  way  to  reintroduce  the  price  of  i11ported  inputs  in  the 
mark-up  behaviour. 
,; -28-
Table  11:  Energy  import  deflator  .  .  . 
PME  •  b0.POIL.EXCHR  + b1.(POIL.EXCHR)_1 
Country/  estimated coefficients1 
sample  bo  b1  bo+b1  Dummy  j  SER  i2  ow 
DE2  0,843  0,843  -0,794  4,91  0,833  1,85 
1970. II-1984. IV  (0,073)  (0,073)  (0,132) 
FR  0,568  0,263  0,832  -0,304  3,83  0,738  2,15 
1974. IV-1984. IV  (0,083)  (0,083)  (0,063)  (0,160) 
UK  0,667  0,154  0,821  5,03  0,918  2,02 
1970.III-1984.IV  (0,030)  (0,030)  (0,036) 
us  0,712  0,145  0,857  4,03  0,933  1,88 
1967.III-1984.IV  (0,026)  (0,026)  (0,031) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors between  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Dummy  is for 1974.I 
Table  12:  Private consumption  deflator 
(a)  PCP  = 
(b)  PCP  = 
(a(L).OPEN.PMM  + b(L).(1-0PEN)P].VAT 
.  .  •  -3  .  . 
Country/ 
sample 
DE3 
1965.I-1984.IV 
FR4 
1965.I-1984.IV 
UK5 
1965.I-1984.IV 
(a(L).(OPEN.PMM  + (1-0PEN).P)  + c(OPEN.PMM- (1/3)-~0PEN(i).PMM(i)tJ.VAT 
Type  of  estimated coefficientsl,2 
equation  a  b  c  SER  i2 
(a)  1,000 
(b) 
(b) 
(0,249) 
0,977 
(0,034) 
0,934 
(0,020) 
0,798 
(0,093) 
0,673  0,732 
-0,252  0,661  0,914 
(0, 112) 
0*  0,497  0,965 
ow 
2,31 
2,92 
1,80 
us6  (a)  1,034  0,934  0,260  0,970  1,94 
1965.1-1984.IV  (0,144)  (0,024) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors  in  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation  method:  OLS 
3 Private consumption  deflator and  value  added  price are corrected for  remaining  seasonal 
components  (X11-method);  equation  has  been  estimated with 
Almon  lags  for a:  5 lags,  degree  1 and  b:  2 lags,  degree  1 
4 Without  any  lags 
5 Including  a  dummy  for the introduction of  VAT  in  1973.I;  equation  has  been  estimated with  an 
Almon  lag  for a:  2 lags,  degree  1;  the  coefficient c has  been  set to zero 
6 Equation  has  been  estimated with  an  Almon  lag  forb:  3 lags,  degree  1 
The  variable VAT  is defined as  (1  +  EX.VATR)/(1  +  EX.VATR(-1)),  where  EX.VATR  is a proxy  for the 
VAT  rate,  calculated under  the assumption  that VAT  receipts are entirely raised on  private 
consumption. 
The  variable OPEN  - used  as  the weight  of  import  cost components  - represents the trend of 
openness  of the domestic  market.  It is calculated as  the fitted value of a  logistic distribution 
describing  the share of real  imports  in  real  total  final  demand. -29-
The  final  equation  is  reported  in  Table  10.  The  quality  of  the  fit  is 
acceptable,  except  maybe  for  Germany,  but  the  1 ow  R2  for  that  country  is 
mainly  imputable  to  the  unsatisfactory  treatment  of  the  seasonal  components 
of  the  lefthand  side  variable.  Faster price  adjustments  are  observed  in  the 
UK  and  the  US,  in  opposition  with  the  slow  wage  indexation  process 
characterising  these  two  countries.  The  coefficient  on  the  mark-up 
variables  do  not  allow  wide  fluctuations  of  the  mark-up  rate. 
3.5.2  Import  prices 
Import  prices  (PMT)  in  the  QUEST  model  are  distinguished  between  non-energy 
goods  (PMN),  energy  (PME)  and  non-factor  services  (PMS).  The  import  price 
deflator  for  energy  is  linked,  vi a  exchange  rates,  in  growth  rates  to  the 
world  oil  price,  in  this  case  defined  as  the  spot  price  of  Saudi  light 
petroleum  (Ras  Tanura).  Estimation  results  for  this  equation  are  presented 
in  Table  11  and  show  an  elasticity  of  0,85  of  energy  import  prices  with 
respect  to  world  oil  prices  converted  in  local  currency.  The  import  price 
of  non-factor  services  is,  for  the  time  being,  entirely proportional  to  the 
import  price  deflator  of  non-energy  goods.  In  the  future  this  variable 
could  be  explained  by  a  behavioural  equation.  The  import  price  deflator  of 
non-energy  goods  is  directly  proportional,  after  conversion  into  local 
currency,  to  a  trade-weighted  (bilateral  import  shares)  average  of 
non-energy  export  pri cas  of  the  other  countries  and  zones  in  the  system 
(see  section  3.8  for  a  definition  of  these  non-energy  export  prices).  This 
quasi-identity  therefore  embodies  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  export 
price  discrimination.  Although,  without  having  to  use  bilateral  export 
prices,  one  could  introduce  this  feature  by  rendering  import  prices 
partially  dependent  on  domestic  prices  to  represent  geographical 
differences  in  mark-up  pricing  behaviour,  it should  be  stressed  that  such  a 
specification  is,  theoretically  speaking,  not  in  agreement  with  the 
separability  hypothesis  underlying  the  bilateral  trade  flow  model. 
3.5.3  The  domestic  final  demand  deflators 
These  deflators  do  not  involve  any  behavioural  issues.  The  main  purpose  of 
these  equations  is  to  correctly  reproduce  the  adjustment  of  final  demand 
deflators  on  domestic  and  import  costs  as  incorporated  in  the  national 
accounts.  With  this  view,  simple  rules  can  be  adopted: 
1)  The  block  has  been  designed  to  reduce  the  number  of  equations.  Only  the 
deflators  for  private  consumption  and  tot  a 1  investment  are  explicit  1 y 
treated.  The  deflator  for  public  consumption  is  replaced  by  a  combination 
of  the  wage  rate  and  the  deflator  for  private  consumption.  Changes  in 
inventories  are  calculated  in  nominal  terms,  using  the  deflator  for  total 
final  demand  instead  of  the  deflator  for  changes  in  stocks  provided  by  the 
national  accounts. 
2)  The  treatment  for  VAT  has  been  simplified  through  the  assumption  that 
VAT  is  only  applied  to  private  consumption  items. 
3)  The  deflators  for  private  consumption  (PCP)  and  total  fixed  investment 
(PIT)  are  simply  adjusted  according  to  a  weighted  average  of  the  import  and 
value-added  prices.  The  weights  are  the  trend  in  openness  of  each  country. -30-
Table  13:  Total  fixed  investment  deflator  .  .  . 
PIT  •  a(L).OPEN.PMM  + b{L).(1-0PEN).P 
Country/  estimated coefficients1 12 
i2  sanple  a  b  i  SER 
DE3  0,808  0,883  0,290  0,874  0,672 
DW 
1,94 
1965.I-1984.IV  (0,347)  (0,146)  (0,111) 
FR4  0,827  1,015  0,636  0,920  2,19 
1965.I-1984.IV  (0, 115)  {0,044) 
UK5  0,997  1*  0,908  0,904  1,50 
1965. I-1984. IV  (0,037) 
us6  1*  1,036  0,539  o,902  1,37 
1965.1-1984.IV  co.o38l 
Notes:  1 Standard  errors in brackets and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation method:  OLS 
Table  14: 
Country/ 
3 Investment  deflator and  value  added  price are corrected for remaining  seasonal  components 
(X11-method);  equation  has  been  estimated with 
Almon  lags  for a:  3 lags,  degree  2,  constraint tail  and  for b:  2 lags,  degree  1 and 
Cochrane-Orcutt correction 
4 Without  any  lags 
5 Equation  has  been  estimated with  an  Almon  lag  for a:  2 lags,  degree  1;  the coefficient b has 
been  set to zero 
6 Equation  has  been  estimated with  an  Almon  lag  for b:  2 lags,  degree  1;  the coefficient a has 
been  set to zero 
Export  prices1 
PXM  - (OPEN.PMM  + (1-0PEN}.P}  •  a(L}.[OPEN.PMM  + (1-0PEN}.P  - WPXMs  + b(L}.EXCHRJ+  c 
estimated coef.ficients2, 3 
i2  SER 
sa!!J2le  a  b  c 
DW 
DE3  -0,207  0,201  -0,195  0,736  0,34  2,12 
1965.I-1984.IV  (0,034)  {0,043)  (0,084) 
FR3  -0,284  -0,423  1,438  0,27  2,64 
1965.I-1984.IV  {0,051)  (0,164) 
UK3  -0,285  0,280  -0,196  1,082  0,34  1,87 
1970. I I-1984. IV  {0,064)  (0,056)  {0,157) 
us3,4  -0,345  -0,104  1,243  o,37  1,48 
1965.I-1984.IV  (0,051}  (0 1141} 
Notes:  1 The  endogenous  variable is the deflator for exports  of goods  (PXM)  for  DE,  FR  and  the  US  and  for 
exports of  non-energy  goods  (PXN)  for the  UK.  Correspondingly,  the competitors•  price index  in  USD 
is WPXMS  for  DE,  FR  and  US  and  WPXNS  (excluding  OPEC)  for the  UK.  The  variable OPEN  used  for the 
weights  of domestic  cost components  is the trend of openness  of the domestic  market  used  for the 
other final  demand  deflators 
2 Standard  errors  1n  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
3 Estimation  method:  OLS  with  Almon  lags;  DE:  a:  no  lag;  b:  4 lags,  polynomial  of degree  2;  FR:  a=b: 
2 lags;  UK:  a:  no  lag;  b:  4 lags,  polynomial  of  degree  2;  US:  a:  3 lags,  polynomial  of degree  1. 
4 Competitor•s  prices being  defined  in  USD 1  no  exchange  rate effect is required for the  US -31-
The  equations  are  written  in  growth  rates;  they  allow  for  so•e  adjustment 
lag,  notably  on  import  prices  and  they  provide  coefficients  close  to  the 
homogeneity  constraint  of  the  price  block.  The  results  are  reported  in 
Tables  12  and  13.  The  quality of  the fit  is  not  always  good.  Generally,  the 
least satisfactory fit performance  is  observed  for  the  investment  deflator. 
3.5.4  Export  prices 
The  treatment  of  export  prices  differs  from  the  one  applied  to  the  other 
demand  deflators,  as  it must  reproduce  the  mark-up  behaviour  on  the  exter-
nal  markets.  In  the  framework  of  a  recursive  price  block,  based  on  a  key 
mark-up  equation  for  the  value  added  price  and  derived  demand  deflators,  it 
is  not  easy  to  isolate the  mark-up  behaviour  on  the  external  Markets. 
The  modelling  of  the  export  price  behaviour  is  based  on  a  standard  mark-up 
assumption:  export  prices  adjust  to  domestic  production  costs  to  a  lesser 
or  greater  extent  depending  on  the  competitive  pressure  on  the  external 
markets.  This  pressure  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  competitors•  prices  to 
domestic  production  costs. 
With  simple  assumptions,  this  is  equivalent  to  defining  the  export  price  as 
a  weighted  average  of  domestic  prices  and  foreign  prices. 
In  the  model,  the  equation  endogenises  the  deflator  for  exports  of  goods 
(PXM),  except  in  the  UK  where  the  special  treatment  for  oil  led  to  a  dis-
tinction  between  export  prices  of  energy  (PXE,  treated  in  Box  2)  and  export 
prices  of  non-energy  goods  (PXN).  The  equation  applies  to  the  latter.  The 
deflator  for  exports  of  services  (PXS)  is  simply  related  to  the  GOP  defla-
tor. 
All  prices  are  expressed  in  national  currency.  Competitors•  prices  are  pro-
vided  by  the  linkage,  calculated  as  an  average  of  export  prices  of  the  com-
petitors,  with  a  double  weighting  system  taking  into  account  the  market 
share  of  the  competitors  on  the  export  markets  and  the  relative  importance 
of  the  export  markets.  The  production  cost  variables  are  the  same  as  those 
used  for  the  domestic  final  demand  deflators  (PMM,P). 
The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  14.  The  homogeneity  of  export 
prices  had  to  be  imposed,  notably  for  France  and  Germany,  where  uncons-
trainted  estimation  results  suggest  that  domestic  costs  are  not  fully 
repercussed  on  export  prices.  Preliminary  tests  have  shown  that,  in  Germany 
and  the  UK,  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  are  not  immediately  considered 
as  a  change  in  the  competitive  position.  Longer  adjustment  lags  on  the 
exchange  rate  than  on  competitors•  prices  in  dollar  have  been  kept  in  the 
final  version  for  these  two  countries. 
The  country  results  exhibit  rather  fast  adjustments  of  export  prices  to 
internal  as  well  as  to  external  conditions.  In  addition,  they  imply  a  rela-
tively  weak  external  constraint,  with  an  elasticity  to  the  competitors• 
prices  between  0,2  and  0,3.  This  feature  may  be  more  specifically  imputed 
to  the  perturbations  over  the  last  years.  Stability  tests  have  confirmed  a 
tendency  to  a  decreasing  sensitivity  of  export  prices  to  competitiveness 
for  all  the  countries  except  the  UK.  The  eighties  in  particular  raise pro-
blems  in  France  and  Germany. -32-
Table  15:  Households•  non-wage  income 
log  {YNWH)  = c + a.log{EX.LSE.WR)  + b.log{GOS+INTG+YX)  + d.log{YNWH{-1)) 
Country/  estimated coefficients1,2 
sample 
i2  a  b3  c  d  !  SER  ow 
DE  0*  0,489  -0,406  0,547  4,1  0,99  2,23 
1965.I-1984.IV  {0,094)  {0,096)  {0,086) 
FR  with  CORC  0,135  0,252  -1,850  0,621  0,520  0,8  0,99  2,24 
1965. I-1984. IV  {0,047)  {0,031)  {0,619)  {0,050)  {0,102) 
UK  with  CORC  0,070  0,258  -0,361  0,648  -0,375  3,8  0,99  2,09 
1965. I-1984. IV  {0,043)  {0,060)  {0,199)  {0,070)  {0,108) 
US  with  CORC  0,111  0,560  -1,865  0,343  0,816  1,4  0,99  2,35 
1965.I-1984.IV  {0,088)  {0,069)  {1,176)  {0,072)  {0,068) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors  in brackets and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation method:  OLS  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction when  CORC  is specified 
3 For  Germany  and  the  US,  where  national  accounts  are based  on  the GNP  aggregate,  the variable GOS 
already  includes  factor  income  from  abroad;  the  YX  variable is then  omitted 
Table  16:  Imp11c1t  interest rate on  government  debt 
RDG  = a + b.RDG{-1)  + {1-b).RL 
Country/  estimated coefficients1 12 
i2  sample  a  b  ~  SER 
DE  0,09  0,86  -0,46  0,80  0,748 
1971. I-1984. IV  {0,07)  {0,05)  {0,12) 
FR  0,25  0,93  0,80  0,34  0,990 
1971. I-1984. IV  (0,23)  (0,05)  {0,08) 
UK  0,02  0,95  -0,64  0,61  0,995 
1971. I-1984. IV  {0,06)  {0,02)  {0,11) 
us  -0,15  0,73  0,37  0,819 
1971. I-1984. IV  {0,07)  {0,05) 
Notes:  1 Standard  errors 1n  brackets and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation  method:  DE,  FR,  UK:  OLS  w1th  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction for autocorrelation 
US:  OLS 
ow 
2,21 
1,27 
1,94 
1,88 -33-
3.6.  Sectoral  income,  taxes  and  transfers,  savings,  government  deficit  and 
the  balance  of  payments 
This  block  has  been  designed  to  guarantee  the  consistency  of  income  flows 
and  to  be  adequate  for  policy  simulations.  But  given  the  data  availability 
and  comparability,  compromises  had  to  be  made. 
Sectoral  income  flows  in  the  QUEST  model  are  modelled  according  to  a  some-
what  simplified  scheme.  Factor  income  from  (YXX)  and  to  (YXM)  the  rest  of 
the  world  is  simply  determined  by  total  exports  or  imports  by  applying  exo-
genous  shares.  The  same  approach  is  applied  to  the  general  government  tra-
ding  surplus  and  profit  income  (YG),  which  is  proportional  to  the  gross 
operating  surplus  of  the  whole  economy  (GOS).  Only  households•  non-wage 
income  (YNWH)  and  interest  payments  on  government  debt  (INTG)  are  modelled 
in  a  semi-behavioural  way,  companies•  profits  (YC)  being  calculated  as  a 
residual  item. 
As  for  most  of  the  sectoral  income  and  financial  flows,  a  proper  modelling 
of  non-wage  income  of  households  would  require  a  disaggregation  into  the 
main  income  sources.  Availability  and  comparability  of  the  data  do  not, 
however,  allow  this  approach  for  the  QUEST  model.  Using  national  quarterly 
data,  only  a  proxy  for  total  non-wage  income,  combining  income  of  self-
employed,  interest  and  property  receipts  can  be  constructed.  These  di ffe-
rent  components  are  so  heterogenous  that  a  simple  rule  linking  the  aggrega-
te  to  the  other  profit  variables  of  the  QUEST  model  (GOS,  INTG)  could  not 
be  applied  without  serious  distortions  in  simulation. 
One  of  the  major  differences  in  the  income  structure between  countries  lies 
in  the  weight  of  self-employed  in  the  economy,  the  highest  being  found  in 
France  and  the  lowest  in  the  UK,  where  non-wage  income  is  to  an  important 
extent  composed  of  dividend  payments.  It  seems  desirable  for  the  QUEST 
model  to  roughly  reproduce  these  country  features.  In  the  absence  of  detai-
led  data  on  the  income  components,  a  simple  rule  correcting  the  link  of 
non-wage  income  to  the  amount  of  profit  generated  in  whole  economy  by  the 
weight  of  self-employed  has  to  be  applied.  The  retained  assumption  is  that 
the  income  of  self-employed  is  partly  related  to  wages.  Total  non-wage 
income  can  then  be  decomposed  into  a  pure  prof1 t  component  and  a  wage 
dependent  component,  their  respective  weights  being  estimated  rather  than 
imposed. 
The  estimation  results  (Table  15)  confirm  the  high  weight  of  self-employ-
ment  in  France  and  show  that  earnings  of  self-employed  are  weakly  related 
to  wages  in  the  other  countries.  In  Germany,  it was  even  necessary  to  eli-
minate  this  link  in  order  to  get  acceptable  results.  The  elasticity  of 
households•  non-wage  income  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  profit  lies 
between  0,7  (FR)  and  1  (DE).  Even  if  the  retained  income  distribution  rule 
is  highly  simplistic,  it nevertheless  reproduces  country  specificities.  In 
addition,  it  should  attenuate  the  strong 
11automatic  stabiliser
11  effect  of 
the  non-wage  income  of  households  on  the  disposable  income  of  households 
which  would  otherwise  occur  in  simulation. -34-
Table  17:  Households'  income  taxes  .  . 
TYH  •  a.(YWB+YNWH+TPH) 
Country/  estimated coefficient1 12 
sample  a  SER 
DE 
1965.I-1984.IV  1,785  -0,285  5,21 
(0,191)  (0,108) 
FR 
1965.I-1984.IV  1,281  -0,346  9,72 
(0,260)  (0,107) 
UK 
1965. I-1984. IV  1,210  -0,229  6,64 
(0,181)  (0,111) 
us 
1965.I-1984.1V  1,200  -0,245  4,09 
(0,156)  (0,110) 
Notes:  1  Standard errors  in brackets  and  SER  in  percentage points 
2  Estimation method:  OLS  with  Cochrane-Orcutt correction 
Table  18:  Social  transfers  received by  households 
log(TPH/PCP)  •  a  + b.LUR 
Country/  estimated coefficients1 12 
sample  a  b  SER 
DE  -0,71  0,012  4,14 
1975.I-1984.IV  (0,02)  (0,003) 
FR  -0,67  0,02  12,43 
1975.1-1984. IV  (0,02) 
UK  3,95  0,02  11,47 
1975. I-1984.1V  (0,02) 
us  -1,23  0,04  9,38 
1975.1-1984. IV  (0,09)  (0,01) 
Notes:  1  Standard errors  in  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2  Estimation method:  OLS 
i2  DW 
0,534  2,07 
0,229  2,31 
0,303  2,14 
0,349  2,03 
i2  DW 
0,228  0,23 
0,362  0,02 
0,041  0,05 
0,250  0,06 -35-
Interest  payments  by  the  government  consist  mainly  of  the  service  of  the 
public  debt.  Interest  charges  are  determined  by  interest  rates  and  by  the 
size  and  composition  of  debt.  Structural  differences  between  countries  are 
very  large  in  this  respect,  so  that  only  a  very  stylized  representation  is 
given.  Government  debt  is  calculated  from  a  benchmark  (from  the  FINPUB 
database)  by  accumulating  government  deficits.  In  doing  so,  it  is  assumed 
implicitly  that government  deficits  are  not  monetary  financed.  This  assu•p-
tion  can  however  easily  be  relaxed  in  simulation.  An  apparent  interest  rate 
on  government  debt  is  derived  from  the  interest  pay11ents  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  government  debt  on  the  other.  This  apparent  interest  rate  on 
government  debt  is  explained  endogenously  as  a  function  of  the  long-term 
interest  rate,  with  a  long-run  coefficient  which  has  been  constrained  to  1 
(see  Table  16). 
Taxes  follow  the  disaggregation  for  policy  instruments  presented  in  section 
2.3.  The  only  tax  component  that  is  modelled  endogenously  is  the  flow  of 
households'  income  taxes  (TYH).  In  order  to  capture  in  one  way  or  another 
the  progressiveness  of  the  tax  systems,  the  equation  assumes  that  the 
growth  rate  of  income  taxes  is  p ropo rt  ion  a 1  to  the  growth  rate  of  income, 
the  coefficient of  proportionality  being  higher  than  one.  In  order  to  esti-
mate  this  coefficient,  the  growth  rate  of  the  tax  base  has  been  approxima-
ted  by  the  growth  rate  of  the  sum  of  the  wage  bill,  households'  non-wage 
income  and  net  current  transfer  received  by  households.  The  estimated  coef-
ficient  of  proportionality  (see  Table  17)  is  in  the  order  of  1,8  for 
Germany  and  1,2-1,3  for  the  other  three  countries.  Thus,  the  German  QUEST 
module  will  contain  a  somewhat  higher  degree  of  tax  progressiveness.  All 
other  tax  variables  are  obtained  from  an  exogenous  average  tax  rate  applied 
to  the  tax  base. 
Endogeni sat  ion  of  transfers  is  limited  to  soci a 1  benefits  received  by 
households.  A very  simple  specification  was  adopted,  in  which  transfers  are 
fully  indexed  to  the  consumption  price  index  and  depend  further  only  on  the 
unemployment  rate  which  represents  the  number  of  recipients  (see  Table  18). 
The  block  provides  as  output  the  respective  agents'  balances:  households' 
saving  (SAVH),  companies'  saving  (SAVC),  government  deficit  (DEFG)  and  the 
current  account  of  the  balance  of  payments  (BPC).  A fully  consistent  system 
going  into  the  detail  of  the  income  flows  and  the  intersectoral  balancing 
process  was  not  env1sageable  given  the  restrictions  on  the  data.  Minor 
flows  had  to  be  neglected  or  further  adjustments  had  to  be  introduced, 
mainly  for  the  government  deficit  and  the  balance  of  payments. 
In  particular,  the  balance  of  payments  requires  special  adjustment  to  link 
the  national  accounts  aggregates  to  the  balance  of  payments  data.  These 
reconciliation  factors  have  been  introduced  on  each  flow  with  the  rest  of 
the  world,  trade  in  goods  and  services,  factor  income  and  transfers.  The 
link  between  factor  income  and  domestic  income  depends  on  the  national 
accounts  system  using  GOP  or  GNP  as  the  main  aggregate.  Transfers  to  the 
rest  of  the  world  are  left  exogenous  and  are  not  imputed  to  any  domestic 
agent.  Factor  income  flows  could  be  endogenised  in  a  further  stage  of  the 
model.  For  the  time  being,  factor  income  from  abroad  (YXX)  and  factor 
income  paid  abroad  (YXM)  are  simply  proportional  to  total  export  earnings 
and  imports,  respectively. -36-
Table  19:  Money  demand 
log(M3/PY)  =a+ b.log(M3(-1)/PY(-1))  + c.(1-b).log{Y~) + d.(1-b).log(1+RS/100)  + e.(1-b)PY.4 
Country/  estimated coefficients  , 
sample  a  b  c  d  e  SER  i2  DW 
DE  0,12  0,84  1,39  -0,31  -2,04  0,80  0,996  1,99 
1973.II-1984.IV  (0,13)  (0,05)  (0,16)  (0,25)  (0,74) 
FR 
1973.11-1984. IV 
-0,25 
(0,23) 
0,86 
(0,06) 
0,63 
(0,18) 
-1,54 
(0,64) 
1,04  0,975  2,06 
UK3,4  -0,09 
(0,72) 
0,76 
(0,04) 
0,65 
(0,27) 
-0,93 
(0,38) 
-0,87 
(0,25) 
1,02  0,969  2,23 
1976. I-1984. IV 
us5  -0,41  o,92  1,30  -0,73  -3,68  o,5o  0,998  2,16 
1973.II-1984.IV  (0,15)  (0,03)  (0,16)  (0,51)  (1,23) 
Notes:  1 Standard errors  in brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
2 Estimation method:  NLS 
3  Interest rate lagged  two  quarters 
4 Dummy  variable reflecting the change  in monetary  policy in 1981  in  the UK:  0,01 
(0,006) 
5 Dummy  variable reflecting the  M3  redefinition in  1983  in the US: 
Table  20:  Short-term  interest rate1 
RS  =  a + b.RS(-1)  + c.YQ.100  + d.UCAP  + e(L).PCP.100  + f.LUR  + g.M3.100  + h.(BPC/Y)  + i.EXCHR  + j.Rsf 
with  Rsf  =  foreign  short-term interest rate (US-rate for  DE,  UK;  DE-rate  for FR) 
estimated ooefficients2,3  Country/ 
sanple  a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h  j 
-23,98  0,46 
(7,00)  (0,11) 
-2,80  0,46 
(2,33)  (0,10) 
0,30  0,40  -{),27 
(0,08)  (0,18)  (0,21) 
5,22  0,33  0,99  0,906 1,51 
1973.11-1984. IV 
FR 
1973.11-1984. IV 
lJ( 
1973.11-1984. IV 
us4,5 
1973.11-1984. IV 
0,64  0,56 
(1,02)  (0,09) 
-5,41  0,47  0,27 
(1,60)  (0,12)  (0,07) 
0,78 
(0,14) 
0,09 
(0,04) 
0,26 
(0,11) 
Notes:1  X  =  X/X_4-1 
2 Standard errors  in brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
(2,09)  (0,08) 
-{),35  1,03 
(0,19)  (0,44) 
-{),41 
(0,15) 
0,36 
(0,07) 
0,40 
(0,12) 
1,23 
1,57 
1,08 
3 Estimation  method:  OLS  with  Almon  lags  (US:  e with  4 lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail) 
4 Dummy  variable representing  the 1980  credit control  measures  in the US:  -6,15 
(1,18) 
5 Dummy  variable reflecting the  1980  switch  in the  US  monetary  policy:  2,83 
(0,64) 
6 For  DE:  difference between  the actual  and  the equilibrium  DM/USD  exchange  rate.  This 
is determined  by  PPP  and  the equilibrium current account  balance,  taken  to be  the 
average  current balance over  the last 8 quarters.  The  equilibrium exchange  rate is 
0,826 1,76 
0,726 1,82 
0,863  1,83 
thus  the fitted value of the estimated equation:  [  8  1  BPCDE  8  1  BPCUS  J 
EXCHR  = 1,36 + log  (P  /P  )  - 0,000163  log  ~ (- --)  I  '2:_  - (--) 
DE  US  i =0  8  Y  DE  -i  i=O  8  Y  US  -1 
For  FR:  FF/ECU  exchange  rate -37-
3.7  The  monetary  sector 
3.7.1  Money  demand 
Money  demand  M3  is  determined  endogenously  in  this  block  (see  Table  19).  A 
broad  concept  of  the  money  stock  has  been  chosen,  in  order  to  cope  with  the 
often  encountered  instability of  money  demand  functions.  Also  for  stability 
reasons  it was  decided  to  li11it  estimation  to  the  period  of  floating  ex-
change  rates,  because  a  change  of  regime  has  provoked  shifts  in  the  money 
demand  function.  The  functional  specification  of  the  11oney  demand  function 
follows  the  traditional  approach  in  which  a  simple  transaction  demand  for 
money  model  is  used  as  a  starting  point  and  the  corresponding  log-linear 
equation  is  estimated  with  an  additional  assumption  of  partial  adjustment 
in  terms  of  actual  real  money  balances  towards  the  desired  ones.  Real  GNP 
represents  a  scale  variable  in  this  equation,  and  the  short  term  interest 
rate  represents  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money.  Expected  inflation, 
as  a  proxy  for  the  return  on  goods  and  services,  is  also  included;  of  the 
three  inflationary  expectations  models  tested,  the  best  results  were  found 
with  static  expectations.  The  partial  adjustment  mechanism  of  actual  to 
desired  money  balances  outperformed  the  error-correction  model,  which  was 
also  tested. 
In  the  preferred  equations,  the  long-run  income  elasticity  was  not  cons-
trained  to  1,  since  for  two  countries  (Germany  and  France)  estimates  were 
significantly different  from  1. 
3.7.2  Interest  rates 
The  monetary  authorities•  policy  reaction  function  determines  the  short-
term  interest  rate  (RS)  (see  Table  20).  It is  assumed  that  the  money  market 
rate  is  the  instrument  of  the  monetary  authorities.  Final  as  well  as  inter-
mediate  targets  of  monetary  policy  enter  the  reaction  function.  Two  catego-
ries  of  target  variables  are  distinguished: 
(i)  internal  targets 
(growth  of  national  income,  utilization  rate  of  productive  capacity, 
inflation  rate,  unemployment  rate,  growth  of  the  money  stock,  ...  ) 
(ii)  external  targets 
(current  balance,  exchange  rate,  capital  movements,  ...  ) 
Whether  or  not  these  target  variables  enter  the  monetary  authorities•  poli-
cy  reaction  function,  depends  largely  on  country-specific  institutional 
factors.  The  principle  of  a  similar  specification  across  countries,  which 
is  a  basic  feature  of  QUEST,  is  therefore  somewhat  relaxed  in  this  specific 
case.  For  Germany,  the  inflation  rate,  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  rate 
of  capacity  utilization  were  found  to  be  the  most  important  internal  tar-
gets.  The  US-interest  rate  and  the  OM-dollar  exchange  rate  appear  as  the 
relevant  externa  1  targets.  For  France,  the  EMS-constraint  appears  in  the -38-
Table  21:  Long-ten.  interest rate1 
RL  •  a+ b.RL(-1)  + c(L).RS  + d.VARRS  + e(L).PCP.100  + f.DEFG/Y 
with  VARRS  •  variance of the short-term  interest rate over  the last two  years 
Country/ 
saq,le  a 
DE  1,50 
1973.11-1984. IV  (0,50) 
FR  0,06 
1973. II-1984. IV  (0,39) 
UK3  3,97 
1973. II-1984. IV  (1,06) 
us  0,16 
1973. II-1984. IV  (0,19) 
Notes:  1 X  = X/X  - 1 
-4 
b 
0,68 
(0,08) 
0,84 
(0,05) 
0,28 
(0,14) 
0,74 
(0,06) 
estimated coeff1c1ents2 13 
c  d  e 
0,11  0,07 
(0,04)  (0,02) 
0,10  0,09 
(0,04)  (0,04) 
0,32  0,12 
(0,08)  (0,05) 
0,24 
(0,05) 
2 Standard errors in  brackets  and  SER  in percentage points 
f 
0,14 
(0,04) 
3 Estimation  method:  OLS  with  distributed lags  (DE:  c with  2 lags 
FR:  c with  2 lags 
f  SER 
0,46 
0,42 
0,84 
-0,34  0,43 
(0,15) 
~  ow 
0,906  1,99 
0,967  2,27 
0,795  2,08 
0,968  1,99 
e with  Almon  lags  (6  lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail) 
UK:  c with  2 lags 
e with  Almon  lags  (6  lags,  degree  1,  constraint tail) 
US:  c with  2 lags) 
US:  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction for autocorrelation 
3 Dummy  variable for the first oil  shock  in the  UK:  0,75 
(0,41) 
Dummy  variable for the  second  o11  shock  in the  UK:  -1,02 
(0,48) -39-
list of  external  targets:  the  FF/ECU  rate  enters  the  equation,  as  well  as 
the  Ger•an  short-ter•  interest  rate.  Also  the  current  balance  as  a  percen-
tage of  GOP  is  a  target  variable.  For  the  UK,  the  growth  of  the  money  stock 
is  the  Most  important  internal  target.  The  US  short-term  interest  rate  and 
the  current  balance  as  a  percentage  of  GOP  are  the  external  targets.  For 
the  US  only  internal  targets  are  found  to  be  of  significance.  These  are: 
the  inflation  rate,  the  growth  rate of  GOP  and  the  growth  rate of  the  money 
stock. 
In  the  equation  determining  the  long-term  interest  rate  (RL),  a  simple 
treat•ent of  the  term  structure  of  interest  rates  is  adopted,  according  to 
which  the  long-term  rate  is  the  sum  of  the  current  and  expected  future 
rates  of  one  period  bonds,  plus  a  risk  preMium.  Interest  rate  expectations 
are  assumed  to  follow  an  auto-regressive  and/or  a  partial  adjustment 
scheme.  The  risk  premium  depends  on  the  variance of  short-term  rates  and  on 
the  relative  supply  of  long-term  assets,  which  is  represented  by  the 
government  deficit as  a  percentage  of  GOP  (see  Table  21). 
It  has  been  decided  to  keep  exchange  rates  exogenous  at  this  stage  of  the 
project. 
The  monetary  part  of  the  QUEST-model,  as  it 1s  descr1bed  above,  allows  for 
three  different  monetary  po11cy  reg1mes.  In  the  f1rst  one,  wh1ch  can  be 
labelled  as  perfectly  accomodating,  the  monetary  authorities•  policy 
reaction  function  is  overridden  and  the  central  bank  meets  an  increased 
demand  for  money  at  an  unchanged  money  market  rate.  In  the  standard  regime, 
the  central  bank  follows  the  estimated  monetary  policy  reaction  function. 
In  the  third  regime,  a  non-accomodating  monetary  policy  is  simulated  by 
fixing  the  money  stock  at  its  baseline  level  and  by  inverting  the  money 
demand  function  to  solve  for  the  corresponding  short-term  interest  rate. -40-
Table  22:  Imports  of non-energy  goods1 
log(MNQ)  •  a+ k.log(MNQ(-1))  + b.(log(YTTQ.Z)- k.log(YTTQ(-1).Z(-1))) 
+ c.(1-k).log(PMN/PYTT)  + d.(UCAP-k.UCAP(-1)) 
Country/  estimated coefficients2 
Sa!!J!le  a  b  c  d  k 
oE4  -4,759  1,382  -1,342  0,336  0,447 
1974.11-1984.1V  (1,028)  (0,100)  (0,254)  (0,146)  (0,089) 
FR  -2,740  1,133  -0,807  1,100  0,607 
1974.1-1984.IV  (0,880)  (0,131)  (0,193)  (0,260)  (0,085) 
UK  -13,348  1,579  -0,269  0,390  0,337 
1970.11-1984.IV  (2,558)  (0,061)  (0,075)  (0,147)  (0,126) 
us  -7,066  1,630  -0,795  0,553  0,399 
1974.11-1984.1V  (1,670)  (0,079)  (0,184)  (0,163)  (0,138) 
SER3  i2  ow 
1,75  0,990  2,16 
1,52  0,994  1,98 
3,44  0,976  1,94 
3,06  0,983  2,26 
Notes:  1 
11Energy••  1s  defined as  SITC  33  for the  UK  and  the  US  and  as  SITC  3 for France  and  Germany.  The 
variable Z is common  across  countries,  and  represents  a trendwise exponential  trade integration 
effect of about  3~ p.a.  before 1975  and  1,1~ afterwards 
2 Standard errors between  brackets;  estimation method:  NLS 
3 Standard error of  the regression  in percentage points 
4 For  the period 1974.11-1977.III,  a  dummy  coefficient was  added  to coefficient d,  with  value 
0,129  and  standard error 0,033 
Table  23:  Imports/apparent  consumption  of energy1 
Country/  estimated coefficients2 
sample  a  b  c  d  9  SER3  i2  ow 
DE  1,299  -0,195  4,15  0,515  1,58 
1973.I-1984.IV  (0,268)  (0,078) 
FR  -7,173  1,545  -0,386  0,686  4,65  0,862  2,14 
1969.I-1984.IV  (1,610)  (0,292)  (0,090)  (0,100) 
UK  -7,537  1,386  -0,641  3,374  0,270  8,32  0,662  1,88 
1976. I-1984. IV  (11,809)  (1,081)  (0,125)  (1,650)  (0,171) 
us  1,591  -0,427  0,435  9,44  0,376  1,97 
1975.1-1984.IV  (0,773)  (0,218)  (0,138) 
Notes:  1  For  the definitions  of  energy  concepts  used,  see  Table  22 
2 Standard errors between  brackets 
3  Standard error of  the  regression  in percentage points 
Specifications 
Germany:  G4(MEQ)  •  b(L).G4(YTTQ)  + c(L).G4(PME/PYTT) 
c(L):  POL  8  2  TAIL  Mean  lag:  3 quarters 
France:  log(MEQ)  =a+ b.log(YTTQ)  + c(L).log(PME/PYTT) 
c(L):  POL  12  2  TAIL  Mean  lag:  5  quarters 
United  log(CEQ)  •  a+ b(L).log(YQ-EX.YEQ-IITQ)  + c(L).log(PME/PY)  + d.IITQ/YQ_1 
Kingdom:  b(L):  POL  4  2  BOTH  Mean  lag:  2  quarters 
c(L):  POL  8  2  TAIL  Mean  lag:  2 quarters 
MEQ  =CEQ+ XEQ- EX.YEQ 
Unites  G4(MEQ)  = b.G4(YTTQ)  + c(L).G4(PME/PYTT) 
States:  c(L):  POL  8  2  TAIL  Mean  lag:  3 quarters 
NOTE:  G4(X)  = X/(X-1+X_2+X_3+X_4).4  - 1 -41-
3.8.  International  trade 
3.8.1  In  the  structural  models 
International  trade  is  split  between  goods  and  services.  Only  the  trade  in 
goods  is  treated  on  a  bil atera  1  basis.  A  further  breakdown  of  i11ports  of 
goods  between  energy  and  non-energy  has  been  introduced  in  order  to  take 
account  correctly  of  the  propagation  of  oil  price  shocks.  International 
flows  of  services  are  not  linked,  but  nevertheless  are  incorporated  in  the 
national  models  as  an  element  of  the  balance  of  payMents. 
3.8.1.1  Trade  in  goods1 
The  main  purpose  of  the  trade  linkage  is  to  translate  all  import  volumes 
and  export  prices  into  export  volumes  and  import  prices.  The  determination 
of  international  trade  in  goods  is  based,  for  each  country,  on  the  weak 
separability  of  a  production  function  which  is  used  to  satisfy  a  given 
final  demand.  Conceptually,  this  leads  to  a  two-stage  approach  in  which, 
first,  total  imports  of  (energy  and  non-energy)  goods  are  determined,  which 
are  next  allocated  among  24  trade  partners.  Aggregating  these  bilateral 
exports  leads  to  total  exports,  while  the  international  trade  structure  is 
also  used  to  calculate  the  relevant  world  prices  which  influence  import 
price  formation  to  a  large  extent.  This  approach  implies  that  export  volu-
mes  and  import  prices  may  be  considered  as  exogenous  variables  for  the 
country  models,  but  as  endogenous  ones  for  the  linkage  module.  For  import 
volumes  and  export  prices,  the  converse  holds. 
Imports  of  non-energy  goods  (MNQ)  depend  on  final  demand  (corrected  for 
trendwise  trade  integration),  the  corresponding  import  price  index  relative 
to  the  final  demand  deflator  and  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  (in 
order  to  represent  the  influence  on  imports  of  excess  goods  demand  on  the 
domestic  market).  The  dynamic  specification of  the  double  logarithmic  equa-
tions  is  derived  from  a  Koyck  lag  on  the  relative price  variable.  The  esti-
mation  results  are  given  in  Table  22.  As  stability  tests  have  pointed  to 
breaks  after  the  first  oil  shock,  except  for  the  UK,  sample  periods  have 
generally  been  shortened.  Correcting  the  final  demand  variable  for  trade 
integration  effects  implies  that  the  elasticity of  non-energy  imports  with 
respect  to  final  demand  is  lower  for  policy  simulations  than  it  would 
otherwise  be,  implying  larger  (Keynesian)  multipliers,  at  least  in  unlinked 
mode.  The  corrected  elasticit1es  range  from  1,1  to  1,6.  The  long-run  rela-
tive  price  elasticities  are  generally  well  determined  and  range  from  -0,3 
to  -1,3.  Also  the  effect  of  the  degree  of  capac1ty  utilization  1s  well 
determined,  and  results  1n  semi-elasticit1es  between  0,2  and  1,1. 
Since  imports  of  energy  goods  (MEQ)  are  assumed  to  be  derived  in  the  same 
framework  as  imports  of  non-energy  goods,  the  specifications  of  the  equa-
tions  for  the  former  resemble  closely  those  for  the  latter  (except  for  the 
United  Kingdom,  wh1ch  is  a  special  case,  see  Box  2).  Imports  of  energy  are 
thus  a  function  of  final  demand  (not  corrected  for  trade  1ntegration  since 
1  See  Italianer  (1987)  for  a  theoretical  derivation  and  extensive 
sion  and  presentation  of  the first  version  of  the  trade  linkage 
discus-
model. -42-
Table  24:  Imports  of non-factor services1 
log{MSQ}  •  a+ b{L}.log{YTTQ}  + c{L}.log{PMS/PYTT}  + d.lQS(MSQ{-1}} 
Country/  estimated coefficients21J 
i2  sa!!!!le  a  b  c  d  J  SER4  ow 
DES  -4,336  1,175  -0,841  -0,290  3,64  0,869  1,93 
1975.11-1984.IV  (0,577)  (0,095)  (0,418)  (0,165) 
FR6  -3,073  0,929  -1,298  0,422  2,87  0,897  1,70 
1977.111-1984.IV  (4,770)  (0,350)  (0,621)  (0,140) 
UK7  -2,212  1,065  -0,473  0,439  2,05  0,935  1,92 
1971.1-1984.IV  (0,735)  (0, 116)  (0,078)  (0,093) 
us  -5,670  1,213  -0,807  2,51  0,973  1,93 
1975.IV-1984.IV  {0 1526)  {0 1084}  (0 1083) 
Notes:  1  National  accounts  definition,  excluding  factor income 
2 Standard errors between  brackets 
3 Estimation  methods:  NLS  with  first-order autocorrelation correction for  DE  and  FR;  NLS  for the 
UK  and  OLS  for the  US 
Dynamics:  b(L)  and  c(L)  represent polynomials  in the lag  operator L.  The  values  given  forb and 
c are the  long-run  coefficients 
DE:  b(L)  = b  c(L)  •  c.L  for 1975.II-1982.IV 
= c  for 1983.I  -1984.IV 
FR:  b(L)  = b  c(L)  = c.L 
UK:  b(L)  = b.(1-d)  c(L)  •  c.(1-d) 
US:  b(L)  = b.L  c(L)  •  c 
4 Standard error of the  regression  in percentage points 
5 Dummies  for 1980.III-1982.IV and  1983.I-1984.IV 
6 Dummy  for 1980.IV  -1984.IV,  data  are  in base  1980 
7 Dummy  for 1971.I  -1976.IV 1  Durbin-h  •  01425 
Table  25:  Exports  of  non-factor  serv1ces1 
Country/ 
log{XSQ}  =a+ b(L}.log(XMQ+MMQ}  + c(L).log(PXS/PMS~ + d.log(XSQ(-1}) 
estimated coefficients  1J 
samQle  a  b  c  d 
DE  -1,600  0,869  -2,149  0,492 
1975. I 11-1984. IV  (0,539)  (0,114)  (0,748)  (0,131) 
FRS  -2,463  1,017  -1,307 
1980. I-1984. IV  (1,395)  (0,306)  (0,585) 
UK6  0,428  0,608  -1,126  0,793 
1970.IV-1984. IV  (0,255)  (0,108)  (0,318)  (0,047) 
us  -0,218  0,700  -0,805  0,878 
1972. II I'-1984. IV  (01175}  (0,182}  (0,274)  (0 1032} 
Notes:  1  National  accounts  definition,  excluding  factor services 
2 Standard errors between  brackets 
j 
-0,735 
(0,128) 
-0,593 
(0.150} 
SER4  'R2  ow 
5,79  0,811  1,92 
3,29  0,776  1,89 
2,13  0,945  1,89 
3,16  0,976  1,97 
3 Estimation  methods:  NLS  with  first-order autocorrelation correction for  DE  and  US;  OLS  for  FR 
and  NLS  for the  UK 
Dynamics:  b(L)  and  c(L)  represent polynomials  in  the  lag  operator  L.  The  values  given forb and 
c are the long-run  coefficients 
DE:  b(L)  = b.(1-d)  c(L)  = c.(L2-dL3) 
FR:  b(L)  = b.L  c(L)  = c 
UK:  b(L)  •  b.(1-d)  c(L)  = c.(1-d) 
US:  b(L)  = b.(1-d)  c(L)  = c.(1-d).L 
4 Standard error of the  regression  1n  percentage points 
5 A second  equation  estimated for 1976.1  - 1984.IV  gave  less satisfactory results,  but  is  used 
for historical  simulations preceding  1980. 
6 Durb1n-h  = 0 454 -43-
this  is  less  relevant  for  energy)  and  the  energy  iMport  price  relative  to 
the  deflator of  final  demand.  The  influence  of  the  degree  of  capacity  uti-
lisation  is  not  present  for  energy  imports,  so  it  has  not  been  included. 
The  estiMation  results,  presented  in  Table  23,  show  elasticities  with  res-
pect  to  final  demand  between  1,3  and  1,6,  thus  of  the  same  order  of  magna-
tude  as  those  for  non-energy  goods.  The  relative  price  elasticities  are 
markedly  1  ower  than  for  non-energy  goods,  and  range  fro•  -0,2  to  -0,4  if 
one  exludes  the  United  Kingdom,  which  is  better  capable  in  substituting 
foreign  energy  by  energy  from  indigenous  sources  than  other  countries  (see 
Box  2). 
Together  with  the  export  prices  (discussed  in  the  section  on  prices), 
import  volumes  of  goods  are  an  exogenous  input  for  the bilateral  trade  flow 
Rlodel  (see  subsection  3.8.3). 
3.8.1.2  Trade  in  non-factor  services 
Imports  of  non-factor  services  (MSQ)  have  been  assumed  to  be  derived  in  the 
sa••  production  function  framework  as  imports  of  goods.  This  leads  to  a 
specification with  imports  of  non-factor  services  depending  on  final  demand 
and  the  corresponding  import  price  relative  to  the  final  demand  deflator. 
Compared  to  the  specification for  imports  of  non-energy  goods,  some  simpli-
fications  had  to  be  made  due  to  the  heterogeneity  of  non-factor  services 
(travel  versus  transport,  origin  or  destination  of  transport  services  not 
necessarily  related  to  good  flows).  Trade  integration  effects  and  the 
degree  of  capacity  utilisation are  therefore  not  present. 
Estimation  results  are  given  in  Table  24.  Volume  elasticities  range  from 
0,9  to  1,2,  while  relative  price  effects  vary  between  -0,5  and  -1,3. 
Statistically these  results  are  well  determined,  but  depend  largely  on  the 
dynamics  of  the  equations. 
Given  the  approach  to  imports  of  non-factor  services,  exports  of  non-factor 
services  (XSQ)  should  theoretically  be  a  function  of  some  world  demand 
variable  for  services  and  the  export  price of  services  relative  to  a  compe-
titors•  price  index.  In  the  absence  of  data  concerning  these  variables, 
world  demand  has  been  proxied  by  the  sum  of  imports  and  exports  of  goods  of 
the  country  in  question,  while  competitors•  prices  are  assumed  to  be  repre-
sented  by  the  import  price  of  services.  The  presence  of  imports  in  the 
volume  variable  is  linked  to  the  fact  that  a  share  of  the  transport  servi-
ces  related  to  imports  of  goods  is  provided  by  domestic  transporters  on  the 
account  of  the  exporting  firm.  As  for  imports  of  services,  extensive 
testing  of  dynamic  specifications  was  required  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  set 
of  plausible  estimation  results,  presented  in  Table  25.  Long-run  vo1u11e 
elasticities  vary  between  0,6  and  1,0  while  the  relative  price  (in  this 
case:  ter11s  of  trade)  effect  is  stronger  than  for  imports  of  services, 
notably  for  Germany  (-2,1  versus  -0,8)  and  the  UK  (-1,1  versus  -0,5). -44-
Box  2:  The  treatment  of  energy  for  an  oil  producer 
The  distinction  of  imports  of  goods  between  energy  and  non-energy  in  the 
structural  models  necessitates  a  specific  treat•ent  for  oil  producing 
countries  such  as  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  model  for  this  country,  oil* 
is  treated  using  the  identity:  apparent  oil  consu•ption  (CEQ)  equals 
domestic  oil  production  (EX.YEQ)  plus  oil  imports  (MEQ)  11inus  oil  exports 
(XEQ).  Oil  production  is  exogenous,while  oil  exports  of  the  UK  are  linked 
to  oil  production  through  the  following  simple  equation: 
log(XEQ)  •  a  +  b0.1og(YEQ)  +  b1.1og(YEQ_1) 
Sample  a  bo  b1  bo+b1  j  SER  i2  ow 
1976.II-1984.IV  -1,256  0,492  0,629  1,121  0,721  7,24  0,964  2,37 
(1,034)  (0,179)  (0,171)  (0,133)  (0,028) 
Standard  error  between  brackets  and  SER  in  percentage  points 
This  equation  implies  that  UK  energy  exports  are  entirely  determined  by 
production,  and  thus  by  supply.  The  consequences  of  this  specification for 
the  trade  linkage  are  treated  in  Box  3.  Apparent  consumption  of  oil  is 
explained  by  a  behavioural  equation,  such  that  imports  are  determined 
residually.  The  estimation  results  for  the  equation  for  apparent  consump-
tion  are  included  in  Table  22  of  the  main  text.  The  explanatory  volume 
variable  is  defined  as  domestic  non-petroleum  production  excluding  changes 
in  stocks,  and  has  an  elasticity  of  1,4.  In  the  relative  price  variable, 
the  energy  import  price  has  been  taken  as  a  proxy  for  the  deflator  for 
total  (domestic  +  foreign)  petroleum  deliveries,  which  does  not  seem 
unrealistic  and  leads  to  a  long-run  relative  price  elasticity  of  -0,6, 
which  is  fairly  high  compared  to  the  other  countries•  results.  The  coeffi-
cient  on  the  - scaled  - stock  variable  implies  that  a  change  in  stocks 
equ iva  1  ent  to  one  percent  of  1  ast-peri od  GOP,  1  eads  to  a  corresponding 
percentage  change  in  petroleum  consumption  (including  stocks)  of  3,41.  In 
order  to  interpret  these  elasticities  in  terms  of  imports  of  energy,  they 
should  be  divided  approximately  by  the  share  of  energy  imports  in  the 
volume  of  apparent  consumption.  In  1980  prices  this  share  decreased  from 
119%  in  1976  to  59%  in  1984  in  the  UK. 
Finally,  in  order  to  deflate  energy  exports  of  the  UK,  a  behavioural  equa-
tion  links  the  energy  export  deflator  to  world  oil  prices  expressed  in 
domestic  currency: 
G(PXE)  =  b0.G(POIL.EXCHR)  +  b1.G(POIL.EXCHR)_1 
Sample 
1970.III-1984.IV  0,598 
(0,119) 
0,133  0,731 
(0,048)  (0,118) 
Dummy  SER 
-0,604  8,06 
(0,207) 
ow 
0,533  2,30 
- Standard  error  between  brackets 
- G(X)  •  X/X-1-1 
-Dummy  is  for  1974.I 
*  For  imports  and  exports, 
products);  for  production, 
gas". 
"o11"  1s  defined  as  SITC  33  (petroleum 
"oil"  is  defined  as  "extraction  of  oil  and -45-
3.8.2  In  the  trade-feedback  models 
The  main  purpose  of  the  trade-feedback  models  is  to  provide  an  "echo"  for 
the  structural  models.  Generally,  they  only  consist  of  equations  for  the 
volumes  and  price  deflators  for  imports  and  exports  of  total  goods.  Export 
volumes  and  import  prices  are  a  result  from  the  trade  linkage,·  so  the  core 
of  each  trade-feedback  model  is  formed  by  an  import  volume  and  export  price 
equation.  Given  the  limited  number  of  variables,  imports  of  goods  (MMSQ) 
are  related,  in  a  reduced-form  equation,  to  exports  of  goods  and  the  terms 
of  trade.  If  the  elasticities  with  respect  to  these  two  explanatory 
variables  equal  both  unity,  this  implies  that  the  ratio  between  the  values 
of  exports  and  imports  of  goods  is  constant  in  the  long  run.  Since  such  a 
condition  is  particularly  important  for  developing  countries,  it  has  been 
imposed  on  a  priori  grounds  for  3  zones:  the  OPEC,  the  NICs  and  the 
rest-of-the-world  zone,  which  comprises  the  remaining  developing 
countries.  For  the  other  countries  and  zones  an  upper  bound  equal  to  1  has 
been  imposed  for  these  two  elasticities  only  in  estimation.  Estimation 
results  for  the  error  correction  or  partial  adjustment  forms  of  the 
equations  are  presented  in  Table  26.  The  economic  significance  of  these 
results  is  fairly  limited,  although  for  a  country  like  Japan  historically 
low  elasticities  of  imports  with  respect  to  final  demand  seem  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  relatively  low  elasticiy  of  imports  with  respect  to 
exports. 
The  determination  of  export  prices  (PXMS)  in  the  trade-feedback  models 
differs  between  energy  exporters  and  other  countries  and  zones.  Of  the  21 
trade-feedback  countries/zones,  7  have  been  identified  for  which  energy 
exports  as  a  percentage  of  total  exports  are  important:  the  Netherlands, 
Canada,  Australia,  Norway,  OPEC,  the  Centrally  Planned  Economies  and  the 
rest-of-the-world  zone.  For  these  countries  export  prices  net  of  energy 
(PXNS)  have  been  calculated  using  the  world  oil  price  (POIL)  as  a  proxy  for 
energy  prices  and  using  the  share  of  energy  in  their  total  exports  of 
goods.  These  non-energy  export  price  proxies,  together  with  the  non-energy 
export  price  of  the  United  Kingdom,  allow  to  define  for  each  country  or 
zone  a  non-energy  import  price  (PMNSZ).  being  equal  to  a  weighted  average 
of  1)  non-energy  export  prices  for  the  energy  exporting  countries/zones  and 
2)  th~ total  export  prices  for  the  other  countries/zones.  These  non-energy 
import  prices  are  the  main  explanatory  variable  in  the  export  price 
equations  for  the  trade-feedback  models.  They  serve  to  transmit  price 
shocks  not  directly  originating  in  changes  in  oil  prices.  Estimates  for 
this  relationship  are  presented  in  Table  27.  They  show  that,  in  the  long 
run,  generally  a  large  proportion  (60-100~)  of  non-energy  import  price 
shocks  is  transformed  into  an  export  price  change.  This  is  part  1 y  due  to 
the  openness  of  the  economies.  and  part  1  y  due  to  the  absence  of  domestic 
cost  variables.  For  the  energy  exporting  countries,  the  total  export  price 
is  furthermore  influenced  by  the  world  oil  price.  These  equations,  also 
shown  in  Table  27,  are  simply  a  rewriting  of  the  net-of-energy  export  price 
definitions,  with  the  non-energy  export  price  substituted  by  the  non-energy 
import  price  with  an  a  priori  elasticity  equal  to  0,5,  except  for  OPEC, 
where  it  is  assumed  to  have  no  influence.  Although  estimations  mostly 
confirmed  the  a  priori  values  imposed  in  these  equations,  they  were  left as 
such  to  ensure  the  consistency  between  the  total  export  price  and  the 
non-energy  export  price,  notably  for  the  case  where  the  oil  price  changes. -46-
Table  26:  Imports  of  goods  in  the  trade-feedback  •odels 
log(MMSQ)  •  a+ k.(b.log(XMSQ/XMSQ_1)  +  c.log(PXMS/PMMS)) 
+  (1-d).(b.log(XMSQ_1)  +  c.log(PXMS_1/PMMS_1)) 
+  d.log(MMSQ_1) 
Country 
BLEU 
Denmark 
Greece 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Nether-
lands 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway4 
Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
Rest  of 
OECD 
OPEC 
CPEs 
NICs 
Rest  of 
the  world 
a 
0,623 
(0,835) 
3,006 
(0,793) 
4,014 
(0,953) 
2,503 
(1,275) 
0,876 
(0,364) 
0,550 
(1,231) 
3,044 
(0,435) 
2,014 
(1,010) 
1,309 
(0,779) 
1,094 
(0,794) 
0,549 
(1,429) 
1,345 
(0,504) 
1,335 
(1,101) 
6,229 
(1,292) 
1,555 
(0,865) 
0,025 
(0,009) 
0,672 
(0,849) 
-0,063 
(0,015) 
1,046 
(0,429) 
0,019 
(0,008) 
0,036 
(0,020) 
Estimated  coefficients1 
b 
0,898 
(0,140) 
0,3745 
0,547 
(0,134) 
0,3046 
0,6416 
0,9435 
0,6148 
0,5166 
0,7605 
0,4628 
0,8546 
0,6815 
0,619 
(0,260) 
0,1719 
0,579 
(0,200) 
1 
* 
0,736 
(0,320) 
1 
* 
0,6715 
1 
* 
1 
* 
c 
0,889 
(0,267) 
1 
* 
0,630 
(0,253) 
0,3757 
1 
* 
0,3793 
1 
* 
1 
0,5666 
0,3379 
0,8426 
0,363 
(0,677) 
0,5155 
0,829 
(0,344) 
1 
* 
0,7403 
(0,472) 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
d 
0,420 
(0,168) 
0,440 
0,124 
0 
* 
0,609 
(0,142) 
0,706 
(0,086) 
0,208 
(0,106) 
0,107 
(0,056) 
0,578 
(0,117) 
0,422 
(0,121) 
0,804 
(0,089) 
0,596 
(0,132) 
0,546 
(0,099) 
0,582 
(0,152) 
0,097 
(0,139) 
0,590 
(0,140) 
0,808 
(0,082) 
0,727 
(0,123) 
0,861 
(0,027) 
0,703 
(0,075) 
0,891 
(0,058) 
0,842 
(0,086) 
0,848 
(0,132) 
1-d 
1 
* 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
1-d 
0,629 
(0,330) 
1-d 
0,902 
(0,360) 
0,761 
(0,131) 
0,645 
(0,305) 
0,052 
(0,058) 
1-d 
0,241 
(0,126) 
1,024 
(0,129) 
2,51 
3,39 
12,41 
4,58 
5,39 
6,43 
11,02 
3,18 
5,46 
3,17 
6,42 
3,11 
6,44 
5,33 
4,32 
3,58 
7,82 
3,39 
0,86 
2,56 
2,76 
i2  DW 
0,705  2,16 
0,728  1,93 
0,311  1,94 
0,501  1,87 
0,914  2,11 
0,683  1,70 
0,769  1,01 
0,632  2,25 
0,778  1,78 
0,823  1,83 
0,588  1,55 
0,906  2,15 
0,161  2,17 
0,608  2,01 
0,444  1,79 
0,532  2,31 
0,282  2,27 
0,431  1,30 
0,990  0,76 
0,118  1,83 
0,643  0,27 
Notes:  1  Standard  errors  between  brackets.  An  asterisk  indicates  an  a 
priori  imposed  value.  Sample  period:  1976.I-1984.IV 
2  If  k  •  1-d,  the  model  becomes  a  partial  adjustment  model 
3  Estimated  standard error of  the  equation 
4  For  Norway,  a  dummy  was  estimated  for  1976.I-1978.I  with  value 
0.165  (0.041) 
5  Long  run  value.  Short  run  value  significant at  1~ 
6  Long  run  value.  Short  run  value  significant at  5~ 
7  Long  run  value.  Short  run  value  significant at  15~ 
8  Long  run  value.  Short  run  value  significant at  10~ 
9  Long  run  value.  Short  run  value  not  significant at  15~ -47-
Table  27:  Export  prices  in  the  trade-feedback  Models 
Non-energy 
exporters: 
log(PXMS)  •  a+ k.b.(log(PMNSZ/PMNSZ_1) 
+  log(PMNSZ_1/PMNSZ_2))/2 
+  (1-d).b.(log(PMNSZ-1)  +  log(PMNSZ_2))/2 
+  d.log(PXMS_1) 
Country 
BLEU 
DenMark 
Greece 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Japan 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
Rest  of 
OECD 
NICs 
a 
-0,055 
(0,009) 
1,177 
(0,226) 
0,455 
(0,378) 
0,498 
(0,290) 
0,477 
(0,237) 
-0,013 
(0,007) 
1,367 
(0,486) 
0,282 
(0,181) 
0,783 
(0,283) 
-0,003 
(0,005) 
0,452 
(0,276) 
0,056 
(0,297) 
0,178 
(0,237) 
0,188 
(0,071) 
EstiMated  coefficients1 
b.(1-d) 
0,161 
(0,213) 
0,268 
(0,128) 
0,511 
(0,264) 
0,622 
(0,224) 
c 
1 
* 
0,739 
(0,052) 
0,898 
(0,086) 
0,886) 
(0,066) 
0,605 
1 
* 
0,688 
(0,110) 
0,594 
(0,389) 
0,822 
(0,064) 
1 
* 
0,722 
0,975 
0,935 
0,923 
(0,032) 
d 
0 
* 
0 
* 
0 
* 
0 
* 
0,734 
(0,248) 
0,395 
(0,104) 
0 
* 
0,851 
(0,102) 
0 
* 
0,309 
(0,103) 
0,629 
(0,142) 
0,476 
(0,229) 
0,335 
(0,210) 
0,454 
(0,123) 
k 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
0,809 
(0,552) 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1 
* 
1,287 
(0,142) 
SER  i2  DW 
5,47  0,486  0,27 
4,62  0,854  0,40 
7,55  0,756  2,08 
5,99  0,837  1,57 
4,11  0,933  1,76 
3,30  0,278  1,89 
10,32  0,520  1,44 
3,41  0,122  1,45 
5,75  0,822  0,39 
2,85  0,187  1,93 
5,13  0,853  1,56 
5,61  0,892  1,04 
4,95  0,905  1,53 
1,35  0,733  1,98 
Energy  exporters:  log(PXMS)  •  v.log(POIL)  +  b.(log(PMNSZ)  +  log(PMNSZ_1))/2 
+  residual 
log(PXNS)  •  (log(PXMS)-v.log(POIL/PPOIL*100))/(1-v) 
+  scale  factor3 
b 
Netherlands  0.15  0.5 
Canada  0.10  0.5 
Australia  0.20  0.5 
Norway  0.40  0.5 
OPEC  1  0 
CPE  0.15  0.5 
Rest  of  the  World  0.15  0.5 
Notes:  1  Standard  errors  between  brackets  and  SER  in  percentage  points 
2  Estimated  standard  error of  the  equation 
3  Scaling  to  obtain  1980  •  100,  PPOIL  •  1980  average  level  of  POll 
4  A  priori  shares  of  energy  in  total  exports.  Source:  Co11mission -48-
As  for  the  structural  models,  the  import  volumes  and  export  prices  form  an 
input  for  the  trade  linkage  module,  discussed  next. 
3.8.3  The  linkage  system 
Together  with  the  export  prices  (discussed  in  the  section  on  prices), 
import  volumes  of  goods  are  an  exogenous  input  for  the  bilateral  trade  flow 
model.  This  model  determines,  on  the  basis  of  import  volumes  and  export 
prices,  bilateral  export  flows  between  the  25  countries/zones  of  the  QUEST 
model,  in  tot  a 1  605  flows.  The  bil atera  1  export  flow  equations  determine 
the  volume  share  of  exports  of  country  i  in  i11ports  of  country  j  as  a 
function  of  the  export  price  of  country  i  relative  to  the  import  price  of 
country  j  (i.e.  the  weighted  average  of  all  countries•  export  prices  with 
import  shares  on  market  j  as  weights  ) .  After  correcting  for  adding-up 
properties,  the  sum  of  bilateral  exports  originating  in  country  i 
determines  total  exports  (XMSQ)  of  country  i,  while  all  bilateral  exports 
going  to  a  country  j  determine  the  weighting  scheme  for  export  prices  which 
forms  the  basis  for  the  determination  of  the  import  price  (PMMS)  of  country 
j.  In  Table  28  the  1 ast  two  columns  present  root  mean-squared  percentage 
errors  for  export  volumes  and  import  prices  calculated on  this  basis  from  a 
dynamic  simulation  over  the  period  1980-1984.  The  first  part  of  the  same 
table  presents  the  implied  export  price  elasticities  for  total  exports, 
also  obtained  by  simulation  (the  corresponding  bilateral  price elasticities 
may  be  found  in  ITALIANER  (1987)).  They  represent  an  average  of  the 
bilateral  relative  price  elasticities,  and  their  long-run  values  vary 
between  -0,65  and  -1,50,  their  simple  average  being  equal  to  about  -1.  The 
speed  of  adjustment  of  bilateral  trade  flows  to  relative  price  changes  is 
presently  rather  high  with,  on  average,  88%  of  a  price  shock  effect  being 
realized within  the  year  after  the  shock. 
The  above  results  refer  to  a  linkage  model  for  total  trade.  The 
distinction  between  non-energy  and  energy  imports  has  necessitated  ad-hoc 
modifications  to  the  bilateral  trade  flow  model  in  order  to  deal  with  this 
distinction  and  in  order  to  assure  the  correct  propagation  of  oil-price 
shocks.  The  modifications  introduced  are  discussed  in  Box  3. -49-
Box  3:  The  treatment  of  energy  in  international  trade 
Starting  from  the  country  models  and  international  trade  linkage  11odule 
described  in  the  text,  this  box  lists  the  modifications  introduced  in 
order  to  deal  as  correctly  as  possible  with  energy.  In  doing  so,  emphasis 
was  put  on  the  correct  propagation  of  oil  price  shocks. 
a)  As  described  in  subsection  3.8.2,  proxies  for  non-energy  export  prices 
were  defined  for  7  energy  exporters.  Together  with  the  non-energy  ex-
port  price  for  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  total  export  prices  of  the 
remaining  countries  and  zones  (which  are  thus  considered  to  be  11 non-
energy11  implicitly),  this  allows  the  calculation  of  non-energy  import 
prices,  i.e.  weighted  averages  of  1)  non-energy  export  prices  for  the  8 
energy  exporters  and  2)  non-energy  export  prices  for  the  16  remaining 
countries  (the  OPEC  export  price  is  excluded).  The  weights  used  were 
bilateral  import  shares  for  total  trade  due  to  lack  of  information  on 
bilateral  energy  flows,  thus  introducing  some  bias. 
b)  For  trade  flows  not  originating  in  one  of  the  8  energy-exporting  coun-
tries/zones,  the  import  price  (for  total  goods)  in  the  relative  price 
term  has  been  replaced  by  the  non-energy  import  price  calculated  as 
described  under  a). 
c)  For  trade  flows  originating  in  one  of  the  8  energy-exporting  countries 
except  the  UK  and  OPEC,  the  same  has  been  done  as  under  b)  but  in  addi-
tion  their  (total)  export  price  in  the  relative  price  term  has  been 
replaced  by  the  non-energy  export  price  proxy,  and  the  relative  price 
term  has  been  multiplied  by  one  minus  the  share  of  energy  in  total  ex-
ports  from  Table  27.  The  latter  implicitly  entails  the  assumption  that 
the  law  of  one  price  holds  for  energy  products  from  different  geogra-
phical  origins,  which  seems  reasonable. 
d)  For  bilateral  exports  from  the  UK  to  all  countries/zones  except 
Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States,  the  same  has 
been  done  as  under  c),  but  using  the  observed  non-energy  export  price 
deflator  and  the  observed  share  of  energy  in  total  exports. 
e)  For  bilateral  exports  from  OPEC  to  all  countries/zones  except  Germany, 
France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  the  bilateral  price 
elasticity  has  been  set  equal  to  zero  under  the  assumptions  that  1) 
OPEC  only  competes  with  other  energy  exporters  and  2)  the  law  of  one 
price  holds  for  energy  products. 
f)  The  equations  for  bilateral  exports  from  the  UK  to  Germany,  France  and 
the  United  States  have  each  been  cut  into  two  parts.  The  first  part 
consists  of  an  expression  multiplying  total  energy  exports  of  the  UK  by 
the  fixed  bilateral  share  of  each  of  the  three  countries  in  UK  total 
energy  exports  (D:  14,5%,  F:  13,3%,  US:  16,5%).  This  part  may  thus  be 
consi dared  as  a  supply  equation  for  bilateral  energy  exports  from  the 
UK  to  each  of  the  three  countries.  The  second  part  of  the  equation 
adds  to  this  an  expression  equal  to  the  original  equation,  but  with  the 
relative  prices  modified  as  under  d)  and  with  the  total  import  volume 
variable  replaced  by  imports  of  non-energy  goods.  So  the  second  part 
represents  the  bil atera  1  non-energy. exports  from  the  UK  to  each  of  the 
three  countries. -50-
Box  3:  The  treatment  of  energy  in  international  trade  (continued) 
g)  Finally,  in  the  equations  for  bilateral  exports  fro11  the  OPEC  zone  to 
Germany,  France,  the  United  KingdoM  and  the  United  States,  the  relative 
price  elasticities  were  put  equal  to  zero,  the  volume  variable  (total 
imports)  was  replaced  by  imports  of  energy  and,  except  for  the  flow  to 
the  UK,  an  additive  term  was  introduced  representing  the  inverse  of  the 
UK  energy  supply  variables  described  under  f). 
As  a  consequence  of  these  ad-hoc  changes,  relative  price  effects  ~mong 
energy  producers  have  been  eliminated  in  the  linkage  module.  If  there  is 
an  oil  price  decline,  the  OPEC  (or  other  energy  exporters,  for  that 
matter)  will  not  gain  market  shares  in  world  trade  of  goods  if  import 
volumes  (non-energy  goods  and  energy)and  export  prices  of  non-energy  goods 
remain  unchanged.  It  will  only  gain  •arket  shares  because  lower  energy 
prices  will  stimulate  energy  iMports  in  general,  and  thus  OPEC  exports. 
Furthermore,  energy  exports  from  the  UK  are  supply-determined.  Any 
autonomous  increase  in  UK  energy  exports  will  be  subtracted  from  OPEC 
exports  and  vice  versa,  thus  treating  OPEC  as  the  swing  producer.  This 
system  will  work  progressively  as  more  structural  models  become 
available. -51-
Table  28:  Characteristics of the linkage system 
Cumulative  export price elasticities for  Root  .aan-squared percentage error 
exports of total  goods!  from  a dynamic  simulation of the 
11nkage  systa~ 1980.I-1984.IV2 
Country  Ql  Q2  Q3  year 1  year 2  year 5  Export  volume  Import  pr1ce 
BLEU  -0,37  -0,47  -0,52  -0,56  -0,60  -0,67  1,9  0,17 
Denmark  -0,60  -0,79  -0,89  -0,95  -1,06  -1,08  1,7  0,32 
FR  of Germany  -0,47  -0,62  -0,70  -0,75  -0,82  -0,83  1,7  0,14 
Greece  -0,58  -0,72  -0,75  -0,76  -0,79  -0,73  9,1  0,26 
Spain  -0,54  -0,73  -0,82  -0,85  -0,89  -0,90  6,0  0,45 
France  -0,42  -0,56  -0,63  -0,67  -0,72  -0,73  1,6  0,17 
Ireland  -0,57  -0,80  -0,93  -1,01  -1,12  -1,18  4,2  0,41 
Italy  -0,71  -0,90  -0,97  -1,00  -1,03  -1,06  3,8  0,30 
The  Netherlands  -0,43  -0,57  -0,64  -0,68  -0,76  -0,80  1,7  0,23 
Portugal  -0,32  -0,53  -0,67  -0,74  -0,93  -1,08  5,4  0,41 
United  Kingdom  -0,55  -0,78  -0,90  -0,97  -1,07  -1,12  2,8  0,19 
United  States  -0,56  -0,71  -0,79  -0,84  -0,92  -0,95  2,1  0,14 
Canada  -0,48  -0,59  -0,64  -0,66  -0,55  -0,65  2,5  0,19 
Japan  -0,51  -0,74  -0,87  -0,96  -1,04  -1,10  5,3  0,13 
Australia  -0,72  -0,90  -0,96  -0,99  -1,04  -1,05  3,6  0,22 
Austria  -0,29  -0,43  -0,52  -0,58  -0,71  -0,79  1,6  0,14 
Finland  -0,70  -0,85  -0,90  -0,91  -0,88  -0,93  3,1  0,27 
Norway  -0,57  -0,82  -0,97  -1,05  -1,16  -1,16  3,5  0,33 
Sweden  -0,51  -0,66  -0,72  -0,74  -0,77  -0,81  3,9  0,26 
Switzerland  -0,41  -0,56  -0,62  -0,66  -0,71  -0,73  2,4  0,39 
Rest of OECD  -0,82  -1,06  -1,17  -1,22  -1,51  -1,49  4,5  0,26 
OPEC  -0,38  -0,50  -0,59  -0,65  -0,76  -0,86  3,8  0,26 
CPEs  -0,46  -0,56  -0,59  -0,65  -0,74  -0,77  4,0  0,19 
NICs  -0,42  -0,64  -0,78  -0,88  -1,08  -1,30  2,9  0,12 
Rest  of world  -0,95  -1,20  -1,31  -1,38  -1,53  -1,39  8,7  0,14 
Notes:  1 The  bilateral  export functions  are of the following  form  (i  •  exporter,  j  =  importer) 
log  (Xij/PXMSi)  = aij + log(MMSZj/PMMSZj)  + bij·log(X1j(-1)/PXMSi(-1)/MMSZj(-1).PMMSZj(-1)) 
+ cij(1-bij).log(PXMSi/PMMSZj)  +dummies 
This  implies  aggregate export functions  with  an  elasticity of 1 w1th  respect to weighted world 
demand  and  a  relative export price elasticity which  is a weighted  average of the c1j 
coefficients.  The  long  run  value  and  the dynamic  profile of these relative export price 
elasticities are given  here,  for the first 4 quarters after a price shock,  and  after 8,  12  and 
20  quarters,  respectively. 
2 The  RMSPEs  g1ve  a good  indication of the ability of the bilateral  trade flow  1n  predicting, 
given  1mport  volumes  and  export prices,  export  volumes  and  import prices. -52-
4.  SIMULATION  PROPERTIES! 
4.1  Simulation  modes 
The  QUEST  model  may  be  simulated  under  three  alternative  monetary  policy 
regimes  when  considering,  for  example,  a  government  spending  shock. 
i)  Standard  monetary  policy 
In  this  mode,  model  simulations  are  characterised  as  follows: 
- the  money  supply  is  determined  by  the  demand  for  money  function; 
- the  short-term  interest  rate  is  determined  by  the  monetary  authorities• 
reaction  function. 
Since  the  short-term  interest  rate  is  allowed  to  react  to  the  policy  shock 
via  the  authorities•  reaction  function,  which  in  turn  will  have  its  impact 
on  the  money  supply  via  the  demand  for  money  function  in  which  it is  one  of 
the  arguments,  this  mode  can  also  be  labelled  as  partially  accommodating. 
Except  for  the  tests  in  subsection  4.2.1,  this  monetary  policy  mode  was 
used  for  all  simulations. 
ii)  Accommodating  monetary  policy  (fixed  interest  rate) 
In  this  mode,  the  money  supply  is  again  determined  by  the  demand  for  money 
function.  The  short-term  interest  rate  is  however  fixed  at  its  baseline 
level.  Since  interest  rates  are  unaffected  by  the  policy  shock,  the  money 
supply  fully  accommodates  demand. 
iii)  Non-accommodating  monetary  policy  (fixed  money  stock) 
In  this  mode,  the  money  supply  is  fixed  at  its  baseline  level.  The  money 
demand  equation  is  renormalised  to  determine  the  market  clearing 
short-term  interest  rate,  whereas  the  short-term  interest  rate  equation  is 
overridden.  For  given  increases  in  GNP/GOP  and  prices,  the  extent  to  which 
interest  rates  need  to  increase  to  keep  money  demand  at  its target  level  is 
determined  by  the  relevant  money  demand  function  elasticities.  Note  that 
the  lagged  short-term  interest  rate  in  the  money  demand  function  for  the  UK 
is  replaced  by  its current  value  in  this  mode. 
Concerning  government  spending,  two  modes  are  available.  Government 
consumption  and  investment  may  be  kept  fixed  at  their  baseline  values  in 
nominal  or  !!!!  terms.  When  fixed  in  nominal  terms,  real  government 
1  It  would  have  been  a  logical  step,  after  presentation  of  the  estimation 
results  and  before  looking  at  the  behaviour  of  the  model  when  influenced 
by  shocks,  to  regard  its  historical  tracking  record,  e.g.  in  the  form  of 
dynamic  simulation  residuals.  Technically,  the  absence  of  an  endogenous 
determination  of  the  (raw)  residuals  of  equations  estimated  with  a 
correction  for  autocorrelation  have  so  far  downgraded  the  value  of  such 
historical  simulations.  The  model  will,  therefore,  have  to  be  rewritten 
in  order  to  perform  such  tests.  Apart  from  this  technical  reason,  the 
fact  that  the  equations  have  been  estimated  such  as  to  contain 
statistically  confirmed  - a  priori  reasonable  economic  behaviour  rather 
than  a  good  statistical  fit  (thus  limiting  the  use  of  dummies),  render 
such  an  exercise  less  interesting  than  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  model •s 
economic  properties. -53-
investment  is  determined  by  dividing  no11inal  governMent  investMent  by  the 
total  investment  deflator,  while  real  government  consumption  is  calculated 
by  dividing  nominal  government  consumption  by  an  average  index  of  noMinal 
wage  cost  and  consumer  prices  (weighted  by  the  share  of  wages  and  non-wage 
expenditure  in  government  consumption,  respectively).  When  fixed  in  real 
terms,  nominal  government  investment  is  equal  to  real  government  investment 
multiplied  by  the  total  investment  deflator,  while  nominal  government 
consumption  is  the  su11  of  employment  in  the  public  sector  (exogenous) 
mu 1 tip  lied  by  nomina 1  wage  cost  (endogenous)  and  rea  1  non-wage  government 
consumption  (exogenous)  multiplied  by  consumer  prices  (endogenous).  In  the 
simulations  presented  in  this  paper,  both  government  consumption  and 
investment  were  always  kept  fixed  at  their  baseline  or  ex-ante  shocked 
levels  in  real  terms. 
Finally,  the  models  may  be  chosen  to  operate  in  unlinked  or  linked  mode.  In 
unlinked  mode,  foreign  demand  and  import  prices  of  goods  are  exogenous  in 
each  country  model.  The  bilateral  export  equations  do  still  operate 
however,  such  that  gains  in  competitiveness  will  increase  exports  in  a  way 
consistent  with  the  linked  mode.  In  the  latter  case,  import  prices  and 
foreign  demand  become  completely  endogenous,  and  there  will  be  spillover 
effects  between  countries  through  international  trade  in  goods. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  all  simulations  are  run  with  exogenous 
exchange  rates.  The  simulation  period  ranges  from  the first quarter  of  1977 
to  the  fourth  quarter  of  1983  as  these  are  the  years.  for  which  all  country 
modules  can  be  simulated  jointly.  Individual  country  modules  may  be  run 
over  a  longer  time  span.  This  paper  presents  the  simulation  results  only 
for  the  first  five  years  of  the  simulation  period  and  only  for  a  number  of 
variables  of  central  importance.  A  more  detailed  presentation  of  the 
simulation  results  than  in  this  part  of  the  paper  can  be  found  in  two 
separate  volumes  (part  II  and  part  III)  which  can  be  obtained  from  the 
authors  upon  request.  Concerning  the  simulation  period  preliminary  tests 
indicate  that  - with  the  notable  exception  of  the  oil  price  shock  - for  the 
majority  of  shocks  the  simulation  results  are  only  to  a  comparatively  small 
extent  baseline  dependent. 
4.2  Non-linked  simulations 
4.2.1  Government  investment  increase 
In  analyzing  the  effects  of  changes  in  fiscal  policy  a  first  set  of 
simulations  concerns  a  sustained  increase  in  general  government  fixed 
investment.  The  size  of  the  shock  is  equivalent  to  1  percent  of  baseline 
real  GOP/GNP.  As  the  size  of  the  fiscal  policy  multipliers1  depends  on  the 
conduct  of  monetary  policy,  three  alternative  monetary  policy  assumptions 
are  investigated  in  turn. 
4.2.1.1  With  monetary  policy  reaction  function 
As  set  out  above,  the  standard  versions  of  the  QUEST  country  modules 
contain  both  a  money  demand  equation  and  a  short-term  interest  equation, 
1  Strictly  speaking,  the  form  in  which  the  simulations  are  presented  in 
this  paper  is  not  the  classical  multiplier  formula  b.Y/  AG  where  Y  is 
real  GOP/GNP  and  G  real  government  spending,  but  A.Y/Y.  Since  in  the 
simulations  presented  below  6G/Y  ==  11,  both  formulas  are  equivalent  in 
this  particular case. -54-
Table  29:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT  INCREASE  1X  OF  BASELINE  GOP, 
=============================================================================== 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••••  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
•••••••••••••••  0  ••••••  0  •  •  •  •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  •  0  YEAR  1 
REAL  ...................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ........ YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
STOCKBUILDING  ........ YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••.•  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
0  0  •••••••  0  ••••••••••••  0  0  •  •  •  3 
••••  0  •••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••••••••  0  ••••••••••••••••  0  •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
•••  0  •  0  •••••••••••••  0  ••••••  0  2 
•••••••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
•••••••••••  0  •••  0  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
•  0  ••••••••••••••••••••••••  0  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
•  0  •••••  0  ••••  0  •  0  ••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2 
0  ••  0  ••••  0  ••••••••••••••  0  0  0  •  3 
••••••••••••••  0  •• 0  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  •  •  4 
0  •••  0  •  0  ••  0  •  0  ••••••  0  •••••  0  •  •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  ••.• :  YEAR  1 
•••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2 
••  0  ••••••••••••••••••••••  0  •  3 
•••••••••••••••••••••  0  0  0  •  •  •  4 
••••••••••••  0  •  0  •  0  •  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
•  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
••••••••••••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  4 
• • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  ••••••••••••••••••••••  2 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION) ••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE....................  2 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
•••••  0  0  0  ••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
•••••  0  ••  0  •••••••••••••  •.. •  •  •  4 
••••  0  •••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
DATE:  4. 11.  88 
STANDARD  MONETARY  POLICY 
==:=~c=~=============== 
SII"FLE 
GERMANY  FRANCE  UK  USA  MEAN 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
1.20  f.3!)  1.02  1.75  1.33 
0.96  1.83  1.07  1.46  1.33 
0.51  1.60  0.64  0.22  0.74 
0.48  1.01  0.34  -o.oo  0.46 
0.36  0.35  0.28  0.28  0.32 
0.43  0.36  0.19  0.65  0.41 
0.63  0.95  0.38  0.63  0.65 
0.40  1.09  0.27  -0.08  0.42 
0.42  0.86  0.15  -0.19  0.31 
0.47  0.53  0.19  0.18  0.35 
2.06  2.22  1.26  2.70  2.06 
1.64  4.28  2.09  2.02  2.51 
0.16  4.38  0.80  -1.12  1.06 
-0.03  2.71  0.10  -1.47  0.32 
-0.05  0.61  0.03  -0.47  0.03 
0.22  0.31  0.16  0.21  0.23 
0.06  0.38  0.13  0.14  0.18 
-0.11  0.18  -0.02  -0.17  -0.03 
0.02  -0.05  -0.09  -0.14  -0.07 
0.01  -0.20  -0.05  -0.02  -0.06 
-0.63  -0.60  -0.44  -0.27  -0.48 
-0.75  -0.94  -0.61  -0.39  -0.67 
-0.64  -1.09  -0.63  -0.38  -0.68 
-0.77  -1.00  -0.67  -0.52  -0.74 
-0.91  -0.91  -0.80  -0.74  -0.84 
0.26  0.17  0.17  0.35  0.24 
0.54  0.66  0.63  1.46  0.82 
0.55  1.26  1.22  2.65  1.42 
0.71  1.74  1.76  3.65  1.97 
0.89  2.06  2.21  4.64  2.45 
------------------------------------------------------
0.34  0.25  0.09  0.47  0.29 
0.73  0.90  0.69  1.73  1.01 
0.78  1.67  1.49  3.05  1.75 
1.06  2.30  2.17  4.16  2.42 
1.32  2.71  2. 71  5.22  2.99 
------------------------------------------------------
0.96  0.22  0.11  0.80  0.52 
1.25  0.93  0.59  2.12  1.22 
1.31  1.89  1.33  3.42  1.99 
1.81  2.79  2.07  4.61  2.82 
2.17  3.44  2.69  5.75  3.51 
------------------------------------------------------
0.26  0.17  0.19  0.74  0.34 
0.62  0.59  0.54  1.04  0.70 
0.48  0.87  0.59  0.37  0.58 
0.30  0.88  0.45  -0.06  0.39 
0.18  0.67  0.32  -0.00  0.29 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.25  -0.17  -0.18  -0.68  -0.32 
-0.59  -0.56  -0.51  -0.98  -0.66 
-0.47  -0.82  -0.57  -0.35  -0.55 
-0.29  -0.82  -0.42  0.05  -0.37 
-0.17  -0.61  -0.29  0.00  -0.27 
------------------------------------------------------
0.56  0.32  0.45  0.96  0.57 
0.98  0.55  0.67  1.52  0.93 
0.57  0.60  0.59  1.38  0.79 
0.49  0.50  0.52  1.56  0.77 
0.51  0.42  0.60  1.85  0.85 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.47  -0.61  -0.73  -0.38  -0.55 
-0.40  -0.29  -0.64  -0.45  -0.44 
-0.65  -0.19  -0.81  -1.11  -0.69 
-0.75  -0.37  -1.05  -1.!54  -0.93 
-0.84  -0.84  -1.21  -1.59  -1.12 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.54  -0.61  -0.62  -0.33  -0.52 
-0.55  -0.81  -0.68  -0.37  -0.60 
-0.46  -0.85  -0.51  -0.22  -0.51 
-0.55  -0.70  -0.41  -0.29  -0.49 
-0.64  -0.58  -0.52  -0.46  -0.55 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  All  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -55-
the  latter  representing  monetary  authorities•  behaviour  in  the  money  Mar-
ket.  In  this  policy  setting,  the  main  immediate  effect  of  an  increase  in 
government  investment  is  to  raise  final  demand  and  - as  capacity  adjusts 
only  slowly  - the  degree  of  capacity  utilization.  Initially,  the  profit 
share  in  GOP  increases  due  to  the  lagged  wage  and  employment  response.  As  a 
result,  private  investment  is  stimulated  at  the  same  time  by  demand  and 
profits,  Making  it in  all  countries  to  be  the  most  dynaMic  GOP  component  in 
the first  two  years  (see  Table  29).  Private  consumption  is  mainly  driven  by 
the  rise  in  households'  real  disposable  incoMe  and  the  reduction  in  the  un-
employment  rate.  The  1 ast  component  of  domestic  fi na 1  demand,  inventory 
investment,  shows  a  rel at  i vel y  strong  rise  in  the  first  two  years  of  the 
simulation  period,  ranging  from  0,1  percent  of  baseline  GOP/GNP  in  Germany 
to  0,3  in  France.  This  "pro-cyclical"  behaviour  reflects  the  important  role 
of  the  transactions/precautionary  motive  in  stockbuilding  as  well  as  work 
in  progress. 
The  real  foreign  balance  on  the  other  hand,  deteriorates,  initially  due  to 
higher  imports  in  response  to  higher  final  demand  and  degrees  of  capacity 
utilization,  later on  also  due  to  lower  exports  as  a  consequence  of  higher 
export  prices.  Although  both  effects  are  particularly  strong  in  the  US 
model,  this  is  not  reflected  in  the  real  foreign  balance  as  a  percent  of 
GNP  due  to  the  comparatively  smaller  share  of  foreign  trade  in  GNP  in  the 
United  States.  Overall,  the  foreign  trade  leakages  in  the  case  of  an 
increase  in  public  investment  are  substantial  in  the  QUEST  model,  when 
action  is  taken  by  one  country  only  (see  the  discussion  on  joint action  in 
section  4.3.1).  Thus,  over  a  five  year  period,  the  increase  in  domestic 
demand  is  almost  twice  as  high  as  the  increase  in  GOP  in  the  three  European 
modules. 
In  terms  of  GOP,  the  multiplier  lies  on  average  over  a  5  year  period  in  the 
order  of  0,71 of  baseline  GOP,  for  all  countries,  except  France.  For  France 
the  multiplier  is  situated at  the  upper  end  of  the  acceptable  range,  as  GOP 
rises  by  significantly  more  than  1  percent,  mainly  in  response  to  the 
strong  profit  effect  in  the  investment  equations  and  the  absence  of  an 
inflation  terM  in  the  consumption  equation  (real  balance  effect).  Overall, 
the  major  part  of  the  GOP  response  is  located  in  the  first  two  years.  But 
although  the  dynamic  profile  of  the  GOP  response  differs  somewhat  between 
countries,  GOP  multipliers  are  relatively  uniform  after  5  years.  Cyclical 
behaviour  and  speed  of  reaction  of  the  US  model  are  marked  compared  to  the 
other  countries,  leading  even  to  negative  private  investment  and  consump-
tion  multipliers  in  years  4  and  5. 
The  employment  effects  associated  with  the  rise  in  economic  activity  appear 
with  a  lag  of,  on  average,  one  year  (see  Graph  1).  Size  and  time  profile of 
the  employment  gains  reflect fairly  closely  the  evolution  of  the  GOP  multi-
pliers  in  the  different  country  modules.  In  those  countries  where  either 
real  wages  rise  quickly  (F.R.Germany)  or  where  the  influence  of  real  wages 
on  potential  employment  is  subject  to  only  short  lags  (United  States),  the 
immediate  decrease  in  potential  employment  tends  to  lower  the  employment 
gains,  although  only  moderately. 
As  far  as  the  wage  and  price  reaction  is  concerned,  the  models  reveal  some 
degree  of  diversity.  In  Germany  nominal  wages  react  quickly  and  strongly  to 
the  productivity  gain~.  The  price  response,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
relatively  weak  so  that  after  5  years  consumer  prices  are  only  1  percent G
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higher  than  in  the  baseline.  The  other  extre11e  is  given  by  the  United 
States  where  the  strong  wage  response  due  to  the  Phillips  curve  effect sets 
in  motion  a  sort  of  wage-price  spiral.  Thus,  after  5  years  consuMer  prices 
are  roughly  5  percent  hi ghar  than  in  the  baseline.  For  France  and  the 
United  Kingdom  the  model  behaviour  lies  so11ewhat  between  the  two  polar 
cases,  Germany  and  US.  Although  nominal  wages  rise faster  in  the  simulation 
with  the  French  model,  reflecting  shorter  indexation  lags  with  respect  to 
inflation  and  the  inclusion  of  a  terms  of  trade effect,  price  increases  are 
of  a  similar  magnitude  compared  to  the  UK  model.  This  can  be  explained 
mainly  by  the  lower  speed  of  adjustment  of  prices  to  wages  in  the  French 
model. 
Concerning  the  behaviour  of  real  wages,  the  following  observations  can  be 
made.  In  all  countries  real  wages  do  not  rise  to  the  same  amount  as  labour 
productivity  in  the  first  1-2  years.  Consequently,  profitability  is  higher 
than  in  the  baseline  thereby  st  1  mu 1  at  i ng  private  investment.  After  2-4 
years,  depending  upon  the  country,  the  growth  in  per  capita  real  wage  cost 
exceeds  the  gain  in  labour  productivity,  thus  leading  to  higher  un1t  labour 
costs.  Th1s  effect  is  relatively  pronounced  in  the  German  and  French  modu-
le,  while  it is  absent  in  the  UK  and  only  weak  in  the  US  modules.  The  roots 
of  this  model  behaviour  can  be  traced  back  to  the  fact  that  in  the  first 
two  countries  wages  adjust  faster  to  prices  than  prices  do  to  wages.  As  a 
result,  real  un1t  labour  cost  are  significantly  higher  than  in  the  baseline 
in  these  two  countries,  even  in  the  medium  term.  The  phenomenon  can  also  be 
observed  when  looking  at  the  profit  share  in  GOP/GNP,  a  variable  that  cap-
tures 
11supply-side
11  factors  in  the  determination  of  private  productive 
investment.  Only  in  the  first  1  - 3  years,  depending  on  the  country,  is  the 
profit  share  higher  than  in  the  baseline.  After  this  initial  period  it  is 
lower  in  all  countries.  The  result  is  that  investment  in  all  four  countries 
is  affected  negatively  by  a  declining  profit  share  towards  the  end  of  the 
simulation  period. 
Interest  rates  in  all  four  models  rise,  although  due  to  different factors. 
While  in  the  German  model  nominal  short-term  rates  rise  in  response  to 
higher  inflation,  higher  capacity  utilization  and  lower  unemployment,  the 
main  transmission  mechanism  in  the  French  and  the  UK  model  is  the  current 
account  deterioration.  The  strongest  rise  in  short-term  interest  rates  is 
observed  in  the  US  model,  where  the  comparatively  high  rate  of  inflation 
together  with  the  GOP  growth  contributes  to  a  rise  in  nomina 1  short  term 
interest  rates  that  attains  almost  two  percentage  points  after  2  years. 
Although  the  rise  in  short-term  interest  rates  feeds  through  to  nominal 
long-term  interest  rates,  real  long-term  rates  vary  in  fact  only  little or 
decline  even  slightly  in  all  countries  but  the  United  States.  In  the  latter 
country,  rea  1  1  ong-term  interest  rates  begin  to  rise  from  the  third  year 
onwards,  thereby  exerting  a  negative  influence  on  productive  as  well  as 
residential  investment. 
At  the  same  time,  higher  inflation  and  interest  rates  reverse  the  initial 
improvement  in  the  general  government  budget  deficit  in  response  to  the 
higher  tax  revenues  associated  with  stronger  income  growth.  The  correspon-
ding  transmission  mechanisms  are  twofold.  On  the  one  hand,  transfer  pay-
ments  to  households  rise,  as  these  payments  are  indexed  on  consumer  pri-
ces.  On  the  other  hand,  interest  payments  on  government  debt  increase  both 
due  to  the  higher  deficit  and  higher  nominal  long-term  interest  rates. -58-
Table  30:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT  INCREASE  1X  OF  BASELINE  GOP, 
=============================================================================== 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  ..  YEAR  1 
REAL  ...................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ........  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  ..  YEAR  1 
RATE  ...................... 2 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
----------------------------- GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE ••••••••••••••••••••  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ......  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
DATE:  4.11.88 
FIXED  SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  RATES 
=============================== 
SIMPLE 
GERMANY  FRANCE  UK  USA  MEAN 
1.30 
1.37 
0.80 
0.35 
0.11 
0.52 
0.97 
0.73 
0.42 
0.30 
2.32 
2.92 
1.60 
0.17 
-0.52 
0.28 
0.29 
-0.01 
-0.10 
-0.09 
-0.68 
-0.99 
-0.91 
-0.82 
-0.87 
0.28 
0.67 
0.76 
0.85 
0.99 
0.37 
0.92 
1.08 
1.25 
1.46 
1.04 
1.65 
1.77 
2.06 
2.38 
0.28 
0.74 
0.70 
0.39 
0.08 
-0.27 
-0.71 
-0.67 
-0.37 
-0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.36 
1.90 
1.72 
1.18 
0.50 
0.37 
0.97 
1.14 
0.93 
0.60 
2.29 
4.64 
5.09 
3.66 
1.58 
0.31 
0.39 
0.20 
-0.03 
-0.20 
-0.61 
-0.97 
-1.15 
-1.08 
-0.99 
0.17 
0.67 
1.29 
1.81 
2.16 
0.25 
0.91 
1.71 
2.39 
2.84 
0.22 
0.94 
1.94 
2.89 
3.61 
0.17 
0.60 
0.90 
0.94 
0.75 
-0.17 
-0.57 
-0.85 
-0.88 
-0.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
1.03 
1.09 
0.68 
0.41 
0.32 
0.19 
0.39 
0.27 
0.15 
0.19 
1.31 
2.23 
1.04 
0.41 
0.35 
0.16 
0.14 
0.01 
-0.02 
-o.oo 
-0.44 
-0.62 
-0.66 
-0.72 
-0.84 
0.17 
0.64 
1.24 
1.80 
2.29 
0.09 
0.69 
1.51 
2.23 
2.80 
0.11 
0.59 
1.35 
2.11 
2.78 
0.19 
0.54 
0.61 
0.48 
0.35 
-0.18 
-0.52 
-0.58 
-0.45 
-0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
o.oo 
1.79 
1.  75 
0.60 
-0.10 
-0.01 
0.65 
0.70 
-0.02 
-0.39 
-0.17 
2.74 
3.00 
0.47 
-0.99 
-0.45 
0.26 
0.29 
0.01 
-0.14 
-0.07 
-0.28 
-0.44 
-0.48 
-0.58 
-0.78 
0.35 
1.54 
2.96 
4.21 
5.27 
0.48 
1.84 
3.43 
4.81 
5.96 
0.82 
2.28 
3.90 
5.32 
6.54 
0.75 
1.17 
0.61 
-0.02 
-0.19 
-0.70 
-1.11 
-0.58 
0.02 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
0.00 
1.37 
1.53 
0.95 
0.46 
0.23 
0.43 
0.76 
0.53 
0.28 
0.23 
2.16 
3.20 
2.05 
0.81 
0.24 
0.25 
0.28 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.09 
-0.50 
-0.76 
-0.80 
-0.80 
-0.87 
0.24 
0.88 
1.56 
2.17 
2.68 
0.30 
1.09 
1.93 
2.67 
3.26 
0.55 
1.37 
2.24 
3.10 
3.83 
0.35 
0.77 
0.71 
0.45 
0.25 
-0.33 
-0.73 
-0.67 
-0.42 
-0.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.41  -0.61  -0.72  -0.31  -0.51 
-0.16  -0.26  -0.61  -0.18  -0.30 
-0.39  -0.12  -0.75  -0.71  -0.49 
-0.67  -0.25  -0.97  -1.29  -0.80 
-0.87  -0.69  -1.12  -1.39  -1.02 
-0.59  -0.61  -0.62  -0.34  -0.54 
-0.74  -0.84  -0.69  -0.43  -0.67 
-0.66  -0.90  -0.55  -0.31  -0.60 
-0.56  -0.78  -0.46  -0.29  -0.52 
-0.56  -0.65  -0.56  -0.43  -0.55 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -59-
Thus,  in  the  United  States  model  simulation  where  both  inflation  and 
interest  rates  are  high,  government  current  expenditure  (i.e.  excluding 
investment)  rises  faster  than  current  receipts.  As  a  result,  the  government 
budget  deficit  deteriorates  significantly  more  in  the  US  than  in  the  other 
three  countries.  However,  also  in  those  countries  the  public  investment 
increase  is  not  "self-financing"  in  the  sense  that  the  resulting  higher  GOP 
growth  would  create  sufficient  revenues  to  eliminate  the  initial  negative 
budgetary  impact  in  the  medium-term.  It  may  be  asked,  therefore,  whether 
the  revenue  effects  of  public  expenditure  policies  are  sufficiently  taken 
into  account. 
With  respect  to  the  medium-term  properties  of  the  QUEST  model,  two  specifi-
cities  are  most  noteworthy.  First,  compared  to  other  models,  price  effects 
in  the  consumption  equation  (real  balance  effect)  are  relatively  impor-
tant.  Secondly,  although  the  supply  block  captures  the  main  supply  side 
mechanisms,  potential  output  and  employment  are  not  very  sensitive  and 
influence  actual  employment  only  with  long  lags. 
4.2.1.2  With  fixed  short-term  interest  rates 
Although  this  is  not  envisaged  for  the  standard  use  of  the  model,  QUEST  can 
also  be  simulated  with  exogenous  short-term  interest  rates  in  order  to 
mimic  the  pursuit  of  an  "accommodating••  monetary  policy.  As  expected,  the 
fact  of  keeping  short-term  interest  rates  constant  at  their baseline  levels 
tends  to  increase  - on  average  over  a  5-year  period  - the  GOP  multiplier of 
a  public  investment  shock  compared  to  the  case  with  a  policy  reaction 
function  (see  Table  30).  Although  short-term  interest  rates  also  influence 
inventory  investment  directly,  the  main  transmission  mechanism  is  the 
influence  short-term  rates  have  on  1 ong-term  interest  rates  and  thereby 
indirectly  on  investement,  consumption  (in  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom) 
and  the  budget  deficit  (interest  payments  on  public  debt). 
Overall,  the  effect  of  keeping  short-term  interest  rates  constant  is  only 
small  in  terms  of  GOP.  In  three  out  of  the  four  countries  (Germany,  France 
and  the  United  States)  GOP  is  on  average  only  0,1  percent  higher  per  year 
than  in  the  simulation  with  endogenous  interest  rates.  In  the  United 
Kingdom  the  effects  are  even  smaller  both  because  the  interest  rate  rise  in 
the  simulation  with  a  policy  reaction  function  is  only  moderate  and  because 
the  influence  of  interst  rates  in  the  UK  model  is  relatively weak  (see  also 
section  4. 2. 2).  As  in  the  German  model  short-term  interest  rates  are  the 
only  determinant  of  long-term  rates,  the  simulation  of  an  accommodating 
monetary  policy  stance  tends  to  stimulate  private  consumption  and  invest-
ment,  especially  in  the  first  three  years.  It  is  noticeable,  however,  that 
even  in  this  case,  as  for  the  United  Kingdom,  the  size  of  the  GOP  IIUlti-
plier does  not  reach  one  in  the  medium  term. 
In  France  and  the  United  States  the  main  effect  of  constant  short-term 
interest  rates  consists  of  higher  private  investment  as  a  consequence  of  a 
more  moderate  rise  in  long-term  interest  rates.  In  the  latter  country,  the 
deterioration of  the  general  government  budget  deficit is  also  significant-
ly  smaller  than  in  the  simulation  with  endogenous  short-term  interest 
rates. 
With  respect  to  inflation,  the  consequences  of  pursuing  an  "accommodating" 
monetary  policy  are  only  minor  compared  to  the  "standard  monetary  policy" 
mode,  i.e.  using  a  policy  reaction  function.  Only  in  the  US  module  the -60-
Table  31:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT  INCREASE  1X  OF  BASELINE  GOP,  =============================================================================== 
FIXED  MONEY  SUPPLY 
------------------ ------------------
SIMPLE 
GERMANY  FRANCE  UK  USA  MEAN 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••. :  YEAR  1  0.59  1.32  1.02  1.59  1.13 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••  2  0.19  1.67  1.05  1.05  0.99 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3  0. 27  1.27  0.58  0.07  0.55 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••  4  0.13  0.54  0.22  0.17  0.26 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••  5  0.11  -0.12  0.11  0.03  0.03 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  ..  YEAR  1 
REAL  ...................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • •  2 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
•••  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  •  0  0  ••  0  •••••••  0  •  •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE....................  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP) ••••••••••••  3 
••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ••••• :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
•••••••  0  0  ••••••••••••••••  0  •  5 
DATE:  8.11.88 
-0.07 
-0.15 
-0.07 
-0.04 
0.03 
0.46 
-1.58 
-2.06 
-2.52 
-2.79 
-0.13 
-0.25 
-0.02 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.32 
-0.19 
-0.28 
-0.31 
-0.35 
0.14 
0.16 
0.21 
0.28 
0.32 
0.36 
0.91 
0.96 
0.66 
0.34 
2.01 
3.32 
2.45 
0.00 
-2.33 
0.30 
0.35 
0.12 
-0.11 
-0.22 
-0.59 
-0.87 
-0.92 
-0.77 
-0.68 
0.17 
0.63 
1.16 
1.55 
1.77 
0.19 
0.38 
0.27 
0.14 
0.19 
1.23 
1.96 
0.46 
-0.55 
-0.93 
0.16 
0.12 
-0.06 
-0.18 
-0.18 
-0.43 
-0.60 
-0.59 
-0.60 
-0.68 
0.17 
0.63 
1.20 
1.  70 
2.09 
0.60 
0.53 
-0.04 
0.09 
0.37 
2.34 
0.57 
-2.26 
-2.00 
-2.51 
0.12 
-0.06 
-0.26 
-0.14 
-0.24 
-0.25 
-0.31 
-0.31 
-0.47 
-0.60 
0.33 
1.28 
2.21 
3.05 
3.90 
0.27 
0.42 
0.28 
0.21 
0.23 
1.51 
1.07 
-0.35 
-1.27 
-2.14 
0.11 
0.04 
-0.05 
-0.12 
-0.17 
-0.40 
-0.49 
-0.53 
-0.54 
-0.58 
0.20 
0.67 
1.19 
1.65 
2.02 
------------------------------------------------------
0.16  0.25  0.09  0.44  0.24 
0.19  0.85  0.68  1.52  0.81 
0.30  1.54  1.47  2.54  1.46 
0.41  2.05  2.10  3.46  2.01 
0.46  2.34  2.56  4.36  2.43 
------------------------------------------------------
0.48  0.22  0.11  0.74  0.39 
0.31  0.89  0.58  1.82  0.90 
0.57  1.76  1.31  2.82  1.62 
0.67  2.49  2.01  3.85  2.26 
0.78  2.95  2.56  4.73  2.75 
------------------------------------------------------
0.16  0.17  0.19  0.68  0.30 
0.21  0.56  0.53  0.83  0.53 
0.15  0.78  0.58  0.20  0.43 
0.11  0.71  0.40  0.02  0.31 
0.04  0.42  0.24  -0.04  0.16 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.15  -0.16  -0.18  -0.63  -0.28 
-0.20  -0.53  -0.51  -0.78  -0.51 
-0.15  -0.73  -0.55  -0.19  -0.41 
-0.11  -0.66  -0.38  -0.02  -0.29 
-0.04  -0.39  -0.22  0.04  -0.15 
------------------------------------------------------
2.67  1.20  0.85  2.54  1.82 
1.63  2.07  1.49  2.63  1.95 
1.86  2.32  2.10  2.54  2.21 
1.90  2.21  2.73  4.27  2.78 
2.04  1.96  3.17  5.56  3.18 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.78  -0.63  -0.74  -0.51  -0.66 
-0.98  -0.38  -0.68  -0.82  -0.71 
-1.06  -0.40  -0.90  -1.45  -0.95 
-1.23  -0.71  -1.21  -1.82  -1.25 
-1.37  -1.30  -1.45  -2.27  -1.60 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.27  -0.59  -0.62  -0.30  -0.45 
-0.14  -0.74  -0.66  -0.2t  -0.45 
-0.21  -0.70  -0.47  -0.16  -0.38 
-0.22  -0.49  -0.32  -0.29  -0.33 
-0.26  -0.37  -0.37  -0.35  -0.34 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -61-
price  level  is  noticeably  higher  after 5  years  (0,7  percentage  points)  than 
with  endogenous  short-term  interest  rates.  When  compared  to 
non-accommodating  monetary  policy  (see  next  section),  it  can  therefore  be 
said  that  the  standard  monetary  policy  mode  is  soMewhat  biased  towards 
accommodating  monetary  policy. 
4.2.1.3  With  fixed  money  supply 
Another  possible  monetary  policy  regime  is  one  of  "non-accommodating" 
monetary  policy.  Technically,  this  policy  stance  has  been  simulated  in  the 
present  simulation  exercise  by  keeping  money  supply  (M3)  constant  at  its 
baseline  level.  Short-term  interest  rates  are  then  determined  by  inverting 
the  money  demand  function. 
As  can  also  be  seen  in  Table  31,  the  main  effect  of  this  monetary  policy 
regime  is  the  occurrence  of  higher  interest  rates.  Compared  to  the 
simulation  with  standard  monetary  policy,  short-term  interest  rates  are  on 
average  roughly  1,5  percentage  points  higher  per  year  for  Germany,  France 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  while  the  increase  is  even  in  the  order  of  2 
percentage  points  in  the  case  of  the  United  States.  The  same  tendency  can 
be  detected  with  respect  to  long-term  interest  rates,  although  to  a  lesser 
extent. 
The  consequences  of  this  response  of  interest  rates  differ  markedly  between 
countries.  The  strongest  impact  can  be  observed  for  Germany,  where  private 
consumption,  private  investment  and  inventory  investment  are  on  average 
lower  than  in  the  baseline.  As  a  result,  the  GOP  multiplier  is  very  small 
and  reaches  only  less  than  half  its  size  in  the  simulation  with  standard 
monetary  policy. 
In  France  as  well,  the  effect  of  higher  interest  rates  on  final  demand  is 
quite  strong,  but  it  is  nevertheless  smaller  than  in  Germany  so  that  the 
medium  term  GOP  multiplier  is  still  close  to  one.  For  the  United  Kingdom 
the  multipliers  are  hardly  affected  since,  as  has  been  mentioned  above, 
interest  rates  have  only  a  very  limited  effect  in  the  UK  model.  Although 
the  interest rise  in  the  US  simulation  is  very  strong,  due  to  the  fact  that 
- as  in  the  German  model  - the  income  elasticity  in  the  money  demand 
function  exceeds  one,  the  GOP  multiplier  is  only  moderately  lower  than  in 
the  simulation  with  endogenous  money  supply  and  interest  rates.  However,  as 
expected,  the  deterioration  in  the  budget  deficit  is  much  stronger, 
reaching  even  2  percent  of  GNP  in  the  f1fth  year. .
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Box  4:  Comparison  with  INTERLINK 
In  order  to  evaluate  the  simulation  properties  of  the  QUEST  model  in  the  light 
of  other multi-country  econometric  models,  this  box  compares  the  QUEST  simula-
tion  results  for  a  public  investment  shock  with  either  fixed  short-term  inte-
rest  rates  or  fixed  money  supply  with  the  corresponding  OECO  INTERLINK  simula-
tions.  The  INTERLINK  model  has  been  chosen  as  for  this  model  the  most  exten-
sive  set  of  multiplier  tables  covering  a  5-year  period  is  readily  available. 
This  is  not  (yet)  the  case  for  other  multi-country  models  like  the  EPA, 
HERMES,  ATLAS,  MIMOSA  etc.  models.  The  comparison  is  confined  to  a  public 
investment  shock,  as  for  this  shock  the  simulation  design  is  the  most  directly 
comparable. 
Overall,  the  QUEST  and  INTERLINK  simulation  results  are  fairly  similar  (see 
Tables  B1  and  B2).  However,  a  few  differences  are  noticeable.  Generally,  the 
speed  of  adjustment  in  the  QUEST  model  is  higher  than  in  the  INTERLINK  model, 
i.e.  the  time  profile of  the  multipliers  is  more  "front-loaded".  This  phenome-
non  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  QUEST  has  been  estimated  on  quarterly  data, 
while  INTERLINK  has  been  estimated  on  semi-annual  data.  For  the  first  2-3 
years,  the  GOP/GNP  multipliers  of  the  QUEST  modules  exceed  the  respective 
multipliers  the  INTERLINK  modules.  But  the  dampening  or  real  balance  effects 
are  stronger  i  QUEST.  For  the  German  and  French  modules  this  concerns  mainly 
foreign  trade,  while  in  the  UK  and  US  modules  private  consumption  is  affected 
most.  In  part,  these  dampening  effects  can  be  traced  back  to  the  fact  that  the 
rise  in  nominal  wages  and  prices  in  the  QUEST  model  is  somewhat  higher  than 
the  one  observed  in  the  INTERLINK  model.  Thus,  on  average,  over  a  five  year 
period,  QUEST  is  slightly  less  "expansionary"  in  terms  of  real  GOP/GNP  or 
final  demand  components  than  INTERLINK,  and  therefore  even  less  "keynesian". 
The  mechanisms  outlined  above  are  clearly  reflected  in  the  multipliers  presen-
ted  in  Tables  B1  and  B2.  With  respect  to  the  simulation  with  exogenous  short-
term  interest  rates  it  appears  that  the  different  QUEST  country  modules  show 
more  uniformity  in  the  time  profile  of  their  response  than  the  respective 
modules  of  the  INTERLINK  model.  Thus,  for  example,  the  QUEST  GOP/GNP  multi-
pliers  are  bell-shaped  for  all  countries,  while  in  the  French  INTERLINK  module 
the  multiplier  continues  to  rise.  Similarly,  while  in  all  QUEST  modules  infla-
tion  rises  continuously,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  German  INTERLINK  module, 
where  inflation  is  decreasing  in  the  fifth  year.  The  same  module  also  shows  an 
employment  response  that  differs  significantly  from  the  one  observed  in  the 
QUEST  simulation.  It  should  be  mentioned,  however,  that  there  are  also  a 
number  of  inter-country  differences  that  appear  in  both  models,  for  example 
the  relatively  marked  inflationary  response  in  the  United  States  modules  and 
the  strong  rise of  private  investement  in  the  French  modules. 
In  the  simulation  with  fixed  money  supply  differences  between  the  QUEST  and 
the  INTERLINK  simulation  results  are  smaller  than  in  the  accommodating  mone-
tary policy  simulation.  Apart  from  the  general  QUEST  characteristics  mentioned 
above,  some  differences  seem  to  be  noteworthy:  generally,  interest  rates  in 
the  QUEST  simulations  rise  more  than  in  the  INTERLINK  simulations.  As  a 
result,  private  fixed  investment  in  the  QUEST  exercise  is  on  average  below  its 
level  in  the  baseline,  while  it  is  slightly  above  its  baseline  level  in  the 
INTERLINK  exercise.  In  addition,  the  interest  rate  increase  is  the  cause  for  a 
negative  private  consumption  multiplier  in  the  German  QUEST  module.  While  with 
respect  to  employment  and  the  external  balance,  both  models  show  a  very  simi-
lar  behaviour,  the  French  INTERLINK  module  shows  a  surprisingly  strong  dete-
rioration  of  the  budget  deficit,  despite  lower  interest  rates  and  price  levels 
than  in  the  French  QUEST  module  simulation. 
Source  for  the  INTERLINK  simulations:  P.RICHAROSON,  A review  of  the  simulation 
properties  of  OECD•s  INTERLINK  model,  OECO,  Working  Paper  Nr.47,  July  1987. 
The  simulations  have  been  run  over  the  time  period  1983-1987. -64-
Table  32:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  EX-ANTE  DECREASE  IN  SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  RATES  BY  1  =================:============================================================= 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••.•••. :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
(LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
(LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE ••••••••••••••••••••  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
----------------------------- CURRENT  BALANCE  ......  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
oATE:  4. l1.88 
GERMANY 
----------
0.30 
0.65 
0.38 
0.28 
0.25 
0.25 
0.55 
0.49 
0.42 
0.41 
0.77 
2.20 
2.01 
1.89 
2.24 
0.18 
0.36 
0.12 
0.05 
0.06 
-0.15 
-0.42 
-0.39 
-0.38 
-0.46 
0.06 
0.25 
0.31 
0.34 
0.45 
PERCENTAGE  POINT 
---------------- ----------------
FRANCE  UK  USA 
---------- ---------- ----------
0.06 
0.25 
0.42 
0.52 
0.50 
0.01 
0.08 
0.17 
0.23 
0.21 
0.33 
1.40 
2.36 
3.00 
3.21 
0.01 
0.05 
0.07 
0.05 
o.oo 
-0.02 
-0.11 
-0.20 
-0.25 
-0.24 
0.01 
0.04 
0.13 
0.23 
0.33 
0.02 
0.07 
0.14 
0.22 
0.15 
o.oo 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.15 
0.42 
0.77 
1.05 
1.08 
0.01 
0.04 
0.11 
0.22 
0.14 
-0.01 
-0.04 
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.14 
o.oo 
0.02 
0.06 
0.15 
0.26 
0.12 
0.39 
0.30 
-0.23 
-0.32 
0.03 
0.09 
0.02 
-0.27 
-0.33 
0.24 
1.33 
1.57 
0.21 
-0.09 
0.08 
0.19 
0.15 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.07 
-0.10 
-0.05 
-0.04 
0.02 
0.14 
0.42 
0.63 
0.65 
SIMPLE 
MEAN 
----------
0.12 
0.34 
0.31 
0.20 
0.14 
0.07 
0.18 
0.17 
0.10 
0.07 
0.37 
1.34 
1.68 
1.54 
1.61 
0.07 
0.16 
0.11 
0.07 
0.04 
-0.05 
-0.16 
-0.20 
-0.21 
-0.22 
0.02 
0.11 
0.23 
0.34 
0.42 
------------------------------------------------------
0.08 
0.37 
0.44 
0.51 
0.67 
0.23 
0.69 
0.70 
0.86 
1.12 
0.05 
0.26 
0.32 
0.21 
0.14 
-0.05 
-0.25 
-0.30 
-0.21 
-0.14 
-1.36 
-1.38 
-1.47 
-1.69 
-1.72 
0.16 
0.42 
0.39 
0.39 
0.44 
0.01 
0.07 
0.18 
0.31 
0.43 
0.01 
0.06 
0.19 
0.37 
0.57 
0.00 
0.05 
0.13 
0.21 
0.27 
-o.oo 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.20 
-0.25 
-1.46 
-1.76 
-1.72 
-1.69 
-1.68 
0.03 
0.13 
0.26 
0.39 
0.49 
o.oo 
0.02 
0.07 
0.18 
0.31 
o.oo 
0.01 
0.06 
0.15 
0.29 
0.00 
0.02 
0.05 
0.10 
0.12 
-o.oo 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-1.55 
-1.99 
-2.07 
-2.05 
-2.08 
0.03 
0.11 
0.20 
0.28 
0.30 
0.02 
0.18 
0.49 
0.72 
0.73 
0.05 
0.26 
0.59 
0.77 
0.78 
0.04 
0.19 
0.23 
-0.05 
-0.23 
-0.04 
-0.18 
-0.22 
0.04 
0.21 
-1.41 
-1.47 
-1.35 
-1.58 
-1.74 
0.11 
0.34 
0.38 
0.17 
0.11 
0.03 
0.16 
0.29 
0.43 
0.53 
0.07 
0.26 
0.38 
0.54 
0.69 
0.02 
0.13 
0.18 
0.12 
0.08 
-0.02 
-0.12 
-0.17 
-0.11 
-0.07 
-1.45 
-1.65 
-1.65 
-1.75 
-1.80 
0.08 
0.25 
0.31 
0.30 
0.34 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.13  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  -0.05 
-0.32  -0.10  -0.05  -0.08  -0.14 
-0.28  -0.18  -0.11  -0.09  -0.17 
-0.27  -0.22  -0.18  0.01  -0.17 
-0.32  -0.22  -0.14  0.02  -0.16 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -65-
4.2.2  Interest  rate  decrease 
The  effects  of  a  lower  short-term  interest  rate  are  simulated  through  a 
sustained  downward  adjustment  in  the  add-factor  for  the  short-term  interest 
rate  equation,  which  remains  endogenous  otherwise.  This  corresponds  to  the 
standard  monetary  policy  case  presented  above. 
The  principal  mechanisms  involved  in  this  simulation  are  the  following  (see 
Table  32).  Short- and  1  ong-term  interest  rates  are  linked  in  the  model 
through  the  long-term  interest  rate  equation,  with  the  long-term  rate 
adjusting  to  movements  in  the  short  rate,  allowing  for  inflation 
acceleration  in  the  case  of  France  and  of  the  United  Kingdom  and,  in  the 
case  of  the  United  States,  involving  the  public deficit to  GOP  ratio. 
The  effect  of  a  lower  short-term  rate  is  therefore  a  gradual  decrease  of 
the  long-term  rate.  After  five  years,  the  long-term  interest  rate  is  thus 
0,7  percentage  points  lower  than  in  the  baseline  simulation  for  Germany, 
1,0  percentage  points  for  France,  0,9  percentage  points  for  the  UK  and  1,6 
percentage  points  for  the  US.  The  more  pronounced  decrease  of  the  long-term 
rate  in  the  US  results  from  the  absence  of  a  significant  inflation 
influence  in  the  US  equation.  Moreover,  the  full  adjustment  to  an  increase 
in  the  short  rate  takes  place  within  one  year,  whereas  in  other  countries 
the  adjustment  is  either  not  complete,  or  involves  longer  time  lags.  The 
1  ower  1  ong-term  interest  rate  feeds  direct  1  y  into  the  investment 
equations.  The  fastest  response  of  private  investment  is  found  in  the 
German  model,  whereas  the  largest  overall  investment  response  is  that  for 
France.  The  effect  is  rather  weak  in  the  UK-model,  where  the  multiplier 
remains  inferior  to  11  of  baseline  GOP  after five  years.  This  is  due  to  the 
low  investment  response  in  the  UK.  Also  in  this  case,  the  US-model  shows  a 
strong  cyclical  effect.  The  capacity  increase  resulting  from  higher 
investment  raises  potential  output  after  five  years,  in  a  range  going  from 
0,11  deviation  with  respect  to  the  baseline  simulation  for  the  UK  to  0,61 
deviation  for  France. 
Private  consumption  is  directly  affected  by  the  lower  interest  rate  which 
represents  the  influence  on  savings  and  on  the  cost  of  consumption  credit. 
It  is  affected  indirectly  by  the  productivity  effect  of  the  investment 
increase  on  wages  and  the  resulting  increase  of  real  disposable  income.  The 
simulation  shows  that  private  consumption  is  almost  unaffected  by  the 
interest  rate  decrease  in  the  UK,  while  it  is  0,41  higher  than  in  the 
baseline  solution  after  five  years  in  Germany.  Since  also  the  response  of 
private  investment  to  the  interest  rate  decrease  is  1  ower  in  the  UK,  the 
difference  with  respect  to  the  baseline  of  domestic  demand  amounts  to  only 
0,31 after five  years,  compared  to  0,71  in  Germany  and  0,81  in  France. 
The  interest  rate  decrease  reduces  the  relative  cost  of  capital  with 
respect  to  labour.  Theoretically,  this  would  imply  some  substitution  fro11 
labour  towards  capital.  Since  however  this  substitution  effect  was  not 
supported  by  the  data  in  estimation,  the  only  impact  on  employment  comes, 
via  demand,  from  the  (positive)  real  interest  rate effect  on  investment.  As 
a  result of  the  more  buoyant  demand,  this  impact  is  particularly  strong  in 
the  French  case. -66-
Table  33:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  EX-ANTE  DECREASE  IN  NOMINAL  WAGE  RATES  OF  1  PERCENT  ================================================================================ 
REAL  GOP/GNP  ......... YEAR  1  ........................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .  YEAR  1  .  . 
REAL  ...................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ........ YEAR  1 
INVESTt'ENT •••••••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . . • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  ..  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  .................. 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  .....  YEAR  1  ........................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
. • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
(LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .: YEAR  1 
RATE  ••••••••••••••••••••••  2 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> •.••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE....................  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  •.••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> •••••••.••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
DATE:  4.11.88 
GERMANY 
----------
0.07 
0.58 
0.75 
0.41 
0.32 
-0.02 
0.22 
0.31 
0.05 
-0.07 
-0.31 
0.30 
1.15 
0.16 
-0.32 
-0.09 
0.08 
0.11 
-0.07 
-0.04 
0.22 
0.32 
0.25 
0.43 
0.45 
-0.47 
-0.77 
-0.70 
-0.69 
-0.61 
-0.72 
-1.08 
-0.99 
-1.00 
-0.88 
-1.67 
-1.77 
-1.57 
-1.58 
-1.26 
0.02 
0.21 
0.51 
0.59 
0.50 
-0.02 
-0.20 
-0.50 
-0.57 
-0.48 
FRANCE 
----------
0.01 
0.26 
0.64 
0.78 
0.71 
-0.16 
-0.24 
-o.11 
o.oo 
-0.04 
-o.5o 
0.17 
1.79 
2.36 
2.25 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.10 
0.07 
-o.oo 
0.23 
0.36 
0.28 
0.26 
0.31 
-o.8o 
-1.10 
-1.11 
-1.04 
-0.95 
-1.10 
-1.45 
-1.47 
-1.41 
-1.30 
-1.85 
-2.21 
-2.18 
-2.01 
-1.74 
0.00 
0.06 
0.21 
0.39 
0.51 
-o.oo 
-o.o5 
-0.19 
-0.37 
-0.47 
UK 
----------
0.04 
0.25 
0.34 
0.38 
0.43 
-0.09 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.06 
-0.09 
-o.o5 
0.18 
0.26 
0.25 
0.33 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
-0.04 
0.02 
0.10 
0.23 
0.34 
0.42 
0.41 
-0.47 
-1.08 
-1.41 
-1.59 
-1.64 
-0.68 
-1.42 
-1.84 
-2.02 
-2.05 
-1.19 
-1.76 
-2.15 
-2.30 
-2.30 
0.01 
0.09 
0.20 
0.29 
0.34 
-0.01 
-o.o8 
-0.19 
-0.27 
-0.30 
USA 
----------
0.13 
0.25 
0.25 
0.17 
-0.04 
0.11 
0.20 
0.05 
-0.02 
-0.16 
0.28 
0.20 
0.32 
0.25 
-0.32 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.07 
0.03 
-0.06 
0.04 
0.07 
0.10 
0.12 
0.16 
-0.44 
-0.84 
-0.88 
-0.90 
-0.91 
-0.56 
-0.94 
-0.97 
-0.99 
-0.99 
-1.00 
-1.00 
-1.05 
-1.07 
-1.04 
0.11 
0.24 
0.20 
0.19 
0.04 
-0.11 
-0.22 
-0.19 
-0.17 
-0.04 
SIMPLE 
MEAN 
0.06 
0.34 
0.49 
0.44 
0.35 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.01 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.21 
0.88 
0.76 
0.48 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.06 
-o.oo 
-0.02 
0.15 
0.25 
0.24 
0.31 
0.33 
-0.54 
-0.95 
-1.03 
-1.05 
-1.03 
-0.76 
-1.22 
-1.32 
-1.36 
-1.31 
-1.43 
-1.69 
-1.74 
-1.74 
-1.59 
0.04 
0.15 
0.28 
0.36 
0.35 
-0.03 
-0.14 
-0.27 
-0.34 
-0.32 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.17  -0.03  -0.05  -0.24  -0.12 
-0.22  -0.12  -0.08  -0.63  -0.26 
0.34  -0.07  -0.09  -0.29  -0.03 
0.25  -0.03  -0.13  -0.14  -0.01 
0.11  -0.06  -0.14  -0.23  -0.08 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.14  -0.05  0.04  0.10  -0.01 
0.06  0.03  0.19  0.18  0.11 
0.22  0.20  0.16  0.17  0.19 
0.13  0.35  0.21  0.16  0.21 
0.11  0.50  0.24  0.05  0.23 
------------------------------------------------------
0.08  0.07  -0.02  0.00  0.03 
0.10  0.14  -0.03  0.01  0.05 
0.05  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.04 
0.21  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.09 
0.25  0.10  0.08  0.10  0.13 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -67-
The  government  balance  improves  considerably  for  all  countries.  This  impro-
vement  results  from  higher  tax  revenues  as  higher  demand  raises  the  tax 
bases.  and  from  1  ower  payments  on  the  outstanding  debt  as  interest  rates 
fall.  Also  here  the  quickest  response  is  that  of  the  German  model,  whereas 
the  largest overall  response  is  found  in  the  case  of  France.  For  the  German 
and  French  models,  the  revenue  effect  dominates,  whereas  in  the  UK  and  US 
models  the  improvement  of  the  government  balance  is  more  due  to  the  direct 
effect  on  interest payments. 
4.2.3  Wage  rate  decrease 
The  simulation  of  a  wage  decrease  is  carried  out  through  a  1  percent, 
one-period  downward  adjustment  in  the  residual  for  the  wage  rate  equation, 
representing  an  external  shock  to  an  otherwise  endogenous  process  of  wage 
determination.  Since  the  wage  equation  is  expressed  in  growth  rates,  this 
is  tantamount  to  a  sustained  ex  ante  decrease  of  1~  in  the  wage  rate  level. 
The  direct  effects  of  such  an  ex-ante  nominal  wage  decrease  are  a  reduction 
of  labour  costs  and  a  reduction  of  domestic  prices.  The  simultaneity  of 
wages  and  prices  has  important  dynamic  effects  through  the  adjustment  of 
the  value-added  price  on  wage  costs,  the  definition  of  the  consumption 
price  as  a  weighted  aggregate  of  the  import  price  and  the  value-added 
price  and  the  indexation  of  wages  on  consumption  prices.  In  France  and 
Germany,  where  wages  adjust  fast  on  prices,  the  highest  reaction  of  wages 
is  found  after  two  years,  whereas  for  the  UK  and  the  US  this  appears  only 
after  four  years  (see  Table  33).  For  the  US,  the  greater  nominal  wage  iner-
tia  is  reflected  in  a  lower  ex  post  effect,  which  is  1.0~ on  average  over 
five  years,  while  it is  1,8~ on  average  for  the  European  countries.  Since, 
however,  the  weight  of  the  wage  costs  in  the  consumption  prices  is  higher 
in  the  US  model,  this  difference  is  not  fully  reflected  in  the  consumption 
price  effect,  which  amounts  to  0,8~ on  average  over  the  five  years  for  the 
US  and  to  1.0~ on  average  for  the  other  countries. 
Real  unit  labour  costs  are  on  average  0,7  to  0,9~  lower  in  France  and  in 
Germany,  where  labour  productivity  lags  behind  the  real  wage  decrease.  In 
the  UK  model,  this  productivity effect  is  absent,  thus  resulting  in  average 
real  unit  labour  costs  which  are  on  average  2,0~ lower  than  in  the  baseline 
simulation.  Also  in  the  US  this  effect  is  weak,  but,  given  the  greater 
nominal  wage  inertia,  real  unit  labour  costs  decrease  to  a  lesser  extent 
than  in  the  other  countries. 
On  the  supply  side,  two  effects  result  from  the  wage  decrease.  One  is  the 
capacity  increasing  profitability effect  on  investment  following  the  reduc-
tion  of  labour  costs  and  the  other  is  the  shift  from  capital  to  labour 
following  the  decrease  in  real  wage  costs.  The  shock  operates  also  through 
the  recursive  channel  linking  potential  employment  and  potential  output  to 
investment.  The  decrease  of  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  resulting 
from  the  increase  of  the  potential  aggregates  is  almost  fully  compensated 
by  the  demand  increase  in  all  countries.  The  overall  effect  on  investment 
is  negative  only  for  the  first  year  (except  for  the  US-model),  but 
thereafter  investment  is  on  average  higher  than  in  the  baseline 
simulation.  Both  effects  have  a  positive  impact  on  employment,  which  is 
o.s~ higher  after five  years  than  in  the  baseline  simulation  in  Germany  and 
France,  and  0,3~  higher  in  the  UK.  In  the  US-model,  the  usual  short  cycle 
appears  also  here;  the  largest  effect  on  employment  is  found  after  two 
years,  and  it diminishes  afterwards. -68-
Table  34:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  EX-ANTE  DECREASE  IN  SOCIAL  SECURITY  CONTRIBUTIONS 
============================================================================== 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••.•••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  ..  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  .................. 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  ..... YEAR  1  ........................... 2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE....................  2 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • . . • . • • • •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ......  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
DATE:  4.11.88 
GERMANY 
---------- 0.47 
1.46 
1.58 
0.91 
0.69 
0.60 
1.40 
1.54 
1.05 
0.82 
0.08 
1.32 
2.20 
0.06 
-0.82 
-0.10 
0.19 
0.15 
-0.14 
-0.06 
0.21 
0.25 
0.15 
0.45 
0.43 
-0.75 
-1.14 
-0.99 
-0.93 
-0.71 
-1.14 
-1.58 
-1.41 
-1.35 
-1.00 
-0.86 
-0.81 
-0.45 
-0.32 
0.45 
0.10 
0.59 
1.13 
1.19 
0.96 
OF  FIRMS  BY  1X  OF  GOP 
--------------------- ---------------------
FRANCE 
----------
0.44 
1.38 
2.16 
2.21 
1.  73 
0.26 
0.76 
1.28 
1.48 
1.26 
-0.16 
2.25 
5.75 
6.32 
5.13 
0.06 
0.24 
0.33 
0.17 
-0.07 
0.25 
0.25 
-0.05 
-0.11 
0.02 
-1.45 
-1.81 
-1.55 
-1.12 
-0.69 
-1.99 
-2.40 
-2.07 
-1.56 
-1.01 
-1.59 
-2.00 
-1.51 
-0.66 
0.32 
0.05 
0.33 
0.80 
1.23 
1.40 
UK 
----------
0.42 
1.02 
1.08 
0.97 
0.96 
0.53 
1.12 
1.19 
1.08 
1.02 
0.29 
1.20 
1.07 
0.61 
0.53 
0.04 
0.10 
o.oo 
-0.10 
o.oo 
0.03 
0.09 
0.21 
0.33 
0.27 
-0.75 
-1.63 
-1.91 
-1.90 
-1.69 
-1.12 
-2.19 
-2.54 
-2.45 
-2.16 
-0.35 
-1.16 
-1.49 
-1.35 
-0.96 
0.07 
0.38 
0.68 
0.80 
0.82 
USA 
----------
0.76 
1.42 
1.01 
0.40 
-0.04 
0.90 
1.69 
1.37 
1.02 
0.83 
1.25 
1.81 
0.81 
-0.75 
-1.92 
0.02 
0.15 
0.11 
-0.05 
-0.16 
-0.01 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.09 
-0.12 
-0.65 
-0.88 
-0.24 
0.43 
1.02 
-0.85 
-0.99 
-0.27 
0.48 
1.13 
0.21 
0.84 
1.58 
2.34 
3.08 
0.40 
0.96 
0.79 
0.43 
0.02 
SIMPLE 
f"EAN 
----------
0.52 
1.32 
1.46 
1.12 
0.83 
0.57 
1.24 
1.34 
1.16 
0.98 
0.37 
1.64 
2.46 
1.56 
0.73 
0.01 
0.17 
0.15 
-0.03 
-0.07 
0.12 
0.13 
0.06 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.90 
-1.37 
-1.17 
-0.88 
-0.52 
-1.27 
-1.79 
-1.57 
-1.22 
-0.76 
-0.65 
-0.78 
-0.47 
0.00 
0.72 
0.16 
0.56 
0.85 
0.91 
0.80 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.10 
-0.57 
-1.09 
-1.15 
-0.91 
-0.16 
0.00 
0.88 
0.63 
0.40 
-0.58 
-0.15 
0.07 
-0.14 
-0.23 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0.16 
0.20 
-0.05 
-0.31 
-0.75 
-1.15 
-1.30 
0.03 
0.03 
0.21 
0.26 
0.17 
-0.57 
-0.21 
0.25 
0.54 
0.62 
-0.06 
-0.12 
-0.38 
-0.40 
-0.21 
-0.07 
-0.36 
-0.65 
-0.75 
-0.75 
0.07 
0.19 
0.22 
0.13 
0.13 
-0.55 
-0.22 
-0.32 
-0.35 
-0.37 
-0.23 
-0.42 
-0.33 
-0.15 
-0.17 
-0.37 
-0.90 
-0.75 
-0.40 
-0.02 
-0.14 
-0.28 
0.43 
0.73 
0.65 
-0.37 
-0.05 
-0.20 
-0.53 
-0.89 
-0.10 
-0.20 
-0.16 
-0.08 
-0.04 
-0.15 
-0.53 
-0.81 
-0.86 
-0.74 
-0.05 
-0.01 
0.43 
0.44 
0.34 
-0.52 
-0.16 
-0.05 
-0.12 
-0.22 
-0.10 
-0.20 
-0.25 
-0.12 
-0.06 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -69-
Private  consumption  is  negatively  affected  by  the  decrease  of  real  disposa-
ble  income  which  results  from  the  wage  decrease,  but  it  is  positively 
affected  by  the  lower  inflation  rates.  For  France  and  the  UK,  the  former 
effect  is  stronger  than  the  latter,  thus  resulting  in  a  negative  deviation 
of  private  consumption  from  its  baseline  value.  For  Germany  and  the  US  the 
opposite  is  true,  although  after  three  years,  due  to  the  already  mentioned 
cyclical  factors,  the  deviation  becomes  negative·  also  for  the  US.  The 
average  increase  of  German  private  consumption  results  also  from  a 
different  treatment  of  non-wage  income  in  the  Ger11an  model,  where  no  effect 
of  self-employed  income  (which  is  related  to  the  nominal  wage  rate)  is 
included,  thus  resulting  in  an  increase  of  non-wage  inco11e  following  the 
profit rise. 
Finally,  the  overall  effect  on  GOP/GNP  1s  positive  on  average.  For  Germany, 
the  UK  and  the  US  this  is  mostly  due  to  the  significant  improvement  of  the 
foreign  balance  following  the  increase  in  price  competitiveness;  for  France 
from  the  third year  on  the  increase  in  investment  becomes  more  important. 
4.2.4  Social  security contribution  decrease  for  employers 
This  shock  is  simulated  through  a  decrease  of  the  exogenous  average 
employers•  social  security  contribution  rate  corresponding  to  a  sustained 
decrease  of  employers •  contributions  of  1%  of  nominal  baseline  GOP  (see 
Table  34).  As  in  the  previous  simulation  (a  1%  nominal  wage  decrease),  the 
decrease  of  employers•  social  security  contributions  results  in  a  reduction 
of  labour  costs,  which  has  both  a  profitability  effect  and  a  real  interest 
rate  effect  as  a  resu 1  t  of  the  price  decreases.  Private  investment  in 
equipment  is  thus  affected  negatively  in  the  first  year  following  the  real 
interest  rate  increases  in  Germany  and  France.  From  the  second  year  on 
however,  the  profitability effect  is  stronger  in  all  countries,  which  leads 
to  a  positive  deviation  of  private  investment  from  its  baseline  solution. 
This  deviation  is  particularly  high  in  the  French  model,  where  it amounts 
to  6,3%  after  four  years.  This  comes  in  part  from  a  very  buoyant  residen-
tial  investment,  following  the  decrease  in  the  unemployment  rate,  a  varia-
ble  which  does  [lOt  affect  residential  investment  in  the  other  country 
models.  In  a  later  stage  of  the  project,  it  is  envisaged  to  enhance  the 
homogeneity  across  countries  in  this  respect.  It  is  also  due  to  productive 
investment,  which  is  substantially  higher  than  in  the  baseline  simulation. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that,  contrary  to  the  German  and  US  models,  the  wage 
rate  equation  in  the  French  model  contains  no  productivity  effect.  Thus, 
the  productivity  increase  which  results  from  the  social  contributions 
decrease  is  not  compensated  by  a  wage  increase  in  this  model.  As  a  result, 
the profit  share  increases  by  0,9%  on  average,  as  compared  to  0,5%  for  the 
German  model,  0,5%  for  the  UK  model,  and  0,1%  for  the  US  model.  This  in 
turn  raises  productive  investment  by  3,9%  on  average,  as  compared  to  0,8% 
on  average  for  the  other  country  models. 
Total  employment  improves  considerably,  as  it  is  affected  positively  both 
by  the  shift  from  capital  into  labour  as  by  the  higher .demand.  Also  the 
effect  on  private  consumption  is  positive:  households•  real  disposable 
income  is  1  to  1,3%  higher  than  1n  the  baseline  simulation  after  five 
years,  whereas  the  price  level  is  lower. -70-
Table  35:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  EX-ANTE  DECREASE  IN  HOUSEHOLDS'  DIRECT  TAXES  BY  1X 
=============================================================================== 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
0  0  0  0  •  0  0  ••••••  0  •••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2 
0  •••••••••••  0  •• 0  ••••••••  0  •  0  3 
•••••  0  •••  0  •••••  0  •••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  4 
0  •••••••••••  0  ••  0  ••  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .: YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
0  •••••••••  0  0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  3 
•••  0  ••  0  •  0  •  0  •••••••  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  •  4 
0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  •  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
0  0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  0  ••  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  •  3 
0  0  •  0  •••••••  0  0  ••••  0  •  0  0  •  0  •  0  •  •  4 
•••••••  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••.•••  2 
••  0  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  ••  0  •  0  0  •  0  0  •  0  •  0  0  0  0  3 
••  0  ••  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  0  ••••  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  •  •  4 
0  •  0  ••••  0  •  0  •  0  0  •••••  0  0  •  0  •  0  •  •  •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
•••••••••  0  ••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  3 
•••••••  0  •••••••••  0  ••••••  0  •  •  4 
•••  0  ••  0  0  •••••••  0  0  0  ••  0  0  0  •  0  0  •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
••••••••••  0  •  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
••••  0  0  0  0  ••••••••••••••••  0  •  •  4 
•  0  0  •  0  •  0  •  0  0  ••••••  0  ••  0  ••  0  •  0  •  0  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
••••••  0  •  0  ••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2 
0  0  0  •••••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
••••••••  0  ••  0  •••••••••••••  0  •  4 
•  0  •  0  0  ••  0  •••••••••••  0  •  0  •  •  •  •  •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2 
••••••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
••  0  0  •  0  0  ••  0  ••  0  0  0  0  0  0  •••  0  0  0  0  0  •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
0  •  0  0  0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  •  0  •  0  2 
•  0  0  ••  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  ••  0  •  0  0  0  0  •••  0  0  0  0  3 
0  •  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  ••  0  •• 0  0  •••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••••  0  •••  0  0  •  0  0  ••••  0  ••••  0  0  •  •  •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
(LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
0  0  ••  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  •  0  ••  0  •  0  ••  0  •••••  0  3 
••••••••  0  •••  0  •••••••••  0  0  0  •  •  4 
0  •••  0  •••••••••  0  0  ••  0  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • •  2 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3 
•••  0  •  0  ••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
•••••••  0  •••  0  0  0  •  0  •  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE ••••••••••••••••••••  2 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3 
•••••••••••  0  0  •••••••••  0  ••  0  •  4 
•••••••••••  0  ••  0  ••  0  ••••••  0  •  •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
0  •••  0  0  0  0  ••  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3 
0  0  0  0  0  •• 0  •  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••••••  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  5 
DATE:  8 • 11. 88 
GERMANY 
----------
0.72 
0.90 
0.43 
0.33 
0.29 
1.34 
2.04 
1.84 
1.77 
1.81 
1.24 
1.59 
0.13 
-0.45 
-0.32 
0.13 
0.11 
-0.09 
-0.02 
0.03 
-0.39 
-0.66 
-0.55 
-0.57 
-0.70 
FRANCE 
----------
0.62 
1.31 
1.38 
1.13 
0.70 
0.86 
1.78 
2.17 
2.25 
2.14 
1.18 
2.90 
3.49 
2.80 
1.51 
0.13 
0.29 
0.22 
0.07 
-0.06 
-0.27 
-0.64 
-0.85 
-0.90 
-0.89 
OF  GOP 
====== 
UK 
----------
0.45 
0.67 
0.49 
0.27 
0.21 
0.88 
1.34 
1.33 
1.21 
1.24 
0.49 
1.09 
0.64 
0.07 
-0.09 
0.07 
0.09 
0.02 
-o.o5 
-0.04 
-0.19 
-0.36 
-0.41 
-0.41 
-0.49 
USA 
----------
0.69 
1.26 
0.81 
0.30 
0.23 
0.91 
1.73 
1.  72 
1.54 
1.67 
1.01 
1.89 
0.43 
-1.12 
-1.31 
0.07 
0.15 
-0.00 
-0.10 
-0.07 
-0.10 
-0.26 
-0.33 
-0.40 
-0.55 
SIMPLE 
MEAN 
----------
0.62 
1.03 
0.78 
0.51 
0.36 
0.99 
1.72 
1.77 
1.69 
1.72 
0.98 
1.87 
1.17 
0.33 
-0.05 
0.10 
0.16 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.24 
-0.48 
-0.53 
-0.57 
-0.66 
------------------------------------------------------
0.15  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.10 
0.45  0.35  0.30  0.70  0.45 
0.47  0.80  0.65  1.62  0.88 
0.52  1.24  1.00  2.58  1.34 
0.68  1.60  1.31  3.51  1.77 
------------------------------------------------------
0.24  0.08  0.06  0.13  0.13 
0.65  0.47  0.34  0.78  0.56 
0.67  1.05  0.80  1.79  1.08 
0.78  1.63  1.23  2.85  1.62 
1.02  2.12  1.61  3.87  2.15 
------------------------------------------------------
Oo60  0.07  0.04  0.29  0.25 
1.10  0.48  0.27  1.12  0.74 
1.04  1.17  0.69  2.20  1.28 
1.32  1.93  1.16  3.31  1.93 
1.67  2.62  1.57  4.37  2.56 
------------------------------------------------------
0.14  0.07  0.07  0.27  0.14 
0.46  0.34  0.28  0.71  0.45 
0.43  0.61  0.37  0.60  0.50 
0.24  0.72  0.32  0.23  0.38 
0.15  0.67  0.23  0.05  Oo27 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.13  -0.06  -0.07  -0.25  -0.13 
-0.45  -0.32  -0.27  -0.67  -0.42 
-0.42  -0.57  -0.36  -0.57  -0.48 
-0.23  -0.68  -0.30  -0.21  -0.35 
-0.14  -0.62  -0.21  -0.04  -0.25 
------------------------------------------------------
0.31  0.14  0.19  0.34  0.24 
0.79  0.36  0.39  1.00  0.64 
0.53  0.48  0.40  1.21  0.66 
0.32  0.47  0.35  1.33  0.62 
0.40  0.45  0.38  1.51  0.69 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.73  -0.86  -0.81  -0.73  -0.78 
-0.47  -0.56  -0.65  -0.51  -0.55 
-0.61  -0.36  -0.70  -0.76  -0.61 
-0.75  -0.48  -0.84  -1.18  -0.81 
-0.77  -0.80  -0.96  -1.46  -1.00 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.33  -0.28  -0.27  -0.13  -0.25 
-0.49  -0.57  -0.42  -0.28  -0.44 
-0.39  -0.70  -0.37  -0.27  -0.43 
-0.40  -0.69  -0.27  -0.26  -0.41 
-0.49  -0.65  -0.33  -0.33  -0.45 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -71-
Except  for  the  US  model,  where  imports  of  goods  and  services  are •ore  than 
21  higher  than  in  the  baseline  simulation  after  two  years,  the  overall  real 
foreign  balance  is  also  positively  affected  in  this  shock,  •ainly  as  a 
result  of  export  increases  following  the  cost  and  price  reductions.  As  a 
result  of  the  strong  effect  of  the  unemployment  rate  on  wages,  the  nominal 
wage  rate  increases  considerably.  This  raises  prices  after four  years,  thus 
creating  a  competitive  disadvantage  for  the  US,  which  results  in  a  negative 
multiplier  on  the  real  foreign  balance. 
The  decrease  of  the  government  receipts  (which  include  soci a 1  security 
contributions)  is  compensated  by  lower  expenditures  only  in  the  French 
model  from  the  third  year  on.  This  comes  Mainly  fro11  a  decrease  in  social 
transfer  payments  as  the  unemployment  rate  is  lower.  In  the  other countries 
however,  this  effect  is  too  weak  as  to  compensate  for  the  1  oss  in  soci a 1 
security  receipts. 
4.2.5  Direct  tax  decrease  for  households 
This  simulation  is  effectuated  through  a  1  percent of  GOP,  one  period  down-
ward  adjustment  in  the  residuals  for  the  equation  determining  the  growth 
rate  of  direct  taxes  for  households  (see  Table  35).  This  represents  an 
external  shock  to  an  otherwise  endogenous  process. 
The  direct  effect  of  this  shock  is  to  raise  households'  real  disposable 
income,  which  is  ex-post  on  average  2,01  higher  than  in  the  baseline  simu-
lation.· This  in  turn  boosts  private  consumption,  which  is  2,01  above  its 
baseline  value  after  two  years  in  Germany,  1,31  in  the  UK  and  1,71  in  the 
US.  In  France,  the  maximum  effect  is  only  reached  after  4  years,  where 
private  consumption  is  2,31  higher  than  in  the  base  case. 
The  wage  rate  equations  do  no~ allow  for  a  repercussion  of  tax  effects  on 
wage  claims,  which  implies  that  the  tax  cut  will  not  have  an  effect on  wage 
costs.  On  the  other  hand,  the  strong  consumption  demand  results  in  invest-
ment  increases,  but  also  in  higher  import  demand  and  more  rapid  inflation 
rates.  Together  with  the  higher  wage  rates  this  leads  to  a  general  rise  of 
production  costs  and  finally  in  a  decrease  in  exports.  The  situation of  the 
real  foreign  balance  therefore  deteriorates  in  all  four  countries  and  espe-
cially  in  France,  where  the  more  buoyant  consumption  demand  leads  to  an 
import  demand  which  is  3,31  higher  than  its  baseline  level  after  3  years, 
compared  with  an  average  for  the  four  countries  of  2,31. 
The  loss  in  government  receipts  resulting  from  the  direct tax  cut  is  partly 
compensated  by  higher  indirect tax  receipts  following  the  increased privata 
consumption  and  by  higher  social  security  receipts  following  the  general 
increase  in  the  wage  bill.  Since  however  government  expenditure  increases, 
mainly  due  to  higher  debt  payments  and  to  higher  government  consumption 
following  the  price  and  wage  increases,  the  overall  government  financial 
balance  deteriorates  considerably. 
A  comparison  of  the  effects  of  a  direct  tax  decrease  for  households  to  a 
decrease o( the  social  security  contributions  by  firms,  both  by  11  of  GOP, 
shows  that  the  positive  impact  on  GOP  is  higher  for  all  countries  in  the -72-
Table  36:  NON-LINKED  QUEST  SII"lJLATION:  DEPRECIATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  CURRENCY  BY  lOX  ========================================================================= 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
<LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • •  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE....................  2 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ••••• :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
DATE:  21.12.88 
SIMPLE 
GERMANY  FRANCE  UK  USA  MEAN 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
3.36  2.03  1.32  1.07  1.94 
3.47  3.65  1.32  1.02  2.37 
1.45  3.38  0.76  0.49  1.52 
1.77  1.80  0.30  0.25  1.03 
1.65  0.17  -0.21  0.18  0.45 
------------------------------------------------------
0.13 
0.42 
-0.73 
-0.70 
-0.56 
2.46 
4.37 
-1.49 
-1.71 
-0.55 
0.61 
0.18 
-0.74 
-O.Ol 
0.09 
2.24 
2.27 
2.88 
2.51 
1.98 
1.60 
3.87 
3.97 
4.59 
5.48 
-0.02 
0.78 
1.17 
0.52 
-0.58 
1.61 
7.80 
8.17 
3.84 
-o. 11 
0.38 
0.73 
0.43 
-0.14 
-0.51 
1.35 
0.99 
0.68 
0.88 
1.18 
1.56 
3.83 
5.26 
6.43 
7.22 
-0.71 
-0.92 
-1.05 
-1.14 
-1.11 
0.63 
1.54 
0.93 
0.55 
-0.03 
0.19 
0.18 
0.12 
0.13 
-0.07 
1.43 
1.42 
1.11 
0.76 
0.53 
1.69 
3.94 
5.95 
7.63 
8.89 
0.12 
-0.06 
-0.42 
-0.60 
-0.59 
1.27 
1.14 
-0.07 
-0.54 
-0.50 
0.11 
0.07 
-0.12 
-0.10 
-0.06 
0.70 
0.82 
0.88 
0.82 
0.68 
0.55 
1.64 
2.72 
3.87 
5.01 
-0.12 
0.05 
-0.26 
-0.48 
-0.71 
1.49 
3.71 
1.88 
0.53 
-0.45 
0.32 
0.29 
-0.08 
-0.03 
-0.14 
1.43 
1.37 
1.39 
1.24 
1.09 
1.35 
3.32 
4.48 
5.63 
6.65 
------------------------------------------------------
0.21  0.05  -0.30  0.21  0.04 
2.90  2.82  2.69  1.42  2.45 
2.89  4.53  5.14  2.66  3.81 
3.73  5.92  7.26  3.96  5.22 
4.94  6.96  8.79  5.15  6.46 
------------------------------------------------------
2.26  0.70  0.86  0.54  1.09 
5.08  3.52  3.13  1.57  3.33 
4.79  5.65  5.47  2.88  4.70 
6. 72  7.60  7.47  4.26  6.51 
8.41  9.06  9.02  5.53  8.00 
------------------------------------------------------
0.64  0.22  0.23  0.43  0.38 
1.97  0.99  0.62  0.68  1.07 
1.56  1.64  0.63  0.44  1.07 
0.90  1.66  0.40  0.18  0.79 
0.67  1.09  0.10  0.06  0.48 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.62  -0.21  -0.22  -0.40  -0.36 
-1.90  -0.94  -0.59  -0.64  -1.02 
-1.51  -1.54  -0.60  -0.42  -1.02 
-0.87  -1.56  -0.38  -0.17  -0.74 
-0.64  -1.01  -0.09  -0.06  -0.45 
------------------------------------------------------
1.76  0.73  0.45  0.83  0.94 
4.44  0.72  0.11  1.54  1.  70 
2.54  0.85  -0.04  1.50  1.21 
1.99  0.66  -0.09  1.  72  1.07 
2.50  0.31  -0.21  1.95  1.14 
------------------------------------------------------
0.98  0.44  0.10  0.36  0.47 
1.80  1.47  0.20  0.46  0.98 
0.99  2.04  0.34  0.30  0.92 
1.12  1.96  0.24  0.14  0.86 
1.26  1.39  0.17  0.15  0.74 
------------------------------------------------------
0.82  -0.04  -0.48  0.34  0.16 
1.43  0.12  0.46  0.56  0.64 
1.87  -o.oo  0.58  0.78  0.81 
1.55  0.28  0.71  0.85  0.85 
1.33  0.88  0.89  0.74  0.96 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -73-
latter case.  The  direct  effect  of  a  reduction  of  labour  costs  is  repercus-
sed  to  all  categories  of  final  demand,  whereas  in  the  tax  reduction  si•ula-
tion  it  is  only  domestic  demand  which  is  positively  affected,  while  the 
real  foreign  balance  deteriorates. 
The  government  balance  is  less  affected  in  the  social  security  shock  than 
in  the  tax  shock,  which  can  also  be  attributed to  the  more  buoyant  domestic 
production  in  the  former  case. 
4.2.6  Currency  depreciation 
This  shock  is  simulated  through  a  sustained  101  decrease  of  the  exogenous 
exchange  rate  (see  Table  36}.  As  is  discussed  in  section  4.3,  the  analysis 
of  exchange  rate  changes  on  a  single  country  basis  is  li11ited  since  it 
ignores  international  feedbacks  which  are  often  crucial  to  the  results  for 
GOP,  prices  and  the  current  account.  The  relevance  of  the  results  which  are 
presented  in  this  subsection  lies  therefore  mainly  in  their  compa~ison with 
the  linked  simulation  of  section  4.3.3. 
The  depreciation  has  an  immediate  impact  on  import  prices,  which  are  from 
the first year  on  some  9  to  101  higher  than  in  the  baseline  simulation,  and 
this  in  all  countries.  Export  prices  increase  more  gradually;  the  lowest 
increase  is  found  in  the  US  where  it  amounts  to  6,21  after  five  years, 
whereas  competitivity  gains  are  almost  completely  eroded  after  five  years 
in  France. 
As  a  result  of  the  high  speed  of  adjustment,  J-curve  effects  are  absent  in 
the  US  and  very  limited  in  the  other  countries:  the  currency  depreciation 
has  a  negative  impact  on  the  current  balance  only  for  the first quarter  of 
the  simulation  period  in  the  German  and  French  models  and  for  the  first 
three  quarters  in  the  UK  model. 
The  high  real  foreign  balance  multiplier  in  the  German  model  - 2,41  on 
average  over  five  years  as  compared  to  0,91  on  average  for  the  other  coun-
tries  - can  be  attributed  to  the  very  high  import  price  elasticity of  the 
German  model,  which  results  in  strong  import  substitution effects. 
The  competitiveness  gains  are  reflected  in  lower  imports  and  higher 
exports.  This  in  turn  stimulates  domestic  demand  in  the  short  run.  Increa-
sing  import  costs  are  further  reflected  in  higher  domestic  nominal  wage  and 
price  levels.  With  wages  lagging  behind  consumer  prices,  real  wages  will 
however  be  lower  than  in  the  baseline  simulation  in  the  beginning  of  the 
period  in  the  UK  and  US  models.  This  negative  effect  on  demand  causes 
private  investment  to  increase  only  slight  1 y  in  the  UK  model,  whereas  it 
increases  up  to  8,21  in,the  French  model.  In  the  German  and  US  models,  the 
investment  response  becomes  negative  after  two  years,  due  to  the  lower  pro-
fitability. 
Finally,  the  average  effect  of  a  currency  depreciation  on  GOP  is  positive 
in  all  four  models.  It  reaches  a  maximum  in  the  second  year  of  the  shock  in 
Germany  and  France,  and  already  in  the first year  in  the  UK  and  the  US.  The 
following  decrease  of  the  GOP-response  reflects  the  erosion  of  competi-
tiveness  gains,  a  lower  consumption  demand  as  a  result of  real  wage  decrea-
ses  and  a  lower  investment  demand,  both  as  a  result  of  lower  profitability 
and  lower  domestic  demand. -74-
Table  37:  QUEST  simulation:  govern11ent  invest•ent  increase  by  1%  of 
baseline  GOP,  standard  monetary  policy;  co11pari son  of  linked  and 
unlinked  simulations 
Real  GOP/GNP 
Total  real 
exports 
Real  foreign 
balance  (% 
baseline  GOP) 
GOP/GNP 
deflator 
Government 
financial 
balance 
(I baseline 
GOP) 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Germany 
S  L 
1.20  1.26 
0.96  1.13 
0.51  0.63 
0.48  0.55 
0.36  0.46 
-0.09 
-0.48 
-0.59 
-0.75 
-1.02 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.18 
-0.35 
-0.61 
France 
S  L 
1.35  1.39 
1.83  1.98 
1.60  1.81 
1.01  1.20 
0.35  0.43 
0.04  0.21 
-0.25  0.16 
-0.76  -0.30 
-1.05  -0.65 
-1.44  -1.22 
-0.63  -0.60  -0.60  -0.58 
-0.75  -0.68  -0.94  -0.91 
-0.64  -0.55  -1.09  -1.06 
-0.77  -0.65  -1.00  -0.97 
-0.91  -0.78  -0.91  -0.87 
0.34 
0.73 
0.78 
1.06 
1.32 
0.36 
0.81 
0.89 
1.18 
1.49 
0.25 
0.90 
1.67 
2.30 
2.71 
0.25 
0.92 
1.77 
2.51 
3.01 
-0.47  -0.44  -0.61  -0.60 
-0.40  -0.32  -0.29  -0.23 
-0.65  -0.58  -0.19  -0.09 
-0.75  -0.70  -0.37  -0.24 
-0.84  -0.77  -0.84  -0.73 
United  Kingdo11 
S  L 
1.02  1.04 
1.07  1.11 
0.64  0.68 
0.34  0.37 
0.28  0.28 
-0.01  0.05 
-0.22  -0.07 
-0.64  -0.47 
-1.12  -0.98 
-1.51  -1.42 
-0.44  -0.43 
-0.61  -0.59 
-0.63  -0.60 
-0.67  -0.64 
-0.80  -0.77 
0.09 
0.69 
1.49 
2.17 
2.71 
0.09 
0.70 
1.54 
2.27 
2.86 
-0.73  -0.72 
-0.64  -0.63 
-0.81  -0.79 
-1.05  -1.04 
-1.21  -1.21 
United  States 
S  L 
1.75  1.81 
1.46  1.63 
0.22  0.37 
-0.00  0.09 
0.28  0.38 
-0.19 
-0.92 
-1.92 
-2.77 
-3.62 
0.22 
0.04 
-0.87 
-1.69 
-2.29 
-0.27  -0.24 
-0.39  -0.32 
-0.38  -0.28 
-0.52  -0.40 
-0.74  -0.59 
0.47 
1.73 
3.05 
4.16 
5.22 
0.48 
1.82 
3.29 
4.59 
5.87 
-0.38  -0.36 
-0.45  -0.37 
-1.11  -1.03 
-1.54  -1.49 
-1.59  -1.54 
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  all  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage 
difference with  respect  to  baseline  simulation 
S  •  single  country  mode  (unlinked) 
L  •  linked  simulation -75-
4.3  The  effects  of  linkage 
The  linkage  modu 1 e  of  the  QUEST  model  permits  a  study  of  the  feedback 
effects  of  an  individual  country's  actions,  or  to  analyse  the  i11pact  of 
shocks  or  policies  which  cross  national  boundaries.  Obviously,  the  present 
structure of  the  model,  which  contains  structural  11odels  for  four  countries 
and  trade-feedback  models  for  the  21  remaining  countries  or  zones,  implies 
the  presence  of  asymmetries  in  the  system.  The  essentially  reduced  forll-
type  trade-feedback  models  will  not  react  in  the  sa•e  way  to  shocks  as  the 
complete  country  models.  Furthermore,  except  for  the  influence  of  US 
interest  rates,  international  transmission  takes  place  through  the  volume 
and  price  effects  of  traded  goods  alone,  thus  excluding  trade  in  services 
or  capital  flows.  Keeping  these  limitations  in  •ind,  the  introduction  of 
linkage  may  nevertheless  serve  to  illustrate  some  features  which  would 
otherwise  be  difficult  to  capture  with  national  models  alone.  This  section 
desribes  the  simulation  results  of  three  types  of  simulations  illustrating 
such  features.  The  first  set  of  simulations  concerns  the  feedback  effects 
of  a  government  expenditure  shock,  and  includes  a  simulation  of  concerted 
action  for  comparison  with  individual  country  shocks.  A  second  simulation 
looks  at  the  consequences  of  an  oil-price  shock.  This  case  is  interesting 
given  the  presence  of  a  structural  model  for  the  United  Kingdom  as  an  ener-
gy  producer  and  the  fact  that  energy  is  treated  explicit  1  y  in  the  model, 
albeit  in  an  ad-hoc  f.ashion.  The  third  set  of  simulations  looks  at  the 
effects  of  a  currency  depreciation,  in  this  case,  the  US  dollar.  Here 
again,  the  distinction  between  linked  and  non-linked  simulation  is  crucial. 
4.3.1  Government  investment  increase  and  concerted  action 
The  simplest  way  to  trace  the  effects  of  linkage  is  by  comparing  the  simu-
lation  results  for  a  government  investment  shock  in  linked  mode  to  those  in 
unlinked  mode.  This  comparison  is  presented  in  Table  37,  while  Tables  38 
and  39  give  the  cross-country  multipliers  for  these  single  country  fiscal 
shocks.  The  linkage  implies  that  part  of  the  import  leakage  which  takes 
place  if  there  is  an  increase  in  demand  is  returned  in  the  form  of  higher 
exports  through  an  increase  in  foreign  demand.  As  Table  38  shows,  the 
effects  on  foreign  GOP  may  reach  a  quarter  of  a  percentage  point  in  some 
cases.  The  negative  contribution  of  the  real  foreign  balance  to  GOP  caused 
by  the  import  leakage  will  thus  be  attenuated.  This  will  contribute positi-
vely  to  the  effect  on  GOP  and,  indirectly,  on  the  government  financial 
balance.  The  extent  of  the  attenuation  depends  mainly  on  the  elasticity  of 
imports  with  respect  to  final  demand:  the  larger  this  elasticity,  the 
larger  will  be  the  positive  impact  of  the  linkage,  ceteris  paribus.  The 
relationship  between  the  size  of  the  final  demand  elasticity of  imports  and 
the  relative  size  of  the  effects  from  linkage  on  the  real  foreign  balance 
is  crucial  in  explaining  the  simulation  results  presented  here.  The  fact 
that  the  final  demand  variable  in  the  equation  for  imports  of  non-energy 
goods  has  been  corrected  for  trade  integration  effects  has  lowered  the 
corresponding  elasticity considerably  (cf.  ITALIANER  (1987)).  Consequently, 
the  effect  from  linkage  has  been  attenuated  a  priori.  The  interpretation -76-
Table  38:  Linked  QUEST  simulation:  government  investment  increase  by  1%  of  baseline  GNP, 
standard monetary  policy;  cross multipliers  for  the structural  models 
Country  taking  action: 
Effect on:  Germany  France 
Year  XTO  YQ  py  XT_Q_  YQ 
Germany  1  0.11  1. 26  0.36  0.43  0.14 
2  -0.06  1.13  0.81  0.77  0.27 
3  -0.18  0.63  0.89  0.85  0.24 
4  -0.35  0.55  1.18  0.71  0.13 
5  -0.61  0.46  1.49  0.47  0.04 
France  1  0.52  0.15  -0.00  0.21  1. 39 
2  0.73  0.28  0.09  0.16  1. 98 
3  0.55  0.20  0.22  -0.30  1.81 
4  0.52  0.09  0.31  -0.65  1. 20 
5  0.50  0.02  0.38  -1.22  0.43 
United Kingdom  1  0.23  0.06  0.01  0.21  0.06 
2  0.38  0.11  0.06  0.44  0.13 
3  0.35  0.08  0.16  0.45  0.12 
4  0.31  0.06  0.26  0.35  0.07 
5  0.27  0.03  0.35  0.15  -0.01 
United States  1  0.20  0.03  0.01  0.15  0.02 
2  0.35  0.06  0.04  0.34  0.06 
3  0.34  0.04  0.10  0.43  0.07 
4  0.35  0.03  0.16  0.41  0.03 
5  0.35  0.02  0.22  0.29  -0.02 
XTQ  •  real  exports of  goods  and  services 
YQ  •  real  GOP/GNP 
PY  =  GOP/GNP  deflator 
(%difference from  baseline) 
United Kingdom  United States 
py  XTO  YO  py  XTO  YO  py 
0.04  0.17  0.06  0.02  0.36  0.05  0.01 
0.14  0.30  0.11  0.06  0.84 -0.00  0.01 
0.20  0.33  0.10  0.08  0.94  -0.01-0.02 
0.23  0.30  0.07  0.10  1.02  0.09  0.03 
0.27  0.28  0.07  0.13  1.35  0.17 0.11 
0.25  0.18  0.05  0.00  0.37  0.10-0.00 
0.92  0.33  0.14  0.03  0.72  0.26 0.06 
1. 77  0.31  0.16  0.10  0.65  0.26 0.20 
2.51  0.24  0.13  0.18  0.69  0.21  0.34 
3.01  0.18  0.06  0.24  0.94  0.21  0.50 
0.01  0.05  1.04  0.09  0.35  0.09  0.01 
0.05  -0.07  1.11  0.70  0.71  0.17 0.09 
0.15  -0.47  0.68  1. 54  0.69  0.10  0.22 
0.27 -0.98  0.37  2.27  0.65  -0.01  0.39 
0.37 -1.42  0.28  2.86  0.85  0.00  0.56 
0.01  0.13  0.02  0.01  0.22  1.81  0.48 
0.03  0.24  0.04  0.03  0.04  1. 63  1.82 
0.09  0.28  0.04  0.07  -0.87  0.37  3.29 
0.16  0.25  0.02  0.11  -1.69  0.09  4.59 
0.22  0.24  0.00  0.16  -2.29  0.38 5.87 -77-
Table  39:  Linked  QUEST  simulation:  government  investment  increase by  1~ of baseline GNP, 
standard monetary  policy,  cross  trade multipliers 
Country  taking  action: 
Effect on:  Germany 
Year  XMSQ  MMSQ 
EC  1  0.41  0.85 
2  0.51  1.02 
3  0.38  0.73 
4  0.31  0.71 
5  0.22  0.71 
OECD  excl.  EC  1  0.26  0.08 
2  0.40  0.14 
3  0.37  0.13 
4  0.39  0.13 
5  0.39  0.12 
OECD  1  0.35  0.49 
2  0.46  0.61 
3  0.38  0.45 
4  0.34  0.45 
5  0.29  0.44 
OPEC  1  0.23  0.04 
2  0.35  0.11 
3  0.32  0.13 
4  0.31  0.11 
5  0.32  0.07 
NICs  1  0.27  0.09 
2  0.39  0.21 
3  0.35  0.27 
4  0.35  0.32 
5  0.34  0.35 
CPEs  1  0.27  0.09 
2  0.44  0.23 
3  0.45  0.27 
4  0.47  0.29 
5  0.49  0.30 
Other  developing  1  0.26  0.22 
countries  2  0.42  0.34 
3  0.39  0.30 
4  0.41  0.30 
5  0.42  0.28 
World  1  0.31  0.38 
2  0.43  0.49 
3  0.37  0.39 
4  0.35  0.39 
5  0.32  0.38 
XMSQ  •  real  exports  of  goods 
MMSQ  •  real  imports  of goods 
PXMS  XMSQ 
0.13  0.40 
0.30  0.72 
0.36  0.68 
0.46  0.42 
0.59  0.10 
0.02  0.18 
0.10  0.38 
0.14  0.45 
0.18  0.41 
0.23  0.27 
0.08  0.31 
0.21  0.57 
0.27  0.58 
0.23  0.42 
0.42  0.18 
0.00  0.31 
0.00  0.59 
0.00  0.63 
0.00  0.58 
0.00  0.40 
0.05  0.18 
0.14  0.37 
0.19  0.43 
0.22  0.37 
0.28  0.24 
0.02  0.16 
0.07  0.35 
0.09  0.45 
0.11  0.45 
0.14  0.35 
0.02  0.25 
0.08  0.47 
0.10  0.54 
0.12  0.47 
0.16  0.34 
0.06  0.28 
0.17  0.54 
0.20  0.57 
0.24  0.44 
0.31  0.24 
PXMS  •  deflator of exports of goods  ($) 
France 
MMSQ 
0.71 
1.17 
1.12 
0.80 
0.42 
0.06 
0.14 
0.17 
0.14 
0.05 
0.41 
0.69 
0.68 
0.51 
0.25 
0.06 
0.21 
0.33 
0.34 
0.25 
0.06 
0.18 
0.28 
0.33 
0.32 
0.05 
0.17 
0.25 
0.28 
0.25 
0.23 
0.41 
0.44 
0.32 
0.17 
0.31 
0.55 
0.58 
0.45 
0.25 
(~difference fro• baseline) 
United Kingdom  United States 
PXMS  XMSQ  MMSQ  PXMS  XMSQ  MMSQ  PXMS 
0.04  0.17  0.39  0.04  0.39  0.13  0.03 
0.19  0.27  0.58  0.14  0.77  0.23  0.16 
0.36  0.19  0.46  0.26  0.68  0.08 0.32 
0.50  0.03  0.29  0.37  0.62  -0.04 0.49 
0.60  -0.08  0.22  0.46  0.89  0.02  0.64 
0.01  0.17  0.06  0.00  0.72  2.02  0.19 
0.05  0.30  0.10  0.04  1.04  2.54  0.68 
0.12  0.30  0.09  0.09  0.42  1.55  1.22 
0.18  0.25  0.05  0.15  0.04  1. 52  1. 70 
0.23  0.22  0.01  0.19  0.21  2.33  2.12 
0.02  0.17  0.23  0.02  0.53  1.02 0.11 
0.12  0.28  0.36  0.09  0.89  1.31  0.40 
0.26  0.24  0.29  0.19  0.57  0.75  0.71 
0.36  0.13  0.19  0.27  0.36  0.66  1.03 
0.43  0.06  0.13  0.34  0.59  1.08 1.32 
0.00  0.12  0.02  0.00  0.84  0.14  0.00 
0.00  0.23  0.07  0.00  1.21  0.48 0.00 
0.00  0.22  0.09  0.00  0.88  0.51  0.00 
0.00  0.19  0.05  0.00  0.81  0.29  0.00 
0.00  0.17 -0.01  0.00  1.15  0.16 0.00 
0.01  0.16  0.05  0.01  0.88  0.26 0.10 
0.08  0.25  0.13  0.07  1.44  0.74  0.40 
0.16  0.23  0.18  0.14  1.00  0.90  0.76 
0.22  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.82  0.93  1.09 
0.28  0.16  0.20  0.26  1.22  1.10 1.  33 
0.00  0.09  0.03  0.00  0.25  0.07 0.01 
0.03  0.20  0.09  0.02  0.55  0.26 0.08 
0.07  0.22  0.13  0.05  0.65  0.37 0.18 
0.10  0.21  0.13  0.07  0.72  0.42  0.26 
0.13  0.20  0.13  0.09  1.00  0.53  0.33 
0.01  0.16  0.10  0.01  0.81  0.81  0.04 
0.05  0.25  0.18  0.06  1.43  1.25 0.19 
0.11  0.25  0.19  0.11  1.31  0.99 0.37 
0.16  0.21  0.17  0.16  1.33  0.83  0.56 
0.20  0.18  0.16  0.20  1.73  1.14 0.71 
0.01  0.15  0.18  0.02  0.61  0.81  0.06 
0.09  0.26  0.29  0.08  0.99  1.12 0.29 
0.19  0.23  0.25  0.14  0.71  0.75  0.54 
0.26  0.16  0.17  0.20  0.56  0.65  0.79 
0.32  0.10  0.12  0.25  0.83  0.97 1.03 -78-
Table  40:  QUEST  simulation:  government  investment  increase  by  11  of  baseline 
GOP,  standard  monetary  policy;  comparison  of 
single  country  action  with  concerted  action 
(Simple  means  of  effects  on  Germany,  France,  the  UK  and  the  US) 
Real  GOP/GNP 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Tot  a 1  rea  1  exports  1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Real  foreign  balance  1 
(I baseline  GOP)  2 
3 
4 
5 
GOP/GNP  deflator  1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Government  financial  1 
balance  (I baseline  2 
GOP)  3 
4 
5 
Single  country  action 
Unlinked  Linked 
(1)  (2) 
1.33 
1.33 
0.74 
0.46 
0.32 
-0.06 
-0.47 
-0.98 
-1.42 
-1.90 
-0.48 
-0.67 
-0.68 
-0.74 
-0.84 
0.29 
1.01 
1.75 
2.42 
2.99 
-0.55 
-0.44 
-0.69 
-0.93 
-1.12 
1.38 
1.46 
0.87 
0.55 
0.39 
0.15 
0.02 
-0.46 
-0.92 
-1.39 
-0.46 
-0.63 
-0.62 
-0.67 
-0.75 
0.30 
1.06 
1.87 
2.64 
3.31 
-0.53 
-0.39 
-0.62 
-0.87 
-1.06 
Concerted  action 
Linked 
(3) 
1.58 
1.85 
1.19 
0.76 
0.55 
0.99 
1.55 
1.06 
0.51 
0.06 
-0.35 
-0.39 
-0.32 
-0.28 
-0.30 
0.32 
1.23 
2.25 
3.26 
4.18 
-0.45 
-0.23 
-0.46 
-0.75 
-0.98 
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  all  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage 
differences  with  respect  to  baseline  simulation. -79-
of  this  phenomenon  is  simple:  given  the  smaller  i•port  leakage,  part of  the 
effect  from  linkage  is  already  present  in  the  unlinked  si•ulation.  Still, 
the  effects  from  trade  feedback  on  total  exports  are  considerable. 
According  to  Table  37,  introducing  the  linkage  adds  between  0,1  and  1,3 
percentage  points  to  the  effect  on  total  exports  after  5  years.  As  seen  in 
Tables  38  and  39,  spillover effects  on  exports  of  other countrtes  sometimes 
surpass  one  percentage  potnt.  The  lower  ftgure  corresponds  to  the  United 
Ktngdom,  and  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  for  thts  country  the  tmpact 
of  the  shock  on  final  demand,  and  thus  on  imports,  is  the  smallest  of  all 
four  countries  considered.  Despite  a  relativ~ly  htgh  demand  elasticity  for 
imports  of  non-energy  goods,  the  consequences  of  linkage  for  total  exports 
therefore  rematn  small  for  the  United  Kingdom. 
Import  leakages  reduce  the  efficiency of  single  country  actions.  If  several 
countries  give  a  fiscal  policy  shock  simultaneously,  this  should  therefore 
enhance  the  effects  on  growth  through  a  smaller  deterioration  of  the  real 
foreign  balance.  Table  40  presents  the  example  of  a  concerted  action  by 
Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  in  the  form  of  a 
similar  increase,  by  11  of  baseline  GOP,  of  government  investment.  A compa-
rison  of  the  simple  means  of  the  effects  on  GDP/GNP  per  country  reveals 
that,  in  the  medium  run,  these  effects  are  more  than  401  higher  in  the  case 
of  concerted  action.  To  a  minor  extent,  this  is  also  reflected  in  the 
government  financial  balance.  The  spillover  effects  from  international 
trade  reduce  the  negative  contribution  of  the  real  foreign  balance  by 
almost  501  in  the  medium  run.  On  the  other  hand,  the  price  linkages  will 
reinforce  the  effects  on  inflation.  After  5  years.  the  price  level  is  on 
average  251  higher  in  the  case  of  concerted  action  compared  to  the  single 
country  action  case.  Although  there  is  thus  a  trade-off  between  the  effects 
on  output  and  inflation  when  there  is  a  concerted  action,  the  relatively 
smaller  effect  on  inflation  suggests  that  the  balance  remains  in  favour  of 
output. 
4.3.2  Oil  price  decrease 
The  effects  of  an  oil  price  decrease  differ  by  country,  depending  on 
whether  the  country  is  identified  1n  the  model  as  a  primary  energy  producer 
or  not.  If  tt  1s  not,  the  oil  price  decrease  lowers  energy  import  prices 
and  therefore  augments  energy  import  volumes  through  a  relative  price 
effect.  To  the  extent  that  1  ower  energy  import  prices  work  through  in 
domestic  prices,  this  effect  should  be  attenuated  somewhat  in  the  medium 
run.  On  the  other  hand,  the  corresponding  increase  in  terms  of  trade  impro-
ves  real  spending  power  and  increases  profits,  thus  exerting  positive 
effects  on  private  consumption  and  investment.  In  the  medium  run,  accelera-
tor  effects  will  disappear,  so  the  increase  in  GOP  will  be  reduced.  In  the 
trade-feedback  models,  1  ower  energy  prices  work  through  in  import  volumes 
via  an  improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade.  When  export  prices  are  aligned  to 
the  changes  in  import  prices,  this  terms  of  trade  effect  will  be  softened 
somewhat.  For  an  o11  producer  such  as  the  United  Kingdom,  1n  the  case  of 
the  QUEST  model,  the  terms  of  trade  will  be  worse  off  compared  to  the  non-
oil  producing  countries.  This  may  be  expected  to  have  a  less  positive 
effect  on  domestic  demand,  and  to  worsen  the  external  balance.  Looking  at 
the  s i mu 1 at  ion  resu 1 ts  of  a  decrease  in  world  ot 1  pri cas  by  101,  as 
presented  in  Table  41,  the  effects  described  above  do  appear  indeed. -80-
Table  41:  LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  DECREASE  IN  WORLD  OIL  PRICES  BY  lOX 
============================================================ 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
STOCKBUILDING  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
. • . • • • • • • • • • . . . . • • . • . • • • . • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  ••••••••••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • . • • • • •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
. • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
(LEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  ..  YEAR  1 
RATE  ...................... 2 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE ••••••••••••••••••••  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
-----------------------------
CURRENT  BALANCE  ......  YEAR  1 
<XBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••.•••  2  ........................... 3  ........................... 4  ........................... 5 
DATE:  5.12.88 
SIMPLE 
GERMANY  FRANCE  UK  USA  MEAN 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
0.42  0.40  0.17  0.23  0.30 
0.23  0.44  -o.oo  0.18  0.21 
0.18  0.35  -0.10  0.01  0.11 
0.19  0.27  -0.09  0.14  0.13 
0.04  0.10  -0.09  0.10  0.04 
0.32  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.21 
0.46  0.39  0.24  0.20  0.32 
0.38  0.36  0.15  0.08  0.24 
0.41  0.31  0.10  0.16  0.24 
0.34  0.24  0.04  0.14  0.19 
------------------------------------------------------
0.93 
0.35 
-0.05 
0.01 
-0.38 
0.04 
-o.oo 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.09 
-0.03 
-0.06 
-0.04 
0.77 
1.05 
1.22 
1.05 
0.51 
0.09 
0.09 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.09 
-0.13 
-0.12 
-0.10 
0.41 
0.45 
-0.15 
-0.32 
-0.37 
0.03 
0.00 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.21 
-0.13 
-0.06 
-0.04 
0.44 
0.32 
-0.13 
0.31 
0.29 
0.02 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.03 
-0.02 
-o.oo 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.64 
0.54 
0.22 
0.26 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.03 
0.02 
-0.11 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.05 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.13 
-0.35 
-0.43 
-0.42 
-0.43 
0.15 
-0.05 
-0.07 
0.04 
0.07 
0.31 
0.01 
0.04 
0.21 
0.21 
0.10 
0.19 
0.14 
0.12 
0.07 
-0.22 
-0.36 
-0.24 
-0.19 
-0.18 
0.02 
-0.15 
0.03 
0.17 
0.22 
-0.08 
-0.21 
0.02 
0.19 
0.30 
0.05 
0.17 
0.22 
0.22 
0.18 
-0.19 
-0.42 
-0.60 
-0.76 
-0.86 
0.03 
-0.25 
-0.51 
-0.77 
-0.99 
-0.08 
-0.29 
-0.48 
-0.66 
-0.80 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.06 
-0.00 
0.10 
0.16 
0.30 
0.12 
0.13 
0.26 
0.34 
0.48 
0.09 
0.21 
0.29 
0.42 
0.57 
0.11 
0.14 
0.02 
0.06 
0.06 
-0.15 
-0.29 
-0.29 
-0.30 
-0.29 
0.08 
-0.08 
-0.07 
-0.05 
-0.06 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.07 
0.07 
0.14 
0.10 
0.09 
0.07 
------------------------------------------------------
-0.10  -0.05  -0.04  -0.10  -0.07 
-0.18  -0.16  -0.06  -0.13  -0.13 
-0.13  -0.21  -o.oo  -0.02  -0.09 
-0.12  -0.21  0.03  -0.05  -0.09 
-0.07  -0.17  0.05  -0.06  -0.06 
0.15  -0.09  -0.11  0.04  -o.oo 
0.07  -0.03  0.03  0.06  0.03 
0.07  -0.04  0.06  0.08  0.04 
0.22  -O.Ol  0.14  0.15  0.13 
0.21  -0.04  0.30  0.20  0.17 
0.25  0.20  0.12  0.13  0.17 
0.23  0.29  0.10  0.12  0.18 
0.22  0.33  -0.01  0.05  0.15 
0.26  0.38  -0.06  0.10  0.17 
0.22  0.39  -0.14  0.11  0.14 
------------------------------------------------------
0.28  0.29  0.20  0.18  0.24 
0.16  0.11  -0.08  0.08  0.07 
0.27  0.12  -0.07  0.13  0.11 
0.32  0.22  -0.13  0.13  0.14 
0.36  0.28  -0.29  0.10  0.11 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IH  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -81-
Germany,  France  and  the  United  States,  which  are  considered  to  be  non-oil 
producing  countrie~ in  the  QUEST  model,  increase  their domestic  deMand  due 
to  the  terms  of  trade  increase.  The  effects  on  private  consuMption  are 
stronger  in  the  former  two  countries  than  in  the  United  States  due  to  the 
fact  that  for  them  terms-of-trade  gains  are  partially  reflected  in  real 
wage  increases,  thus  having  a  stronger  effect  on  real  disposable  income. 
Since  the  effect  on  private  consumption  is  rather  stable,  the  accelerator 
effect  from  the  private  consumption  increase  on  investment  peters  out  after 
a  few  years,  thus  causing  a  slowdown  in  the  GOP  increase.  The  positive 
effects  on  domestic  demand  are  counteracted  by  a  slightly  negative 
contribution  from  the  real  foreign  balance.  This  May  be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the  energy  price  decrease  causes  so11e  substitution  of  domestic 
production  factors  by  energy  imports  through  a  relative price effect  on  the 
volume  of  the  latter.  Notwithstanding  the  negative  contribution  of  the  real 
foreign  balance,  the  current  balance  improves  for  Germany,  France  and  the 
United  States  due  to  the  more  than  offsetting  improvement  in  the  terms  of 
trade.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  effects  signalled  for  the  other  coutries 
appear  as  well,  since  the  lower  energy  price  increases  apparent  energy 
consumption  which,  with  energy  production  and  exports  being  exogenous, 
leads  to  an  increase  in  energy  imports.  Since  energy  demand  in  the  United 
Kingdom  is  more  sensitive  to  price  changes  than  in  the  other  countries,  the 
short-run  affect on  the  real  foreign  balance  is  more  negative  due  to  higher 
additional  energy  imports.  In  the  medium-term  this  is  attenuated  since  the 
relative  price  decrease  of  energy  becomes  smaller  as  domestic  prices  are 
influenced  by  the  disinflationary  process.  The  deterioration  of  the  terms 
of  trade  (which  is  not  passed  on  into  wages)  erodes  the  profit  rate,  thus 
depressing  investment  and  GOP.  This  effect,  as  well  as  a  negative  change 
for  the  current  balance,  occurs  1n  the  medium  run  only  since  the 
deterioration  of  the  terms  of  trade  due  to  the  energy  export  price decrease 
is  baseline  dependent  due  to  the  relatively  small  share  of  energy  in  total 
exports  in  the  beginning  of  the  simulation  period,  which  started  1n  1977. 
In  the  present  situation,  the  seemingly  positive  effects  in  the  short  run 
would  probably  not  take  place. 
4.3.3  Dollar  devaluation 
The  dollar  devaluation  has  been  simulated  in  linked  mode  in  the  11odel  by 
increasing  dollar/foreign  currency  rates  by  101  for  all  non-US  countries 
and  zones.  For  those  countries  or  zones  which  are  identified  as  oil 
exporters  in  the  model,  the  fact  that  the  oil  price  is  kept  exogenous  in 
nominal  dollar  terms  implies  that  they  will  devalue  with  the  US  dollar 
proportionally  with  the  share  of  energy  in  their  export  basket.  The  OPEC, 
for  instance,  which  is  assumed  to  export  oil  exclusively,  will  thus 
completely  follow  the  dollar  devaluation.  For  the  other  countries  an 
effective  revaluation  takes  place,  although  the  parities  between  them 
remain  unchanged.  Compared  to  the  results  for  the  dollar  depreciation  in 
unlinked  mode,  the  main  effect  of  linkage  is  that  non-US  countries  and 
zones  will,  when  faced  with  an  effective  revaluation  of  their  currencies, 
adjust  their  export  prices  in  local  currency  to  make  up  for  their  loss  of 
competitiveness.  The  competitive  advantage  of  the  United  States  will  thus 
be  reduced,  and  the  positive  contribution  from  the  increase  in  its  real 
foreign  balance  will  be  smaller.  Comparing  the  results  for  the  United 
States  in  linked  and  unlinked  mode  in  Tables  36  and  42,  it appears  that  the 
real  foreign  balance  effect  1n  the  former  case  is  about  two-thirds  of  that -82-
Table  42:  LINKED  QUEST  SIMULATION:  lOX  DEPRECIATION  OF  THE  US  DOLLAR  WITH  RESPECT  TO  ALL 
============================================================================== 
REAL  GOP/GNP  •••••••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
• • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
• • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
REAL  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
•• 0  •••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
••••••••••••••••••••••  0  0  •  0  •  4 
•  0  ••••••••••••  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
TOTAL  PRIVATE  ••••••• :  YEAR  1 
INVESTMENT •••••••••••••••••  2 
••  0  ••••••••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
••••••••••••••••  0  •• 0  •••  0  0  0  0  5 
STOCKBUILOING  ••••••. :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••.•  2 
•••••••••••  0  •• 0  •  0  0  0  •  0  •• 0  •  0  •  3 
•••••  0  •••••••  0  •••••••••  0  •• 0  4 
•••••••••••••••••••••••  0  •  •  •  5 
REAL  FOREIGN  BALANCE  :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••••••••••  2 
•  0  •••  0  •••  0  0  •  0  0  0  •••••••••  0  •  0  3 
0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••••••••  0  ••••••  0  •  0  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  •  0  5 
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  .:  YEAR  1 
DEFLATOR  •••••••••••.•.•.••  2 
•••••• 0. •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
•••••••••••••  0  •• 0  •  0  0  ••••  0  0  •  4 
•••••••••••••  0  •• 0  •••••  0  •  •  •  •  5 
GOP/GNP  DEFLATOR  •••• :  YEAR  1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
0  0  ••••  0  ••••••••••  0  •• 0  •• 0  •  •  •  3 
••••••  0  ••  0  •••••••••  0  0  •• 0  •  •  •  4 
•• 0  •••  0  ••••  0  0  ••••  0  0  ••••••  0  0  5 
NOMINAL  WAGE  RATE  ..•  :  YEAR  1 
••••••••••••••••  0  ••  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  2 
•  0  •••••  0  0  ••••  0  •  0  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3 
•••••••••  0  0  •••••••••  0  •••  0  •  •  4 
0  •••  0  0  0  ••  0  ••••• 0.  0  ••••••  0  •  •  5 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  .••• :  YEAR  1 
•••••••••••  0  ••  0  •••••••  0  0  •  •  •  2 
0  0  •  0  0  0  •••••  0  •••••••••••  0  •  •  •  3 
•• 0  •••••••  0  ••  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••••••••••••  0  •  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  ••  0  0  0  5 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  ••• :  YEAR  1 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> ••••••••••  2 
••  0  •  0  0  0  •  0  •••••••  0  •  0  ••••  0  •• 0  3 
••  0  •  ~  0  0  ••••  0  ••  0  •••  0  0  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
••  0  ••••••••  0  ••  0  0  0  •••••  0  0  0  0  •  5 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  .:  YEAR  1 
RATE  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • . •  2 
CLEVEL  DEVIATION> •••••••.••  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
. • • • . • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • . . • • • .  5 
GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  :  YEAR  1 
BALANCE •.••••••••...•••••..  2 
CXBASELINE  GOP) ••••••••••••  3 
•••  0  •••••••••••••••••••  0  •• 0  4 
•••••••  0  ••••••••••  0  0  ••••••  0  5 
CURRENT  BALANCE  ••••• :  YEAR  1 
CXBASELINE  GOP> ••••.•••••••  2 
• . • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • . • • .  3 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4 
•••••••••••••  0  0  0  0  0  •  0  •• 0  0  ••  0  5 
oATE:  2.12.88 
GERMANY 
----------
-1.36 
-1.29 
-0.67 
-0.53 
-0.54 
-0.23 
-0.34 
0.00 
0.19 
0.19 
-1.96 
-2.11 
-0.56 
0.02 
-0.56 
-0.27 
-0.17 
0.15 
0.03 
-0.06 
-0.61 
-0.55 
-0.71 
-0.67 
-0.48 
-0.51 
-1.27 
-1.45 
-1.67 
-1.97 
-0.13 
-1.03 
-1.14 
-1.36 
-1.74 
-0.92 
-1.81 
-1.89 
-2.38 
-2.96 
-0.30 
-0.73 
-0.63 
-0.35 
-0.19 
0.29 
0.71 
0.61 
0.34 
0.18 
-0.49 
-0.99 
-0.48 
-0.07 
-0.02 
-0.46 
-0.70 
-0.49 
-0.42 
-0.47 
-0.21 
-0.32 
-0.37 
-0.28 
-0.17 
FRANCE 
---------- -0.93 
-1.35 
-1.16 
-0.62 
-0.12 
-0.14 
-0.40 
-0.44 
-0.14 
0.24 
-1.30 
-2.82 
-2.69 
-1.19 
0.16 
-0.21 
-0.27 
-0.13 
0.06 
0.16 
-0.39 
-0.31 
-0.25 
-0.36 
-0.47 
-0.39 
-1.15 
-1.70 
-2.15 
-2.45 
-0.01 
-0.85 
-1.47 
-1.94 
-2.31 
-0.18 
-1.09 
-1.88 
-2.56 
-3.06 
-0.12 
-0.41 
-0.62 
-0.60 
-0.40 
0.12 
0.39 
0.59 
0.56 
0.37 
-0.18 
-0.55 
-0.36 
0.01 
0.20 
-0.29 
-0.58 
-o. 11 
-0.65 
-0.48 
-0.05 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.11 
-0.27 
CURRENCIES 
---------- ----------
UK 
---------- -1.09 
-1.14 
-0.58 
-0.28 
-0.11 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.13 
0.30 
0.26 
-1.90 
-2.98 
-1.15 
-0.53 
-0.53 
-0.17 
-0.14 
-0.03 
-0.08 
-0.06 
-0.65 
-0.52 
-0.44 
-0.29 
-0.13 
-0.54 
-1.50 
-2.44 
-3.21 
-3.75 
0.01 
-1.21 
-2.39 
-3.34 
-4.06 
-0.29 
-1.24 
-2.40 
-3.39 
-4.12 
-0.21 
-0.56 
-0.59 
-0.40 
-0.22 
0.20 
0.53 
0.56 
0.37 
0.20 
0.31 
0.77 
0.98 
1.15 
1.35 
-0.32 
-0.48 
-0.45 
-0.39 
-0.45 
-0.17 
-0.34 
-0.51 
-0.57 
-0.66 
USA 
----------
0.50 
0.49 
0.30 
0.23 
0.17 
-0.07 
-0.21 
-0.34 
-0.41 
-0.42 
0.41 
0.41 
0.01 
-0.13 
-0.17 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.44 
0.53 
0.57 
0.55 
0.49 
0.39 
1.02 
1.60 
2.26 
2.95 
0.03 
0.75 
1.41 
2.17 
2.88 
0.27 
0.80 
1.54 
2.35 
3.11 
0.18 
0.31 
0.24 
0.14 
0.09 
-0.17 
-0.29 
-0.23 
-0.13 
-0.08 
0.49 
0.92 
0.85 
1.01 
1.18 
0.12 
0.17 
0.13 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.26 
0.38 
0.43 
0.38 
SIMPLE 
MEAN 
---------- -0.72 
-0.83 
-0.52 
-0.30 
-0.15 
-0.10 
-0.24 
-0.16 
-0.02 
0.07 
-1.19 
-1.87 
-1.10 
-0.46 
-0.28 
-0.15 
-0.14 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.30 
-0.21 
-0.21 
-0.19 
-0.15 
-0.26 
-0.73 
-1.00 
-1.19 
-1.31 
-0.03 
-0.58 
-0.90 
-1.12 
-1.31 
-0.28 
-0.84 
-1.16 
-1.49 
-1.76 
-0.11 
-0.35 
-0.40 
-0.30 
-0.18 
0.11 
0.34 
0.38 
0.28 
0.17 
0.03 
0.04 
0.25 
0.53 
0.68 
-0.24 
-0.40 
-0.38 
-0.35 
-0.33 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-0.13 
-0.13 
-0.18 
UNLESS  INDICATED  OTHERWISE,  ALL  VARIABLES  ARE  EXPRESSED  IN  PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCE 
WRT  BASELINE  SIMULATION -83-
in  the  latter.  An  analysis  of  the  quarterly  results  (not  shown  here) 
reveals  that  in  the  linked  simulation  the  United  States  current  balance 
turns  negative  in  the  first  quarter  only,  which  is  no  surpise  given  the 
short  lags  in  the  trade  linkage  model.  While  the  increase  in  the  real 
foreign  balance  and  the  current balance  are  significantly  s11aller  in  linked 
mode  compared  to  unlinked  mode,  the  medium  terM  effect  on  GNP  is  virtually 
the  same  in  the  two  cases.  The  compensation  comes  from  domestic  demand. 
Private  consumption  is  more  positive  in  linked  11ode  since  the  price 
decreases  of  US  trade  partners  upon  the  dollar  devaluation  di11inish  the 
effect  on  US  inflation,  thus  reducing  the  negative  real  wealth  effect  on 
private  consumption.  The  profile  of  private  invest11ent  is  highly 
contrasting  between  linked  mode  and  unlinked  11ode.  The  stronger  increase  in 
the  rea  1  foreign  ba 1 ance  in  unlinked  11ode  produces  an  accelerator  effect 
which  renders  private  investment  more  buoyant  in  unlinked  mode  for  the 
first  two  years.  After  the  accelerator  effects  have  died  out,  1  ower  real 
interest  rate  increases  and  less  negative  accelerator  effects  fro• 
decreasing  private  consumption  in  linked  mode  cause  the  negative 
contribution  from  investment  to  GOP  to  be  smaller  than  in  unlinked  mode. 
An  interesting  aspect  of  the  linked  US  dollar  devaluation  are  its  effects 
on  the  o t.h e r  co  u n t r 1  e s  i n  the  s y s t em .  The i r  c u r r en  c i e s  a r e  a 11  rev  a 1  u e d 
effectively,  although  their  parities  remain  unchanged  between  themselves. 
This  effective  revaluation  will  lead  to  some  loss  of  competitiveness  and 
thus  loss  of  exports,  which  will  be  attenuated  to  the  extent  that  exporters 
adjust  their  prices  downwards  in  local  currency  in  order  to  remain 
competitive.  Next  to  this  price  effect,  exports  of  non-US  countries  are 
influenced  negatively  as  well  by  a  decrease  in  the  demand  for  their exports 
due  to  the  import  volume  decrease  in  the  United  States.  Given  the 
relatively  high  share  of  the  United  States  in  world  imports  and  the  fact 
that,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  decrease  in  exports  for  countries 
outside  the  US  has  negative  consequences  for  their  imports,  a  negative 
spiral  is  started  which  leads  to  a  decrease  in  world  trade.  In  the 
countries  with  structural  models,  this  negative  spiral  is  reinforced  by 
negative  accelerator  effects  on  investments,  thus  decreasing  the  1 evel  of 
GOP  by  more  than  1%  in  the  short  run.  In  the  medium  term,  when  this 
accelerator  effect  has  worked  itself  out  and  private  consumption  has 
recovered  through  real  balance  effects  (Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom)  or 
real  disposable  income  (France),  the  negative  effects  on  GOP  gradually 
decline,  although  they  do  not  disappear  completely. -84-
5.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  SUBJECTS  FOR  FURTHER  RESEARCH 
The  modelling  strategy  for  the  QUEST  model  renders  it  a  quarterly 
medium-term  world  model  right  from  the  outset:  structural  models  are 
present  only  for  Germany.  France.  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States 
at  this  stage.  but  a  quantitative  description  of  their  positioning  in  the 
world  economy  is  guaranteed  through  the  trade  linkage  system  among  25  trade 
partners.  The  structural  models  themselves  contain  many  features  of  the 
Keynesian-(neo)classical  synthesis  that  has  developed  over  the  last 
decade. 
On  the  real  demand  side.  the  dynamic  form  of  the  private  consumption 
function  places  it in  the  permanent  income/life-cycle  tradition.  amended  to 
include  elements  of  uncertainty  and  opportunity  costs  in  terms  of  savings 
and  wealth.  Stock  formation  is  mainly  influenced  by  two  traditional 
motives:  transactions  demand  and  precautionary  demand.  Private  investment 
is  decomposed  into  investment  in  equipment.  residential  construction  and 
non-residential  construction  (structures).  Private  residential  construction 
depends  mainly  on  GDP  and  financing  constraints.  while  the  illiquid  nature 
of  this  asset  makes  it  sensitive  to  inflationary  expectations.  Private 
investment  in  equipment  and  investment  in  non-residential  construction  both 
depend.  either  directly  or  indirectly.  on  three  components:  a  putty-clay 
type  accelerator  mechanism.  real  interest  rates  as  a  proxy  for  the  real 
user  cost  of  capital  and  a  profit  share  corrected  for  the  degree  of 
capacity  utilisation.  The  correction  for  capacity  utilisation  may  be 
considered  as  a  disequilibrium  factor.  while  the  profit  share  captures  at 
the  same  time  possible  self-financing  constraints  as  well  as  aspects  of 
demand  uncertainty. 
The  capital  stock  of  private  equipment  next  forms  the  exogenous  input  in 
the  cost  minimisation  process  of  the  producer.  which  determines  potential 
(or  classical)  output  and  employment.  Disequilibrium  on  the  goods  market 
spills  over  to  the  labour  market  in  the  form  of  the  degree  of  capacity 
utilisation  which  conditions  the  translation  of  potential  employment  into 
actual  employment.  This  combination  of  demand  constraints  and  the  effect of 
rea  1  wages  (vi a  potentia  1  emp 1  oyment)  makes  emp 1  oyment  dependent  on  both 
Keynesian  and  classical  components.  1n  the  sense  of  disequilibrium  theory. 
Wages  are  determined  by  an  expectations-augmented  Ph1111ps  curve.  in  some 
countries  amended  to  include  productivity  and/or  terms-of-trade  effects. 
Forward  tax  shifting  is  not  included.  Prices  for  domestic  final  demand 
components  depend  on  a  domestic  producer  pr1ce  (value  added  deflator)  and 
import  costs.  This  holds  also  for  export  prices.  but  for  them  margins  are 
influenced  by  competitors•  prices  as  well.  The  domestic  producer  price  is  a 
variable  mark-up  on  wage  costs.  the  mark-up  being  dependent  on  the  degree 
of  capacity  utilisation  and  temporary  import  price  increases. 
Condensed  appropriation  accounts  for  households.  firms  and  the  government 
allow  to  calculate  sectoral  balances  and  the  balance  on  the  current 
account.  Featuring  in  the  accounts  are  progressive  income  taxes  for 
households  and  an  explic1t  treatment  of  government  debt. -85-
The  monetary  sector  is  represented  through  equations  for  money  demand  and 
interest  rates,  which  may  be  combined  into  different  options  for  monetary 
policy. 
International  trade  in  goods  among  the  25  partners  is  11odelled  through  a 
consistent  import  allocation  system  on  the  basis  of  relative  prices, 
modified  to  deal  correctly  with  the  propagation  of  oil-price  shocks.  With 
import  volumes  and  export  prices  from  the  structural  country  11odel s  or 
trade-feedback  models  as  inputs,  the  trade  linkage  module  endogenously 
calculates  export  volumes  and  import  prices,  which  would  otherwise  be 
(partially)  exogenous  in  the  country  models.  In  non-linked  mode,  the 
effects  of  price  competitiveness  on  exports  are  consistent  with  the  trade 
linkage  system.  For  the  structural  models,  import  volumes  depend  on  final 
demand,  relative  prices  and  a  disequilibrium  effect  from  the  goods  market 
through  the  degree  of  capacity  utilisation. 
The  blueprint  described  above  introduces  a  certain  similarity  in  the 
simulation  properties  of  the  structural  country  models.  The  dynamics  in  the 
wage-price  nexus,  for  instance,  cause  expansionary  demand  shocks,  the 
effects  of  which  are  relatively  strong  in  the  short  run,  to  be  rather 
short-lived.  Fairly  fast  cyclical  reactions  also  show  up  when  there  is  an 
improvement  in  international  competitiveness:  J-curves  do  hardly  appear.  On 
the  other  hand,  supply  shocks  such  as  a  decrease  in  social  contributions  of 
employers  or  an  oil  price  shock  take  more  time  to  build  up  but  have  a  more 
durable  character.  These  properties  of  the  model  seem  to  confirm  a  priori 
expectations  on  the  dynamic  pattern  of  responses  of  the  economy  to  demand 
and  supply  shocks. 
Nevertheless,  differences  in  coefficient  estimates  and  selectiveness  with 
respect  to  the  inclusion  of  explanatory  variables  leave  room  for 
country-specific  model  behaviour  as  well.  The  French  model,  for  instance, 
is  more  expansionary  following  a  demand  shock  than  the  other  models,  among 
others  due  to  the  fact  that  the  consequent  inflationary  pressure  exerts  no 
negative  effects  on  private  consumption.  The  German  model  is  the  1  east 
inflation-prone  due  to  the  fact  that  prices  take  much  longer  to  adjust  to 
wages  than  vice  versa.  The  converse  is  true  for  the  United  States.  Coupled 
with  strong  inflationary  effects  on  private  consumption,  there  is  a  very 
strong  cyclical  reaction  in  the  United  States  model  to  expansionary  shocks, 
with  multipliers  often  returning  to  zero  after  three  to  four  years.  The 
model  for  the  United  Kingdom,  finally,  is  characterised  by  a  relatively 
weak  influence  from  the  monetary  sphere  on  the  real  sphere,  due  to  small 
interest  rate effects  on  domestic  final  expenditures. 
Taken  together,  the  above  features  of  the  QUEST  model,  through  their equal 
emphasis  on  supply  and  demand,  make  the  model  a  representative  of  the 
current  matnstream  of  eclectic  applied  econometrics.  Further  research  will 
therefore  put  emphasis  on  the  extension  of  the  existing  blueprint  to  the 
other  member  countries,  as  well  as  on  re-estimation  of  the  existing  models 
where  data  with  a  new  baseyear  have  become  available.  This  does  not 
preclude  further  refinements,  within  the  existing  framework,  of  the 
structural  country  models. -86-
Such  refinements  are  probably  the  least  urgent  on  the  real  deMand  side. 
Concerning  the  labour  market,  the  endogenisation  of  the  participation  rate 
is  envisaged.  A  reconsideration  of  the  wage-price  nexus,  given  the 
prevailing  intercountry  differences  and  its  important  effects  on  the 
dynamic  behaviour  of  the  model,  might  also  represent  a  task  ahead.  Sectoral 
income  equations  could  be  refined  further,  e.g.  by  introducing 
institutional  lags  in  equations  concerning  public  sector  tax  receipts. 
Further11ore,  given  the  multinational  character  of  the  QUEST  11odel,  an 
extended  endogenisation  of  international  linkages  1s  foreseen, 
concentrating,  in  a  first  instance,  on  exchange  rate  determination 
consistent  with  the  working  of  the  exchange  rate  11echani sm  of  the  EMS. 
Preli•inary  research  in  this  direction  has  already  shown  some  encouraging 
results. -87-
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Appendix  1:  List  of  countries  and  zones 
1.  BL 
2.  DK 
3.  DE 
4.  GR 
5.  SP 
6.  FR 
7.  IR 
8.  IT 
9.  NL 
10.  PO 
11.  UK 
12.  us 
14.  JA 
13.  CA 
15.  AU 
16.  AT 
17.  FI 
18.  NO 
19.  SE 
20.  sw 
21.  RO 
22.  OP 
23.  CP 
24.  NI 
25.  RW 
Complete  country  models 
Belgium-Luxembourg  Economic  Union  (BLEU) 
Denmark 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United  Kingdom 
United  States 
Japan 
Country  trade-feedback  models 
Canada 
Australia 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Zone  trade-feedback  models 
Rest  of  OECD  countries:  Iceland,  New  Zealand,  Turkey 
OPEC 
Centrally  planned 
economies 
Newly  industrialised 
countries 
Rest  of  the  world 
Algeria,  Ecuador,  Gabon,  Indonesia, 
Iran,  Iraq,  Kuwait,  Libya,  Nigeria, 
Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  United  Arab 
Emirates,  Venezuela 
Albania,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, 
German  Democratic  Republic,  Hungary, 
Poland,  Romania,  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Hong  Kong,  Israel, 
Republic  of  Korea,  Philippines, 
Singapore,  South  Africa,  Taiwan, 
Thailand,  Yugoslavia 
all  countries  not  included  elsewhere, 
incl.  trade  not  specified  in  terms  of 
destination 
Note:  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  treated  as  BL  only  in  the  trade  linkage. -89-
Appendix  2:  List  of  variables 
BPC 
BPC  NA 
BPT-NA 
CEQ-
CG/EX.CG 
CGQ/EX.CGQ 
CP 
CPQ 
D***·*** 
DEBT 
DEFG 
DELTA 
DOLLAR 
E.****** 
EXCHR 
EX.CNWGQ 
EX.EECU 
EX.EXCHR 
EX.ICGQ 
EX.IEGQ 
EX.L 
EX.LEEG 
EX.LSE 
EX.POPT 
EX.POPW 
EX.SCCR 
EX.SCHR 
EX.SLRES 
EX.SUBQ 
EX.TIR 
EX.TPX 
EX.TYCR 
EX.VATR 
EX.YEQ 
EX.YGR 
EX.YWOR 
EX.YXMR 
EX.YXXR 
GOS 
IEPQ 
IG/EX.IG 
IGQ/EX.IGQ 
IHPQ 
IIT 
IITQ 
INTG 
IPQ 
ISPQ 
ITQ 
KAPEQ 
KAPIQ 
LE 
LEE 
LEEP 
LEEPPOT 
LU 
LUR 
MEQ 
MESQ 
1'11 
f11Q 
tt1S 
tt1SQ 
tt1SZQ 
1'1'1SZ 
MNQ 
MQEX12 
MQIN12 
MS 
MSQ 
MT 
MTQ 
M3 
ONE 
OPEN 
p 
PCP 
PIIT 
PIT  : 
PLINK  R.****: 
PME  -
PMES 
Pl'11 
PI'1'1S 
PI'1'1SZ 
PMN 
PMNSZ 
PMS 
CURRENT  BALANCE,  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS  BASED 
CURRENT  BALANCE,  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  BASED 
TRADE  BALANCE,  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  BASED 
REAL  APPARENT  DOMESTIC  PETROLEUM  CONSUMPTION 
NOMINAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
REAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
NOMINAL  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
REAL  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
DUI'11Y  <FOR  THE  PERIOD  INDICATED> 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  DEBT 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  DEFICIT 
DEPRECIATION  RATE 
=  1  (  AUXILIARY  VARIABLE  USED  FOR  SIMULATING  A DEPRECIATION  OF 
THE  DOLLAR  AGAINST  All  OTHER  CURRENCIES  IN  LINKED  MODE> 
RESIDUAL  FROM  ESTIMATION  CAFTER  CORC  CORRECTION> 
=  1  (VARIABLE  SYMBOLIZING  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE  IN  THE 
TRADE-FEEDBACK  COUNTRY  MODULES> 
REAL  NON-WAGE  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
EXCHANGE  RATE  LOCAL  CURRENCY/ECU 
EXCHANGE  RATE  LOCAL  CURRENCY/DOLLAR 
REAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT  IN  CONSTRUCTION 
REAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT  IN  EQUIPMENT 
TOTAL  LABOUR  FORCE 
PUBLIC  SECTOR  EMPLOYMENT  CINCL.  ARMED  FORCES> 
NUMBER  OF  SELF-EMPLOYED 
TOTAL  POPULATION 
POPULATION  IN  WORKING  AGE 
AVERAGE  EMPLOYER  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTION  RATE 
AVERAGE  EMPLOYEE  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTION  RATE 
DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  THE  ACTUAL  AND  THE  EQUILIBRIUM 
OM/DOLLAR  EXCHANGE  RATE 
SUBSIDIES  AT  CONSTANT  PRICES 
INDIRECT  TAX  RATE 
NET  UNREQUITED  TRANSFERS  PAID  ABROAD,NAT.  ACC.  BASED 
AVERAGE  CORPORATE  PROFIT  TAX  RATE 
PROXY  FOR  THE  VAT  RATE 
REAL  PETROLEUM  AND  GAS  EXTRACTION 
PROFIT  SHARE  OF  GOVERNMENT 
AVERAGE  OTHER  LABOUR  INCOME  RATE 
RATIO  OF  FACTOR  INCOME  PAID  ABROAD  TO  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
RATIO  OF  FACTOR  INCOME  FROM  ABROAD  TO  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
GROSS  OPERATING  SURPLUS 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  EQUIPMENT 
NOMINAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  HOUSING 
NOMINAL  TOTAL  INVESTMENT  IN  INVENTORIES 
REAL  TOTAL  INVESTMENT  IN  INVENTORIES 
INTEREST  PAYMENT  ON  PUBLIC  DEBT 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  STRUCTURES 
REAL  TOTAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  GROSS  STOCK  OF  PRIVATE  EQUIPMENT 
REAL  TOTAL  STOCK  OF  INVENTORIES 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT 
TOTAL  NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES 
NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES  IN  THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
POTENTIAL  EMPLOYMENT  IN  THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY  IN  DOLLARS 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS  - CIF  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS  - CIF  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
QUASI-FOB  REAL  IMPORTS  CSUM  OF  AN  APPROXIMATION  OF  REAL 
BILATERAL  IMPORTS  IN  DOLLARS>  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  CURRENT  DOLLARS,  QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  FROM  EXTRA-EUR12,QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  FROM  INTRA-EUR12,QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
NOMINAL  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
REAL  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
MONEY  SUPPLY  - M3  -
=  1  <CORRECTION  FACTOR  TO  IMPOSE  ADDING-UP  ON 
BILATERAL  EXPORTS  IN  VALUE  WITH  RESPECT  TO  IMPORTS> 
TREND  OF  OPENNESS  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  MARKET 
PROXY  FOR  THE  VALUE  ADDED  DEFLATOR 
DEFLATOR  FOR  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  INVESTMENT  IN  INVENTORIES 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  CUSTOMS/NAT.  ACCOUNTS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY  IN  DOLLAR 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  PRICE  INDEX  IN  DOLLAR 
CIF  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  PRICE  INDEX  IN  DOLLAR 
QUASI-FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  PRICE  INDEX  IN  DOLLAR 
QUASI-FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES PMT 
POll 
PXE 
PXM 
PXMS 
PXN 
PXNS 
PXS 
PXT 
PXWP 
py 
PYTT 
R.MMMMMM 
RC.MM 
RC.MS 
RC.TPX 
RC.XM 
RC.XS 
RC.YX 
RDG 
RL/NSA  RL 
RS/NSA-RS 
SAVC  -
SAVG 
SAVH 
SAVHR 
sec 
SCH 
SUB/EX.SUB 
TI 
TIME 
TPH 
TYC 
TYH  u.•••••• 
UCAP 
ULC 
UPRO 
VOIL 
WPXMS 
WPXNS 
WR 
X<I,J> 
XEQ 
XESQ 
XM 
XMQ 
XMS 
XMSQ 
XMZQ 
XNQ 
XQ(J) 
XQEX12 
XQIN12 
XS 
XSQ 
XT 
XTQ 
Xlol1 
XX <I ,J> 
y 
YC 
YDH 
YDHQ 
YG 
YNWH 
YQ 
YQPOT 
YTDQ 
YTTQ 
YWB 
YWH 
YWO 
YX 
YXM 
YXX 
z 
-90-
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
PETROLEUM  SPOT  PRICE  <SAUDI  LIGHT>  IN  DOLLARS/BARREL 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR 
FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR,FOB- 1980=100 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
INDEX  OF  PRICE  COMPETITIVENESS  <EXPORT  PRICES 
RELATIVE  TO  COMPETITORS'  PRICES> 
DEFLATOR  OF  GDP/DNP 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  FINAL  DEMAND 
RESIDUAL  ITEM  <TO  INSURE  IDENTITY) 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  NET  TRANSFERS 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  NET  FACTOR  INCOME 
IMPLICIT  INTEREST  RATE  ON  GOVERNMENT  DEBT 
LONG  TERM  INTEREST  RATE  <SEASONALLY  UNADJUSTED> 
SHORT  TERM  INTEREST  RATE  <SEASONALLY  UNADJUSTED> 
COMPANIES'  SAVING 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  SAVING 
HOUSEHOLDS'  SAVING 
HOUSEHOLDS'  SAVING  RATIO 
EMPLOYERS'  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 
EMPLOYEES'  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 
SUBSIDIES 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
TIME  TREND 
NET  CURRENT  TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY  HOUSEHOLDS 
CORPORATE  PROFIT  TAX 
INCOME  TAX 
RESIDUAL  FROM  ESTIMATION 
UTILISATION  RATE  OF  CAPACITY 
UNIT  LABOUR  COST  INDEX 
LABOUR  PRODUCTIVITY  PER  PERSON  EMPLOYED 
SHARE  OF  ENERGY  IN  THE  VOLUME  OF  EXPORTS, 
MOVING  AVERAGE  <UK  ONLY) 
WAGE  COST  PER  EMPLOYEE 
EXPORT  MARKET  GROWTH  <IMPORT  VOLUMES  WEIGHTED  WITH 
BILATERAL  EXPORT  SHARES> 
COMPETITORS'  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  PRICES,  DOUBLE-WEIGHTED 
COMPETITORS'  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  PRICES, 
DOUBLE-WEIGHTED 
WAGE  RATE  PER  EMPLOYEE 
EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS  FROM  I  TO  J,  FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY  IN  DOLLAR 
NOMINAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  CURRENT  DOLLARS,  FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR,  FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
SUM  OF  BILATERAL  REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
REAL  BILATERAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS  TO  COUNTRY/ZONE  J 
QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR  TO  EXTRA-EUR12 
QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR  TO  INTRA-EUR12 
QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
NOMINAL  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
NOMINAL  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
REAL  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
INDEX  OF  MARKET  SHARES  <REAL  EXPORTS  DIVIDED  BY 
EXPORT  MARKET  GROWTH> 
EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS  FROM  I  TO  J,  FOB  - DURING 
SIMULATION  BEFORE  ADJUSTMENT  FOR  ADDING  UP  CONDITION 
NOMINAL  GROSS  DOMESTIC/NATIONAL  PRODUCT 
COMPANIES  PROFIT  BEFORE  TAX 
HOUSEHOLDS'  DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS'  REAL  DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  TRADING  SURPLUS  AND  PROFIT  INCOME 
NON  WAGE  INCOME  OF  HOUSEHOLDS 
REAL  GROSS  DOMESTIC/NATIONAL  PRODUCT 
REAL  POTENTIAL  OUTPUT 
REAL  TOTAL  DOMESTIC  DEMAND 
REAL  TOTAL  FINAL  DEMAND 
WAGE  BILL 
COMPENSATION  OF  EMPLOYEES 
OTHER  LABOUR  INCOME 
NET  FACTOR  INCOME  FROM  ABROAD,  NAT.  ACC.  BASED 
FACTOR  INCOME  PAID  ABROAD,  NAT.  ACC.  BASED 
FACTOR  INCOME  FROM  ABROAD,  NAT.  ACC.  BASED 
TRADE  INTEGRATION  VARIABLE  - FITTED  VALUE  OF  A LOGISTIC  SPLINE 
FUNCTION  APPLIED  TO  THE  OECD  SHARE  OF  IMPORTS  IN  TOTAL  FINAL 
DEMAND 
NOTE:  DOTTED  VARIABLES  REPRESENT  QUARTERLY  GROWTH  RATES  AND  ARE  - UNLESS 
INDICATED  OTHERWISE  - DEFINED  AS:  X/X(-1)  - 1 
'QUASI-FOB'  MEANS 
- FOR  VALUES  :  IMPORTS  CALCULATED  BY  ADDING  UP  BILATERAL  EXPORT  VALUES 
- FOR  VOLUMES:  BILATERAL  EXPORT  VALUES  DEFLATED  BY  TOTA  EXPORT  PRICES 
- FOR  PRICES  :  USING  TOTAL  EXPORT  PRICES  INSTEAD  OF  BILATERAL  PRICES -91-
Appendix  3:  Model  structure for  a  standard  model 
NOTE:  THIS  MODEL  LISTING  REPRESENTS  THE  MOST  GENERAL  FRAMEWORK. 
NOT  FOR  ALL  COUNTRIES  ALL  THE  MENTIONED  VARIABLES  APPEAR 
CE.G.  SOME  RESIDUAL  ITEMS  'R.***'  TO  RESPECT  IDENTITIES>. 
IN  THE  SAME  WAY,  THE  FUNCTIONAL  FORMS  FOR  THE  BEHAVIOURAL 
EQUATIONS  COUNTAIN  A VARIABLE  IF  IT  IS  USED  IN  AT  LEAST 
ONE  COUNTRY  MODULE.  FOR  THE  EXACT  SPECIFICATION  OF  THE 
INDIVIDUAL  COUNTRY  MODULES  SEE  PART  II OF  THE  'QUEST' 
DOCUMENT  (SEPARATE  VOLUME> 
*********************************************************************** 
PARAMETERS  USED  THROUGHOUT  THE  MODEL 
*********************************************************************** 
PGN  0  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE  EXOGENOUS  IN  REAL  TERMS 
= 1  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE  EXOGENOUS  IN  NOMINAL  TERMS 
PLINK  0  NON-LINKED,  SINGLE  COUNTRY  MODE 
=  1  LINKED  MODE 
PARGNP  = 0  GOP  DEFINITION 
=  1  GNP  DEFINITION 
*********************************************************************** 
THE  G()()OS  MARKET  . 
*********************************************************************** 
REAL  DEMAND 
YQ 
ITQ 
IPQ 
IGQ 
XTQ 
MTQ 
f't1Q 
YTTQ 
YTOQ 
KAPIQ 
==  CPQ  + CGQ  +  ITQ  +  IITQ  +  XTQ  - MTQ 
-- IPQ  +  IGQ  -- IEPQ+  ISPQ+IHPQ  -- EX.IGM100/PIT*R.IGQ*PGN 
+  <1-PGN>*CEX.IEGQ+EX.ICGQ)  -- XMQ  +  XSQ 
f't1Q  +  MSQ  -- MNQ  +  MEQ 
CPQ  + CGQ  +  ITQ  +  IITQ  +  XTQ 
-- CPQ  + CGQ  +  ITQ  +  IITQ  -- KAPIQC-1>  +  IITQ 
+  R.YQ 
+ R. ITQ 
+  R.XTQ 
+ R.MTQ 
+ R.YTTQ 
+ R.YTDQ 
+  BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  EXPLAINING  DEMAND 
COMPONENTS 
CPQ  = FCYOHQ,PCP,LUR,RL,EX.POPT>  + U.CPQ 
CGQ  =  (1-PGN>*FCEX.CNWGQ,EX.LEEG> 
PGN*FCEX.CG,WC,PCP>  *  R.CGQ 
ISPQ  = FCIEPQ,RL,PY,GOS/Y)  + U.ISPQ 
IHPQ  = FCEX.POPT,PIT,YQ,RL,PY,LUR,YOHQ-CPQ,PCP>  + U.IHPQ 
IITQ  = FCITQ+CPQ+CGQ+XTQ+R.YQ,KAPIQ,RS,PYTT,UCAP>  + U. IITQ 
XQCJ>  =  FCMMSZQCJ>,PXMS/PMNSZCJ))  + U.XQCJ> 
= CCJ)MXESQ+FCMMSZQCJ>-MESQCJ),PXMS/PMNSZCJ>>+  U.XQCJ> 
(J:  COUNTRIES  WITH  STRUCTURAL  MODELS> 
=  FCMMSZQCJ>,VOIL,PXNS/PMNSZCJ>>  + U.XQ(J) 
(J:  COUNTRIES  WITH  TRADE-FEEDBACK  MODELS) 
XMZQ  =  (SUM  J:  XQCJ)) 
XMQ  =  CXMZQMR.XMQ)M(1-PLINK> 
+PLINK*XMSQ*PLINK  R.XMQ 
XSQ  = FCXMQ+f't'IQ,PXS/PMSl- + U.XSQ 
MNQ  = FCYTTQMZ,PMN/PYTT,UCAP>  + U.l"t1Q 
MEQ  FCYTTQ,PME/PYTT>  + U.MEQ 
MSQ  =  FCYTTQ,PMS/PYTT>  + U.MSQ 
XEQ  =  FCEX.YEQ>  + U.XEQ 
XNQ  CXMZQ-(SUM  J:  CCJ>>*XESQ>•R.XNQM(1-PLINK> 
+ PLINK*CXMSQ-CSUM  J:  CCJ>>*XESQ)  M PLINK  R.XNQ 
(J:  COUNTRIES  WITH  STRUCTURAL  MODELS)  -
XMQ  =  XNQ  +  XEQ 
CEQ  FCYQ-EX.YEQ-IITQ,PME/PY,IITQ>  + U.CEQ 
MEQ  =CEQ+  XEQ- EX.YEQ 
XESQ  =  XEQ  M R.XESQ 
MESQ  =  MEQ  M R.MESQ 
MMSQ  = l"t1Q  *  PLINK_R.MMSQ 
VOIL  =  FCXESQ/XMSQ> 
NOMINAL  VARIABLES 
XM 
XM 
xs 
XT 
""' 
-- CXMQMPXM/100.) 
=  CXNQ*PXN+XEQ*PXEl/100 
-- CXSQ*PXS/100.) 
-- XM  +  XS  ==  (MNQMPMN+MEQMPME)/100 
CEXCL.  UK) 
CUK  ONLY> 
CUK  ONLY> 
CEXCL.  UK> 
CEXCL.  UK> 
CUK  ONLY> 
CUK  ONLY> 
CUK  ONLY> 
CUK  ONLY> 
<UK  ONLY> 
CUK  ONLY> 
<UK  ONLY> 
(UK  ONLY> 
(UK  ONLY> 
CEXCL.  UK> 
(UK  ONLY) -92-
MS  ==  <MSQMPMS/100.) 
MT  ==  tt1 +  MS 
Y  ==  CPQMPCP/100.  +  ITQMPIT/100.  + liT 
+ CG  +  XT  - MT 
YTT  ==  Y + MT 
CG  =  <1-PGN)MF(EX.LEEGMWC,EX.CNWGQMPCP•R.CG>+PGNMEX.CG 
IG  =  (1-PGN>•<EX.IEGQ+EX.ICGQ>•PIT/100MR.IG+PGN*EX.IG 
liT  =  IITQMPYTT/100  + R.IIT 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
BEHAVIOURAL 
DEFINITIONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
EXTERNAL 
PARAMETER  : 
CCJ> 
CPQ 
CGQ 
ISPQ 
IHPQ 
IITQ 
MNQ 
MEQ 
MSQ 
XSQ 
CEQ 
XEQ 
XQ(J) 
YQ 
ITQ 
IPQ 
IGQ 
XTQ 
MTQ 
MMQ 
YTTQ 
YTDQ 
KAPIQ 
XMQ 
XNQ 
XESQ 
XMZQ 
MESQ 
MMSQ 
XM 
xs 
XT 
tt1 
MN 
MS 
MT 
IG 
CG 
IIT 
y 
YTT 
VOIL 
REAL  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
REAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  STRUCTURES 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  HOUSING 
REAL  TOTAL  INVESTMENT  IN  INVENTORIES 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
REAL  APPARENT  DOMESTIC  CONSUMPTION  OF  ENERGY 
(UK  ONLY) 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY  <UK  ONLY> 
REAL  BILATERAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  TO  TRADE 
PARTNER  J  ,  QUASI-FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  GOP/GNP 
REAL  TOTAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
REAL  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
REAL  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  TOTAL  FINAL  DEMAND 
REAL  TOTAL  DOMESTIC  DEMAND 
REAL  STOCK  OF  INVENTORIES 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  <UK  ONLY> 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY  IN  DOLLAR 
SUM  OF  BILATERAL  REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY  IN  DOLLAR 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR,  CIF 
CUSTOMS  DATA 
NOMINAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
NOMINAL  EXPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
NOMINAL  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
NOMINAL  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
NOMINAL  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
NOMINAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT 
NOMINAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
NOMINAL  INVENTORY  INVESTMENT 
NOMINAL  GOP/GNP 
NOMINAL  FINAL  DEMAND 
SHARE  OF  ENERGY  IN  THE  VOLUME  OF  EXPORTS, 
MOVING  AVERAGE  C  UK  ONLY) 
<OUTPUT  OF  THE  LINKAGE  BLOCK> 
XMSQ  REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  IN  DOLLARS-FOB-
CUSTOMS  DATA 
FIXED  SHARE  OF  TRADE  PARTNER  J  IN  REAL 
ENERGY  EXPORTS  (UK  ONLY> 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  SUPPLY  BLOCK 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IEPQ  FCYTTQ,RL,PY,GOS•UCAP/Y,TIME>  + U.IEPQ 
KAPEQ  ==  (1-DELTA>*KAPEQC-1>  +  IEPQ  + R.KAPEQ 
LEEPPOT  =  F<YQPOT,WC/PY,TIME> 
YQPOT  =  F<KAPEQ,LEEPPOT>  + U.YQPOT 
LEEP  =  F<LEEPPOT/YQPOT•YQ>  + U.LEEP 
UCAP  ==  YQ/YQPOTM100  + R.UCAP 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
BEHAVIOURAL 
IEPQ 
LEEPPOT 
LEEP 
YQPOT 
REAL  PRIVATE  FIXED  INVESTMENT  IN  EQUIPMENT 
POTENTIAL  EMPLOYMENT  IN  THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES  IN  THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
POTENTIAL  OUTPUT DEFINITONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
KAPEQ 
UCAP 
DELTA 
-93-
CAPITAL  STOCK  <PRIVATE  EQUIPMENT> 
DEGREE  OF  CAPACITY  UTILIZATION 
DEPRECIATION  RATE 
*********************************************************************** 
PRICES 
*********************************************************************** 
DEFLATORS: 
PY  -- lOO.*(Y/YQ) 
PXT  ==  lOO.M(XT/XTQ) 
PMT  ==  lOO.*(MT/MTQ> 
PMM  ==  lOO.*(MM/MMQ) 
PYTT  ==  100.*(CPQ*PCP/100+ITQ*PIT/100+IIT+CG+XT>IYTTQ 
PIIT  ==  lOO.*<IIT/IITQ> 
+  BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  EXPLAINING  VALUE-ADDED  PRICES, 
CONSUMER  PRICES,  IMPORT/EXPORT  PRICES  OF  GQ()DS  ETC. 
PCP  = F<EX.VATR,OPEN,PMM,P> 
PIT  = F(OPEN,PMM,P> 
P><M  = F(OPEN,PMM,P,WPXMS,EX.EXCHR> 
P><M  ==  lOO.M()(M/XMQ) 
P><MS  ==  PXM/EX.EXCHR 
PXN  = F(OPEN,PMM,P,WPXNS,EX.EXCHR> 
PXNS  ==  PXN/EX.EXCHR 
PXE  =  F(POIL*EX.EXCHR> 
PXS  =  PY 
PMN  = PMNSZ*EX.EXCHR 
PME  = F<POIL*EX.EXCHR> 
PMES  ==  PME/EX.EXCHR*lOO 
PMS  =  PMN 
P  = F(WC,UCAP,PMM> 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
BEHAVIOURAL 
*U.PCP 
*U.PIT 
*U.PXM 
*PLINK  R.PXMS 
*U.PXN-
*R.PXNS 
*U.PXE 
*R.PXS 
*R.PMN 
*U.PME 
*R.PMES 
*R.PMS 
*U.P 
DEFLATOR  FOR  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  SEVICES 
<EXCL.  UK> 
(UK  ONLY) 
(UK  ONLY> 
(UK  ONLY> 
(UK  ONLY> 
PCP 
PIT 
PXM 
PXS 
PMN 
PME 
PMS 
PXN 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY 
DEFINITIONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
EXTERNAL 
PXE 
p 
py 
PXT 
PMT 
PMN 
PYTT 
PIIT 
PXNS 
PMES 
PXMS 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  SERVICES 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
(UK  ONLY> 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  ENERGY  (UK  ONLY) 
VALUE-ADDED  PRICES 
DEFLATOR  OF  GOP 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  EXPORTS 
DEFLATOR  OF  TOTAL  IMPORTS 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS 
DEFLATOR  OF  FINAL  DEMAND 
DEFLATOR  OF  INVENTORY  INVESTMENT 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS, 
IN  DOLLARS  (UK  ONLY> 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  ENERGY,  IN  DOLLARS 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS,  IN  DOLLARS 
FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
POIL  :  PETROLEUM  SPOT  PRICE  IN  DOLLAR/BARREL 
OPEN  :  TREND  OF  OPENNESS  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  MARKET 
(OUTPUT  OF  THE  LINKAGE  BLOCK> 
PMNSZ  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  PRICE  INDEX  IN  DOLLAR 
QUASI-FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
WP><MS  DOUBLE-WEIGHTED  COMPETITORS'  EXPORT  PRICES 
OF  GOoDS  IN  DOLLAR 
FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
WPXNS  DOUBLE-WEIGHTED  COMPETITORS'  EXPORT  PRICES 
OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS  IN  DOLLAR  <UK  ONLY> 
FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA -94-
*********************************************************************** 
LABOUR  MARKET  <WAGES,EMPLOYMENT  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT> 
*********************************************************************** 
LE  ==  LEE+EX.LSE 
LEE  -- LEEP+EX.LEEG 
LU  -- <EX.L-LE> 
LUR  ==  100.*LU/EX.L 
UPRO  ==  1000000.*YQ/LE 
WC  ==  1000000.MYWH/LEE 
ULC  ==  (WC/UPRO>*R.ULC 
+  BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  EXPLAINING  EMPLOYMENT 
EARNINGS,  WAGE  COSTS  ETC. 
= F<PCP,PY,LUR,UPRO>  + U.WR 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
BEHAVIOURAL 
DEFINITIONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
STRUCTURAL 
LE 
LEE 
LU 
LUR 
UPRO 
we 
ULC 
EX.POPT 
EX.POPW 
EX.L 
EX.LSE 
EX.LEEG 
WAGE  RATE  PER  EMPLOYEE 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT 
TOTAL  NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
LABOUR  PRODUCTIVITY  PER  PERSON  EMPLOYED 
WAGE  COST  PER  EMPLOYEE 
UNIT  LABOUR  COST  INDEX 
TOTAL  POPULATION 
POPULATION  IN  WORKING  AGE 
TOTAL  LABOUR  FORCE 
NUMBER  OF  SELF-EMPLOYED 
NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES  IN  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR 
*********************************************************************** 
SECTORAL  INCOMES 
*********************************************************************** 
YWB  -- <LEE*WR/1000000.) 
YWH  -- YWB  + sec  + vwo 
GOS  -- Y - YWH  - TI  + SUB  + R.GOS 
YDH  ==  YWB  +  TPH  +  YWO  +  YNWH  - TYH  - SCH 
YDHQ  -- YDH*100./PCP 
YC  -- GOS  - YNWH  +  INTG  -YG  +  <1-PARGNP>*<YX  + R.YC> 
+ PARGNP*GOS*R.YC 
+  QUASI-BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  FOR  PROFIT  AND  PROPERTY  INCOME 
AND  OTHER  LABOUR  INCOME 
=  EX.YWOR*<YWB>  YWO 
YNWH 
YG 
INTG 
=  F<EX.LSE*WR,GOS+INTG+YX*(l-PARGNP>>  = EX.YGR*<GOS> 
+ U.YNWH 
-- RDG*DEBT/400 
ENDOGENOUS 
QUASI-BEHAVIOURAL 
YWO 
YNWH 
YG 
INTG 
DEFINITIONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
STRUCTURAL 
YWB 
YWH 
GOS 
YDH 
YDHQ 
YC 
EX.YGR 
EX.YWOR 
OTHER  LABOUR  INCOME 
NON  WAGE  INCOME  OF  HOUSEHOLDS 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  TRADING  SURPLUS  AND  PROFIT 
INTEREST  PAYMENT  ON  PUBLIC  DEBT 
WAGE  BILL 
COMPENSATION  OF  EMPLOYEES 
GROSS  OPERATING  SURPLUS 
HOUSEHOLDS  DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS  REAL  DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
COMPANIES  PROFIT  BEFORE  TAX 
PROFIT  SHARE  OF  GOVERNMENT 
AVERAGE  OTHER  LABOUR  INCOME  RATE -95-
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  :  OPTIONS  FOR  INSTRUMENTS 
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
IG  -- EX.IGMPGN  +  <<EX.IEGQ+EX.ICGQ)MPIT/lOO.MR.IG)M(l-PGN> 
IGQ 
CG 
CGQ 
SUB 
-- -- -- --
CEX.IGM100./PIT>*R.IGQMPGN  +  CEX.IEGQ+EX.ICGQ)M(l-PGN> 
EX.CGMPGN  +  CEX.LEEGMWC/1000000+EX.CNWGQMPCP/100*R.CG)M(1-PGN> 
FCEX.CG,WC,PCP>MR.CGQMPGN  + FCEX.CNWGQ,EX.LEEG)M(1-PGN> 
EX.SUBMPGN  +  CEX.SUBQMPY/100.)M(1-PGN> 
ENDOGENOUS: 
DEFINITIONS 
EXOGENOUS  : 
POLICY 
CGQ/CG 
IEGQ,ICGQ/IG 
SUBQ/SUB 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
(EQUIPMENT,  CONSTRUCTION,  TOTAL> 
SUBSIDIES 
EX.CGQ/EX.CG  :  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION 
EX.IEGQ,EX.ICGQ/EX.IG  : 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
CEQUIPMENT,  CONSTRUCTION,  TOTAL> 
EX.SUBQ/EX.SUB:  SUBSIDIES 
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS,  TAXES  AND  TRANSFERS 
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
sec  = EX.SCCRM('(Iol3) 
SCH  = EX.SCHRM(Yiol3) 
TYH  = F<Yiol3  +  YNWH  +  TPH>  + U.TYH 
TYC  EX.TYCRMCYC> 
TI  = CEX.VATR/C1.+EX.VATR>>* 
CPQMPCP/100+EX.TIRMCY+MT> 
TPH  = FCPCP,LUR> 
ENDOGENOUS 
BEHAVIOURAL 
TYH 
TPH 
QUASI-BEHAVIOURAL 
sec 
SCH 
TYC 
TI 
EXOGENOUS  : 
POLICY 
EX.SCCR 
EX.SCHR 
EX.TYCR 
EX. TIR 
EX.VATR 
+ U.TPH 
INCOME  TAX 
NET  CURRENT  TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY  HOUSEHOLDS 
EMPLOYERS  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 
EMPLOYEES  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 
CORPORATE  PROFIT  TAX 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
AVERAGE  EMPLOYER  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTION  RATE 
AVERAGE  EMPLOYEE  SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTION  RATE 
AVERAGE  CORPORATE  PROFIT  TAX  RATE 
OTHER  INDIRECT  TAX  RATE 
VALUE-ADDED  TAX  RATE 
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
NET  ACQUISITIONS  OF  FINANCIAL  ASSETS,SAVINGS  RATIO  AND  GOVERNMENT  DEBT 
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 
SAVH  YDH  - CPQMPCP/100. 
SAVHR  -- 100.*SAVH/YDH 
SAVC  YC  - TYC  +  PARGNPMR.SAVCMGOS 
SAVG  -- - CG  +  YG  +  CTYH  +  TYC  + SCC  + SCH  + TI> 
- SUB  -INTG  -TPH  + R.SAVGMTPH 
DEFG  -- - SAVG  +  IG  + R.DEFGMITQMPIT/100. 
DEBT  -- DEBTC-1)  + DEFG 
ENDOGENOUS 
DEFINITIONS 
SAVH 
SAVHR 
SAVC 
SAVG 
DEFG 
DEBT 
HOUSEHOLDS'  SAVING 
HOUSEHOLDS'  SAVING  RATIO 
COMPANIES'  SAVING 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  SAVING 
GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  DEFICIT 
NOMINAL  GOVERNMENT  DEBT -96-
*********************************************************************** 
BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS 
*********************************************************************** 
YXX  =  XT*EX.YXXR 
YXM  = MT*EX.YXMR 
YX  -- YXX  - YXM 
BPT  NA==  XT  - MT  +  C1-PARGNP>*YX 
BPC-NA==  BPT  NA- EX.TPX 
BPC- ==  BPC-NA  +  CRC.XM  +  RC.XS  - RC.MM  - RC.MS 
- Rf.TPX> 
+  QUASI  BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  EXPLAINING  THE  RECONCIALIATION 
FACTORS  OF  NA  AND  BOP  DATA 
RC.XM  = 
RC.XS  = 
RC.MM  = 
RC.MS  = 
RC.YX  = 
RC.TPX  = 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
DEFINITIONS 
FCXM> 
FCXS> 
FCMM> 
FCMS> 
FCYX> 
FCEX.TPX> 
YX 
BPT  NA 
BPC-NA 
BPC-
QUASI-BEHAVIOURAL 
YXX 
YXM 
RC.MM 
RC.MS 
RC.XM 
RC.XS 
RC.YX 
RC.TPX 
EXOGENOUS  : 
EXTERNAL 
EX.TPX 
+  R.RC.XM 
+  R.RC.XS 
+  R.RC.MM 
+  R.RC.MS 
+  R.RC.YX 
+  R.RC.TPX 
NET  FACTOR  INCOME  FROM  ABROAD 
BALANCE  ON  GOODS  AND  SERVICES  NA  BASED 
CURRENT  BALANCE  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  BASED 
CURRENT  BALANCE  BOP  BASED 
FACTOR  INCOME  FROM  ABROAD 
FACTOR  INCot'E  PAID  ABROAD 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  IMP.OF  GOODS 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  IMP.OF  SERVICES 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  EXP.OF  GOODS 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  EXP.OF  SERVICES 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  NET  FACTOR  INC. 
RECONCILIATION  FACTOR  NA/BOP  FOR  NET  TRANSFERS 
NET  UNREQUITED  TRANSFERS  PAID  ABROAD 
CNA  DEFINITION> 
*********************************************************************** 
TRADE-FEEDBACK  MODELS 
*********************************************************************** 
OIL  EXPORTERS  :  NETHERLANDS,  UNITED  KINGDOM,  CANADA,  AUSTRALIA,  NORWAY, 
OPEC,  CENTRALLY  PLANNED  ECONOMIES,  REST  OF  WORLD  ZONE 
NON-OIL  EXPORTERS  :  REMAINING  COUNTRIES/ZONES 
MMSQ 
PXMS 
=  FCXMSQ,PXMS/PMMS> 
= FCVOIL,POIL,EXCHR,PMNSZ> 
=  FCEXCHR,PMNSZ> 
+  U.MMSQ 
*  R.PXMS  COIL  EXPORTERS> 
*  U.PXMS  CNON-OIL  EXPORTERS> 
ENDOGENOUS  : 
BEHAVIOURAL 
MMSQ 
PXMS 
REAL  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS,  IN  DOLLARS 
CIF  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS,  IN  DOLLARS 
FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
EXTERNAL  :  <OUTPUT  FROM  TRADE  LINKAGE> 
PMMS 
PMNSZ 
XMSQ 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  GOODS,  IN  DOLLARS 
CIF  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
DEFLATOR  OF  IMPORTS  OF  NON-ENERGY  GOODS 
IN  DOLLARS,  QUASI-FOB  - 1980=100  - CUSTOMS  DATA 
REAL  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS,  IN  DOLLARS 
FOB  - CUSTOMS  DATA -97-
*********************************************************************** 
LIN<AGE  BLOCK 
*********************************************************************** 
OIL  EXPORTERS  :  NETHERLANDS,  UNITED  KINGDOM,  CANADA,  AUSTRALIA,  NO~Y, 
OPEC,  CENTRALLY  PLANNED  ECONOMIES,  REST  OF  WORLD  ZONE 
NON-OIL  EXPORTERS  :  REMAINING  COUNTRIES/ZONES 
STRUCTURAL  MODEL  COUNTRIES  :  GERMANY,  FRANCE,  UNITED  KINGDOM, 
UNITED  STATES 
TRADE-FEEDBACK  COUNTRIES  :  REMAINING  COUNTRIES/ZONES 
INDEX  I 
INDEX  J 
INDEX  K 
FOR  THE  EXPORTING  COUNTRY  OR  ZONE 
FOR  THE  IMPORTING  COUNTRY  OR  ZONE 
FOR  THE  EXPORTING/IMPORTING  COUNTRY  OR  ZONE  OR  REGIONAL 
AGGREGATION 
LINKAGE  SYSTEM  IN  DOLLARS: 
PXNSCI> 
l't1S(J) 
l't1SZ<J> 
l't1SZQ<J> 
=  <PXMS<I>**Cl/(1-VOIL<I>>> 
/CPOIL/PPOIL*100>**CVOIL<I>IC1-VOIL<I>>>  *  R.PXNS<I> 
COIL  EXPORTERS  EXCLUDING  OPEC  AND  UK> 
==  PXMS<I>  <NON-OIL  EXPORTERS> 
==  Pl't1SCJ>•MMSQCJ)/100 
=  F<MMS<J>>  + U.MMSZ<J> 
==  MMSZCJ)/PMMSZ(J)M100 
+ BEHAVIOURAL  EQUATIONS  EXPLAINING  EXPORTS  OF  GOODS  FROM  I  TO  J 
XX<I,J> 
ONE<J> 
X<I,J> 
XMS<I> 
PMMSZ<J> 
= PXMS<I>*<F<MMSZQ<J>,PXNS<I>IPMNSZCJ>> 
<I:  NON-OIL  EXPORTERS> 
= PXMS<I>*<F<I't1SZQ(J),VOIL,PXNS(I)/PMNSZ<J>> 
<I:  OIL  EXPORTERS  EXCLUDING  OPEC  AND  UK> 
= PXMS<I>*<F<MMSZQCJ),VOIL,PXNS<I>IPMNSZ<J>> 
<I:  UK,  J:  TRADE-FEEDBACK  COUNTRIES> 
= PXMS<I>*<C<J>*XESQCUK>+F<MMSZQCJ>-MESQ(J), 
PXNSCI)/PMNSZ(J)) 
<I:  UK,  J:  STRUCTURAL  MODEL  COUNTRIES> 
= PXMS<I>*<F<MMSZQ<J>> 
<I:  OPEC,  J:  TRADE-FEEDBACK  COUNTRIES> 
= PXMS<I>•<-C<J>*XESQCUK>+F<MESQ(J)) 
<I:  OPEC,  J:  STRUCTURAL  MODEL  COUNTRIES> 
==  MMSZCJ)/SUM<I:  XXCI,J)) 
==  ONE<J>*XXCI,J> 
==  SUMCJ:  XCI,J)) 
==  SUM<I:  XCI,J))/SUMCI:  XCI,J)/PXMS<I>> 
+ U.XX<I ,J)) 
+  U. XX <I ,J)  > 
+ U.XX<I,J>> 
+ U.XX<I,J)) 
+  U.  XX <I,  J >  > 
+ U. XX<I,J» 
LINKAGE  OUTPUT  DATA  TO  COUNTRY  MODELS  IN  DOLLARS: 
XMSQ<I>  ==  XMS<I>IPXMS<I>*100 
PMNSZ(J)  ==  SUMCI:  X<I,J))/SUMCI:  XCI,J)/PXNS<I>>  (I:  EXCLUDES  OPEC> 
PMMS(J)  = FCPMMSZCJ))  *  U.PMMS(J)  <TRADE-FEEDBACK  COUNTRIES> 
WPXMS<I>  ==  SUM<J:  XCI,J)MSUMCK:  X<K,J))/ 
SUMCK:  XCK,J>IPXMS<K>>>ISUM(J:  XCI,J>> 
<SUMMATIONS  OVER  K EXCLUDE  I> 
WPXNSCI>  ==  SUMCJ:  XCI,J>*SUM<K:  XCK,J))/ 
SUM<K:  XCK,J)/PXNS<K>>>ISUMCJ:  X<I,J>> 
<I:  UK  ONLY,  SUMMATIONS  OVER  K EXCLUDE  UK  AND  OPEC> 
EX.EXCHR<J>==  EXCHR<Jl/DOLLAR  <STRUCTURAL  COUNTRY  MODELS> 
EXCHR<J>  ==  1/DOLLAR  <TRADE-FEEDBACK  MODELS> 
PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS: 
IH'ISQ<I) 
XW't(I) 
PXWP<I> 
==  SUM(J:  XCI,J)MMMSQ(J))/SUM(J:  XCI,J)) 
=  XMSQCI>IWMMSQ(I) 
=  PXMSCI)/WPXMS<I> 
REGIONAL  AGGREGATIONS: 
EC12  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES 
ROEC  OECD  EXCLUDING  EUR12 
OECD  OECD  COUNTRIES 
NODC  NON-OIL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  <NICS  +  REST  OF  WORLD  ZONE> 
WT  WORLD 
MMS<K>  ==  SUM(J:  MMS<J>>  <K  EC12,ROEC,OECD,NOOC,WT> 
MMSQ<K>  ==  SUM<J:  MMSQ<J>>  <K  EC12,ROEC,OECD,N<>DC,WT> 
PMMS<K>  ==  MMS(K)/MMSQ<K>*100  <K  EC12,ROEC,OECD,NODC,WT> 
MMSZQ<K>  ==  SUM<J:  MMSZQ<J>>  <K  EC12,ROEC,OECD,NODC,WT> 
XMS<K>  ==  SUM<I:  XMSCI>>  CK  EC12,ROEC,OECD,NODC,WT> 
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